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Abstract
In the United Kingdom, there is a system for the co-ordination of the 
emergency services in response to disasters - The Emergency M anagement 
Combined Response System (EMCRS). It is a complex three tier command 
and control system. It was set up in response to a need for better co­
ordination between agencies, when they respond to disasters.
This research has developed models of the EMCRS that support diagnosis 
of co-ordination problems between agencies. Data for the modelling was 
acquired by means of training exercises. The co-ordination problems were 
identified through behaviour conflicts between the agencies. For example, 
the Fire Service behaviours of setting up a cordon around the disaster site 
conflict w ith the Ambulance Service behaviours of accessing the site for 
treatm ent of casualties.
In the course of EMCRS model development, the scope of an existing 
framework was extended to accommodate EMCRS characteristics, which 
are general to: (i) systems with more than one level of operation and 
interactions between the levels; (ii) systems that do not have stable 
membership; and (iii) systems where there are trade-offs between different 
parts of the system that affect performance. For example, the framework 
extension for (ii) is to include time lines and a symbol that denotes 
additional structures.
The EMCRS models constitute substantive Hum an Com puter Interaction 
design knowledge, that is, knowledge that is both explicit and supports 
design. Such knowledge supports design practice directly, as the diagnosis 
of design problems, and indirectly, as the prescription of design solutions. 
An initial m ethod for coordination design problem diagnosis by means of 
EMCRS models is also proposed. The strengths and weaknesses of the 
research are identified and discussed. Future work w ould be to apply the 
extended framework to data from an actual disaster to validate the 
EMCRS models.
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Chapter 1
Research Background
This research is intended to constitute Hum an Com puter Interaction (HCI) 
substantive design knowledge, in the form of models that support 
diagnosis of specific design problems, and reasoning about potential 
solutions to these problems. One view of HCI (Long, 1996), is that of an 
engineering design discipline, whose research validates design 
knowledge, both substantive and methodological. Design knowledge 
supports design practice as the diagnosis of design problems and the 
prescription of design solutions. Long and Dowell (1989) propose the 
discipline of HCI as the application of HCI knowledge, to support design 
practices, intended to solve HCI design problems. They identify validated 
engineering principles as a type of knowledge that best supports HCI 
practice. These principles would therefore support the design of general 
solutions to general classes of HCI design problems. The development of 
such principles represents a long-term goal for an engineering design 
discipline of HCI. Design-oriented frameworks are one form of HCI 
knowledge, which is both explicit and is intended to support design 
directly. Such frameworks provide the basis for modelling specific design 
problems. Their purpose is to enable designers to reason more effectively 
about potential design solutions. Frameworks lack the 'guarantee' of 
validated engineering principles. Instead, they support the practices of 
' specify-and-implement'. That is, practices where design proceeds through 
iterations of successive cycles of specification and implementation. Such 
frameworks support the designer in producing better specifications at an 
earlier stage of design, thus reducing costly iteration. These frameworks 
produce models of the systems under investigation, that support diagnosis 
of design problems, and reasoning about design solutions. The aim of the 
current research is to develop such models for the Emergency 
M anagement Combined Response System (EMCRS) -  a system that 
manages the response of the emergency services to disasters, that support 
diagnosis of EMCRS coordination design problems and reasoning about 
design solutions to these problems.
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Introduction
This chapter presents the aims and the background to the research, 
presented in the following chapters. The research is carried out within the 
field of HCI, and the domain studied is emergency management. Section 1 
gives a brief introduction to the domain of study and theoretical 
background to the research. Section 2 presents the aims of the research. 
Section 3 gives a detailed description of the emergency m anagem ent 
system to be studied. Section 4 presents background literature from HCI 
and other relevant areas of study. Section 5 gives a brief outline of the 
framework, applied for use in this research. Section 6 gives a summary of 
the chapter.
1.1 Background
1.1.1 Domain of study
Emergency management is an example of a m ulti-user planning 
environment, which requires operators to deal w ith emergency situations. 
Controlling these situations requires the co-ordination of num erous 
agents, who share the various specific tasks, which fulfil the overall goal of 
making the situation stable. These tasks involve a num ber of people, often 
geographically distributed, working simultaneously (rather than 
sequentially) as a team towards the achievement of shared goals. The 
development of systems for emergency management, therefore, demands 
the analysis and modelling of co-operative work tasks, placing strong 
emphasis on the capture and representation of concurrent task activities, 
involving multiple agents.
On 11th September 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre left 
343 fire fighters dead. The enquiry into the emergency services response 
to the disaster, by McKinsey consultants (McKinsey 2002), found that the 
fire fighters had little or even no co-ordination within their service. Many 
crews proceeded to the Twin Towers without first informing their 
commanders. Once inside the building, the crews were unable to 
communicate with their commanders, due to equipm ent failures. There 
was also little or no co-ordination with other services, such as Police and 
Ambulance. The report made 12 recommendations for changes in training
10
and procedures for the Fire Service - intended to produce a more effective 
system of inter-agency co-ordination. This report, then, identifies co­
ordination as a major problem in the emergency services' response to the 
disaster.
In the United Kingdom, there exists a system for the co-ordination of the 
emergency services in response to disasters, such as explosions, air crashes 
etc. - the Emergency Management Combined Response System (EMCRS) 
(Dealing with Disaster 1994, 2001). This system manages, that is, plans 
and controls, agencies, such as Fire and Police, when they respond to 
disasters. The EMCRS was set up  to support better co-ordination between 
agencies responding to disasters. However, a succession of enquiries into 
disasters e.g. H idden (1989), Fennel (1988) have identified problems with 
EMCRS co-ordination, not dissimilar to those revealed by the McKinsey 
report.
The background to the domain of study has now been presented. The 
next section presents the background to the theoretical basis of the 
research.
1.1.2 Grounding in HCI
As stated in the introduction to the thesis, one view of HCI (Long, 1996) is 
that of an engineering design discipline, whose research acquires and 
validates design knowledge, both substantive and methodological.
Design knowledge supports design practice as the diagnosis of design 
problems and the prescription of design solutions (Long, 1996). Long and 
Dowell (1989) propose the discipline of HCI as the application of HCI 
knowledge, to support design practices, intended to solve HCI design 
problems. However, existing knowledge in the form of craft and applied 
science (Long and Dowell, 1989) has serious shortcomings. First, craft 
knowledge exists implicitly in the expertise of experienced designers.
Thus, it is not publicly available for inspection and developm ent and has 
an unknown scope of application. Second, applied science knowledge 
from relevant academic disciplines (such as Psychology, Linguistics and 
Sociology), although it may be scientifically validated, supports design 
only implicitly and indirectly. The knowledge supports explanation and 
prediction, and so understanding, rather than diagnosis and prescription,
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and so design. (Smith et al, 1997). Long and Dowell (1989) describe a third 
type of knowledge to support HCI practice: engineering principles. Such 
principles would be validated with respect to their support for design. 
They would support the design of general solutions to general classes of 
HCI design problems. The development of such validated engineering 
principles represents a long-term goal for an engineering design discipline 
of HCI. Design-oriented frameworks are one form of HCI knowledge, 
which is both explicit and is intended to support design directly, unlike 
craft and applied science. Such frameworks provide the basis for 
modelling specific design problems. Their purpose is to enable designers 
to reason more effectively about potential design solutions. Frameworks 
lack the 'guarantee' of validated engineering principles. Instead, they 
support the practices of 'specify-and-implement'. That is, practices where 
design proceeds through iterations of successive cycles of specification 
and implementation. Such frameworks support the designer in producing 
better specifications at an earlier stage of design, thus reducing costly 
iteration.
1.2 Aims
The aim of the present research is to develop models of the EMCRS that 
support the diagnosis of EMCRS co-ordination design problems and the 
reasoning about solutions to these problems. To develop such models a 
design-oriented framework is required, that supports modelling of the 
EMCRS - a distributed cognitive planning and control system, comprising 
more than one user, or groups of users, whose activities m ust be co­
ordinated for effective performance. One such fram ework was developed 
for a class of HCI design problem, expressed as the planning and control 
of multiple task (HCI-PCMT) work in office administration (Smith et al., 
1997) (see later for details). The office administration domains previously 
modelled by the HCI-PCMT framework were single user planning and 
control systems. Application of the HCI-PCMT framework to model the 
EMCRS would, thus, extend the scope of the framework to accommodate 
multi-user planning and control systems. The models produced would 
identify planning and control co-ordination design problems and thus 
diagnose ineffective performance. A diagnosis m ethod for application of
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the framework will also be proposed. Performance is expressed as a 
function of the task quality of the work (how well it is performed), and the 
resource costs (workload) of the worksystem. The modelling framework 
enables performance diagnosis by making a distinction between the 
worksystem (and its resource costs) and the work dom ain (and its task 
quality). Thus, the EMCRS model is intended to constitute HCI 
substantive design knowledge to support the diagnosis of EMCRS design 
problems. Prescription of solutions to these problems will not be 
attempted, as this is beyond the scope of the current research, but 
suggested prescriptions will be proposed to clarify the nature of the 
diagnoses.
1.3 Emergency Management for Disaster Response
Emergency M anagement is the management of the m ultiple emergency 
services in response to emergency situations, in the case of this research, 
specifically disasters. In the context of emergency planning, the definition 
of disaster adopted here is as follows:
'Any event (happening with or w ithout warning) causing or threatening 
death or injury, damage to property or environment or disruption to the 
community, which because of the scale of its effects cannot be dealt with 
by the emergency service and local authorities as part of their day-to-day 
activities (Dealing with Disaster, 1994)/
This definition encompasses those used by the emergency services for a 
'major incident7. In defining a major incident, the emergency services 
recognise that there will be a need for special arrangements to be brought 
into play, in response to such an incident for: the rescue and transport of a 
large num ber of casualties; the involvement, either directly or indirectly, 
of large num bers of people; the handling of a large num ber of enquiries, 
likely to be generated by both the public and the news media, usually to 
the Police; and any incident that requires the large scale combined 
resources of the three emergency services; the mobilisation and 
organisation of the emergency services and supporting organisations, e.g. 
Local Authority, to cater for the threat of death, serious injury or 
homelessness to a large number of people (Emergency Planning College,
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1996). However, not every major incident will become a disaster; for 
example, a serious accident on a motorway will be a major incident, if it 
dem ands special arrangements on the part of the Police, Fire and 
Ambulance Services, but unless it has some wider ranging effects on the 
community, it is unlikely to be regarded as a disaster. Causes of disaster 
may be sudden and unpredictable. However, certain kinds of industrial 
activity carry known risks and are subject to legal requirements for 
emergency planning. These cases include known chemical or nuclear 
hazards at fixed locations, where the most probable types of incident, and 
their likely consequences, are largely foreseeable. It is, therefore, possible 
to make detailed plans in advance for the appropriate action to be taken. 
There are also specialist emergency service units, often on the industrial 
site, who will initially react to any incident. The general emergency 
service teams from the wider area will not necessarily become involved in 
such incidents. Therefore, these types of incident will not be covered by 
this research, as it focuses on the emergency system set up  for the 
management of more wide-ranging disasters/m ajor incidents.
The initial response to a disaster is usually provided by the emergency 
services, supported by the local authority, but many agencies can become 
involved. The common objectives to a disaster response, as declared by the 
Home Office are:
• To save life.
• To prevent escalation of the disaster.
• To relieve suffering.
• To protect property.
• To safeguard the environment.
• To facilitate criminal investigation and judicial, public, technical or other 
inquiries.
• To restore normality as soon as possible.
Each service or agency working at the scene of a disaster has its own role 
and functions: (Dealing with Disasters, 2nd Edition 1994).
• The Police co-ordinate all those responding at and around the scene.
• The Fire Service are to rescue people and to prevent further escalation of 
the disaster by tackling fires or dealing with other hazards.
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• The Ambulance Service, with the medical incident officer and medical 
teams seek to save life, through effective emergency treatm ent and 
transporting the injured in order of priority to hospital.
• HM Coastguard initiates and co-ordinates civil maritime rescue, which 
includes mobilising, organising and dispatching resources to assist 
people in distress at sea or in danger on the cliffs or shoreline.
• The Local Authorities support the emergency services, as well as the 
local and w ider community and co-ordinate the response by 
organisations, other than the emergency services.
• Volunteers contribute to a wide range of activities, either as individuals 
or as members of a voluntary organisation.
• Industrial or commercial organisations may play a direct part in the 
response to disaster, if their personnel, operations or services have been 
involved.
• Military assistance may be used in support of civil authorities.
• Central government may provide advice or support.
More specifically the role of the Police is:
• The saving of life in conjunction with other emergency services.
• Co-ordination of the emergency services and other organisations, during 
the immediate response phase.
• Protection and preservation of the scene.
• Investigation of the incident in conjunction with other investigative 
bodies.
• Collation and dissemination of casualty information.
• Identification of victims.
• Restoration of normality.
The role of the Ambulance Service is:
• The saving of life in conjunction with other emergency services.
• To provide a focal point for all National Health Service and other 
medical resources.
• The treatm ent and care of injured persons.
• Determination of the priority evacuation of the injured.
• Determining the main receiving and supporting hospitals.
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• Arranging and ensuring the most appropriate means of transporting the 
injured.
• Restoration of normality.
The role of the Fire Service is:
• The saving of life in conjunction with other emergency services.
• Tackling fires, released chemicals and other hazardous situations.
• Rescue of trapped casualties.
• Safety of all personnel, involved in the rescue work.
• Information gathering and hazard assessment.
• Assisting the Ambulance Service at casualty loading points.
• Assisting the Police with recovery of bodies.
• Restoration of normality.
There is a continuum by which the emergency services distinguish 
different types of accident. The classification of the incident will 
determine the type of system that is set up to deal with it. For a simple 
accident, the emergency services have their own plans. For a major 
incident, the emergency services have different planning procedures, 
which allow the interaction between all the emergency services. With 
disasters, it is different again. There is a senior co-ordinating group 
(comprising a senior Police, Fire and Ambulance Officer), who oversee the 
work of the emergency services. The more serious the situation is 
perceived to be, the more levels of planning are pu t into operation.
Overall control is taken away from the actual emergency services dealing 
with the disaster situation.
The planning and control system, which is set up for emergency response 
to a disaster, is that of the 'combined' response. The combined response 
system has a command and control organisation with a three tier 
structure. This system will be referred to as the EMCRS (Emergency 
M anagement Combined Response System). The EMCRS is a generic 
management framework, which has been agreed nationally which:
• Defines relationships between differing levels of management.
• Allows each agency to tailor its own response to plans to interface with 
the plans of others.
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• Ensures all parties involved understand their relative roles in the 
combined response.
• Retains sufficient flexibility of option to suit local circumstances to 
enable the emergency services to interact effectively (Dealing with 
Disaster, 1994; 2001).
All the different agencies should use this structure to organise their own 
planning procedures, so that they interface effectively w ith each other. The 
three levels are operational, tactical and strategic (sometimes referred to as 
bronze, silver and gold). At each level, each of the agencies has its own 
commander for co-ordinating the response. At the strategic level, these 
commanders make up a senior co-ordinating group. The operational 
response is carried out by each agency, concentrating on their specific 
tasks within their areas of responsibility, e.g. the Fire Service fighting fires. 
The tactical response determines the priority in allocating resources. It 
also plans and co-ordinates the overall response, obtaining other resources 
as required, for example additional fire engines. The strategic co­
ordinating group has to formulate the overall policy within which the 
response to a major incident will be made. At the strategic level, there is 
one person from each emergency service. Under the EMCRS, the 
management of the response to major emergencies will normally be 
undertaken at one or more of the three levels. The degree of m anagement 
required will depend on the nature and scale of the emergency. The 
following is a representation of the EMCRS:
Strategic level 
Tactical level
Operational
level
Senior co-ordinating group
Fire Police Ambulance
Service Service Service
Fire Police Ambulance
Service Service Service
There needs to be co-ordination at all levels of the EMCRS, so that the 
disaster situation is brought under control, as quickly and efficiently as 
possible. There needs to be co-ordination at each level w ithin the hierarchy 
and between the levels. One of the main mechanisms by which the
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performance of any planning system is affected, is that of coordination. 
This mechanism is required, because each problem-solving agent only 
possesses a local view and incomplete information and, therefore, m ust 
co-ordinate with other agents to achieve globally coherent and efficient 
solutions. In emergency management, there is not only coordination 
between each problem solving agent w ithin one group, bu t also co­
ordination between each agency (which is m ade up of many single agents) 
on a horizontal level, and vertical co-ordination between the different 
command levels. As stated in the introduction earlier, co-ordination, or 
rather lack of co-ordination, has been identified as a major factor in the 
ineffective response of the emergency services to disasters (Auf de Heide, 
1989).
The aim of this research is to attempt to diagnose these co-ordination 
problems with respect to the planning and control of the EMCRS. The 
emergency services' response to disasters has different phases. First, there 
is the initial response, when the situation is usually fairly chaotic. Second, 
the response some time later (which could be a few hours, maybe longer 
depending on the scale of the incident), when the situation is more stable. 
Last, the restoration of normality phase, when the actual incident has been 
brought under control, but the situation has not returned to normal. 
Within each of these phases, the emergency services will have different 
roles/tasks that they need to carry out. During the initial response phase, 
the tasks being carried out by the emergency services will be their primary 
tasks in response to the situation, e.g. Fire Service fighting fires, 
Ambulance Service treating casualties. Collaboration, coordination and 
communication are thus, vital at the initial response stage (Dealing with 
Disaster, 2001). Coordination problems, occurring between services in the 
initial response phase, will, therefore, have more of a detrimental effect on 
EMCRS performance than coordination problems occurring at other 
phases, when the tasks being carried out are not dealing with the initial 
effects of the situation. Data collected for use in the modelling of the 
EMCRS will thus need to include the initial phase as a priority. The level 
of description of the data is also important. At a major incident, there are 
potentially three levels of operation -  operational, tactical and strategic. 
The operational level will have lots of personnel and their resources, who
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are physically responding to the disaster. Data at this level of description, 
will not be required to inform the modelling, partly because these data 
risk making the model too complex, and so difficult to apply, but mainly 
because the aim of the research is to identify planning and control co­
ordination problems between the different services, not between the 
different personnel of each service, or within personnel of the same 
service. As each agency has it own roles/ tasks that m ust be carried out in 
response to a disaster, it is suggested that this level will be the lowest 
description for the data. An example task, for the Fire Service, w ould be 
to fight fires. A description of the behaviours associated with this task 
would be given at the level of description of firemen and fire equipm ent -  
not Fireman 1 plus Fire Hose 1, Fireman 2 plus Fire Hose 2 etc.
The EMCRS is thus a complex system interacting with a complex dynamic 
situation. There are multiple agencies, with m ultiple personnel, at 
multiple levels of command, carrying out concurrent task activities. The 
HCI-PCMT has been chosen for modelling the EMCRS because: the 
framework is for modelling planning and control systems of which the 
EMCRS is an example; the work involves multiple tasks; there is a need to 
identify the tasks and behaviours of the worksystem in relationship to its 
work, better to identify coordination problems w ithin the EMCRS; and the 
framework supports directly the diagnosis of design problems and so 
ineffective performance (and indirectly prescription of design solutions). 
Chapter 2 presents the HCI-PCMT framework in detail.
The following sections outline other models and frameworks from the HCI 
and Emergency Management literature that were not viewed as suitable 
for developing the EMCRS models.
1.4 Frameworks and models from HCI and other relevant 
literature
Frameworks and models are prevalent in the HCI literature (Long 1987; 
Whitefield 1990). However, most models of interaction are task based 
(Wright et al., 2000). Traditional task analysis m ethods such as GOMS 
(Card et al, 1983), Hierarchical Task Analysis (Shepherd, 1989), Task 
Knowledge Structures (Johnson, 1992), based on observable actions may 
not be appropriate for analysing complex work domains. (Moray et al,
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1992). These methods of task analysis do not account for the variability of 
behaviour that is observed in complex systems. (Vicente, 1990). Other 
analysis techniques, such as protocol analysis, video analysis, discourse 
analysis, conversation analysis, interaction analysis, cognitive task 
analysis, and sequential data analysis, use naturally unfolding events as 
data. (Sanderson and Fischer 1994). However, the data collected from 
such techniques is qualitative. How to use these analysed data to produce 
design solutions is not made clear. Other more advanced techniques such 
as the Interaction Framework (Blandford, Harrison and Barnard, 1995), 
have been developed to aid the design of interactive systems involving 
two or more agents, and for evaluating such systems. The Interaction 
Framework will produce interactional requirements for a system.
However any design solutions proposed, do not take considerations, other 
than interactional ones, into account (Blandford et al, 1995).
All of the frameworks, methods, or analysis techniques mentioned so far, 
do not use an ecological perspective, as an approach to HCI. The 
ecological perspective takes its name from an approach to psychology that 
was advanced by Brunswik (1956) and Gibson (1979). The approach 
viewed Psychology as the study of the interaction between the hum an 
organism and its environment. When applied to hum an factors, the 
ecological approach suggests that the fundamental unit of analysis is the 
human-machine system (Flach, 1989). Hum an and work environment are 
reciprocally coupled and cannot be studied independently of each other. 
As a result, an ecological approach to hum an factors begins by studying 
the constraints in the environment (i.e. the task or the w ork domain) that 
are relevant to the operator. (Vicente, 1990). This emphasis is different 
from the one used by the m ethods/fram eworks that have been already 
mentioned, which often minimise or do not acknowledge the importance 
of the domain on behaviour. One of the areas that the ecological approach 
can inform is hum an performance modelling. In order to understand 
behaviour, it is necessary to have a separate, but commensurate, 
understanding of the context in which the behaviour takes place, and the 
mechanisms generating that behaviour (Vicente, 1990). Thus, when 
developing a model of hum an performance, it is im portant to have a 
functional description of the domain, in which behaviour is taking place.
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In the case of the EMCRS, the importance of understanding the behaviour 
of the system, with respect to the dynamic nature of the disaster domain, 
is obvious. Analysing the behaviours of the EMCRS, w ithout taking into 
account the effects those behaviours are having on the domain, and 
likewise not taking into account the effects the changing dom ain has on 
those behaviours, would provide an unrealistic analysis of the EMCRS, 
attributing the complexity of the EMCRS behaviours only to complex 
psychological mechanisms.
The HCI-PCMT framework has an ecological perspective, in as much as it 
includes a domain external to the system of concern. In addition, the 
framework models the interactive combination of the hum an and 
com puter/ device. There are, of course, other m ethods that have some type 
of ecological perspective. One area of HCI, that has been claimed by 
Woods (1998) to be ecological, is cognitive engineering. W oods (1998) 
states; Tt is about multidimensional, open worlds and not about the 
artificially bounded closed worlds typical of the laboratory or the 
engineers desktop. An example of the ecological perspective is the need to 
study hum ans solving problems with tools (i.e. support systems), as 
opposed to laboratory research, which continues, for the m ost part, to 
examine hum an performance stripped of any tools. Cognitive engineering 
is a sine qua non for this -  how to pu t effective cognitive tools into the 
hands of practitioners/ There are therefore, ecological m ethods and 
models in the area of Cognitive Engineering. Mancini (1986), proposed the 
DYLAM methodology (where machine and hum an behaviour are 
modelled separately; but are also tightly coupled by the dynamic 
simulation of the studied sequences), as a technique for balancing and 
interfacing between the model of the hum an mental processes and 
mechanisms of decision making and the model of the machine affected by 
the hum an actions (Amendola et al 1988). However, this m ethod is not 
appropriate in multiple task situations. Boy (1983) and Boy and Tessier 
(1983) created a model called MESSAGE, which includes a supervisor 
managing three types of processes called channels, i.e. receptors, effectors 
and cognition. MESSAGE includes the concepts of automatic and 
controlled processes. These automatic processes involve a particular 
knowledge, which is modelled by a situational representation -  the term
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situation is used to characterise the instantaneous state of the environment 
or world, by a set of components called world facts. (Boy 1988). This 
methodology has been used in the development of knowledge-based 
systems (KBS), which have been used in the training of operators in 
complex environments.
Another area of research, where models and methods are relevant to the 
current research is distributed decision making. A system is characterized 
by distributed decision making to the extent that it lacks a centralised 
control agent, or decision maker. The need for distributed decision making 
or control arises because of the complexity of the problems facing the 
decision makers. Tasks are distributed, and this distribution leads to a 
need for coordination (Brehmer 1991). The EMCRS could, thus, be 
classified as distributed decision making. Classical decision making 
models have limited usefulness in modelling distributed decision making, 
as they normally only consider one decision maker, who may only have 
one goal, which can be stated in quantitative terms. The decision maker 
has a known num ber of solutions, and the models are normative -  i.e. the 
decision making is considered as a logical process. (Koopman and Pool, 
1991). Rasmussen (1991) has identified the need to take a Cognitive 
Engineering approach in developing modelling frameworks for 
distributed decision making. Separate representations of the work domain, 
the generic cognitive decision tasks, and the useful strategies for such 
decision tasks, together with the subjective criteria of choice, need to be 
identified to develop useful models. Teams in emergency m anagem ent are 
often faced with ill-structured problems, uncertain and dynamic 
environments, shifting, ill-defined and sometimes competing goals, 
multiple eventfeedback loops, time constraints, high stakes, multiple 
players, and organisational norms and goals that m ust be balanced against 
the team m ember's personal choices. These factors have been identified by 
Orasanu and Connolly (1993) as typical for decision making in naturalistic 
environments (Schaafstal et al 2001). There has been m uch research in this 
area developing models and methods for analysing naturalistic decision 
settings (including emergency management), resulting in the Naturalistic 
Decision Making (NDM) paradigm (Klein, 1997). NDM emphasizes the 
role of situation awareness in decision making and the use of mental
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simulation to describe the mental processes of decision making. However, 
Doherty (1993) and Klein and Woods (1993), have identified clear 
limitations in the models and research of naturalistic decision making - the 
major problems being that none of the models or m ethods are easily 
testable. The statements tend to be about w hat goes on at a high level of 
description and there is little about how it goes on, at a lower level, i.e. in 
detail. A second weakness is that the research base is limited - many of 
the studies depend on ethnographic designs, which lack rigour. 
Application of these models has been used in the support of decision 
training. However, these models do not support diagnosis of co­
ordination design problems, and thus, do not support design directly. The 
idea of socially distributed cognition refers to the fact that participants in 
collaborative work relationships are likely to vary in the knowledge they 
possess and m ust therefore engage each other in dialogues that allow 
them to pool resources and negotiate their differences to accomplish their 
tasks. Hutchins (1990) has identified im portant features to be accounted 
for in a distributed task, which ensure effectiveness:
• Shared task knowledge - each person understands enough about each 
others' work to co-ordinate effectively;
• Horizon of observation - which allows other team members to witness 
other performances; and
• Multiple perspectives, which allow for activities to be observed from 
different points of view.
The behaviour of each member of the team is contingent on the behaviour 
of all the other members of the team. An action by one m ember will 
trigger an action (reaction) by another member, until the task is complete. 
Each member of the group has knowledge of a specific part of the 
distributed task, the whole group is undertaking. The co-ordination 
among the actions of the members of the team is not achieved by 
following a master procedure, instead it emerges from the interactions 
among the members of the team. The procedure is used as a guide to 
organising actions. Distribution of tasks leads to a need for co-ordination. 
In extending the scope of the HCI-PCMT framework to accommodate the 
EMCRS, these features may need to be taken into account. For example, 
having shared task knowledge. Each of the emergency services needs to
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understand w hat each of the other services are doing, in order to co­
ordinate their behaviours to produce effective performance.
There have been many methods, models and frameworks developed for 
analysis of Emergency Management. Specifically Rogalski and Samurcay 
(1993) have focused on communication between the services as a means of 
analysing distributed decision making. In one paper (Rogalski and 
Samurcay, 1993), they have analysed horizontal and vertical co-ordination 
through conversational analysis of the interactions between two groups of 
emergency decision groups, planning the resolution of two forest fires.
The efficiency of the two groups is compared. The analysis allows an 
understanding of why one group is better than the other. The group that 
has a better flow of communication and distribution of roles is more 
efficient. Samurcay and Rogalski (1991) have also developed a Method for 
Tactical Reasoning (MTR) and applied it in emergency management. This 
method describes a decomposition of the overall task (for the class of 
emergency situations) into specific tasks (involved in analysis and 
planning), as prescribed tasks in the sense developed by Leplat (1988).
The MTR provides a model of the cognitive tasks, involved in emergency 
management. This research allows for an understanding of emergency 
management behaviours, but does not relate it directly to the design of the 
emergency m anagement system. Kaempf et al (1996) studied the decision 
making of experienced personnel in complex command and control 
environments, using the recognition-primed decision (RPD) model (Klein,
1993), which depicts how experienced people make decisions in natural 
settings. The results of the study suggested that decision makers use 
recognitional processes and that situation awareness is of primary 
concern. However, it is difficult to generalise from this study to other 
command and control domains, as the domain studied was very 
procedural in nature, and thus, other command and control settings may 
place different requirements on the decision makers. Other work, such as 
Blandford and Wong, (2004) and Blandford et al, (2002) has looked at the 
behaviours of individual services within emergency management, but 
does not relate these behaviours to the other services within emergency 
management, and does not develop systematic models that can be directly 
used for design of the emergency management system.
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It is recognised that no specific reference has been m ade in this section to 
the planning literature. The relevant planning literature is presented in 
the following chapter as part of the background to the HCI-PCMT 
framework development.
1.5 HCI-PCMT Framework
A framework was earlier developed to model the management, that is, planning 
and control, of multiple task work (PCMT) in office administration. The 
Framework is the Planning and Control for Multiple Task Framework (HCI- 
PCMT) (Smith et al, 1992; 1997, Hill et al, 1995). The HCI-PCMT framework is 
based on a conception of HCI (Dowell and Long 1989 and 1998), and has an 
ecological perspective. The HCI-PCMT framework has taken the approach of 
developing a generic cognitive model for the worksystem as a whole, as opposed 
to the user alone, which is similar to the 'joint-cognition' approach of Woods and 
Hollnagel (1987). Hutchins (1987) has used the term 'distributed cognition' to 
refer to models of cognition supported by many agents working together, usually 
teams of individuals. Models derived from application of the framework will be 
similar inasmuch as the cognition of the worksystem is distributed across the 
physically separate user and devices. Chapter 2 will present the HCI-PCMT 
framework and background to its development.
1.6 Means-Ends Hierarchy versus HCI-PCMT
This chapter has described the many models and m ethods that abound in 
the HCI and emergency management literature, but which are not viewed 
as appropriate for the current modelling, for the reasons given. However, 
to further justify the use of the HCI-PCMT framework in the current 
research, rather than using another established framework, a comparison 
will now be made, at a high level, between the HCI-PCMT framework and 
the Means-Ends Abstraction Hierarchy of Rasmussen and Vicente (1989), 
which is also a framework for modelling complex w ork environments.
Rasmussen and Vicente (1989) developed a framework for modelling 
complex work domains. This framework -  the Means-Ends Abstraction 
Hierarchy similar to HCI-PCMT has an ecological approach to HCI in the
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Gibsonian (Gibson, 1979) sense of the primary unit of analysis being the 
total ecosystem of users and environment, and not the users and 
environment as distinct categories. Rasmussen and Vicente m apped 
Gibson's affordances within the Means-Ends Hierarchy (Rasmussen,
1986). The results of this mapping indicated that affordances could be 
structured as a Means-Ends Hierarchy, and thereby function as a 
mechanism to cope with the complexity of the natural environment. The 
Means-Ends model has five levels, ranging from physical properties to 
high level goals and intentions. The interrelationships between the 
affordances and the five levels are articulated as 'whaT, 'how ' and 'w hy'. 
These are fundamental questions that in Artificial Intelligence terms 
correspond to: declarative knowledge (what); procedural knowledge 
(how); and meta-knowledge (why) (Albrechtsen et al, 2001).
Adopting such a format to structuring the affordances of a system 
provides a mechanism for coping with complexity. However unlike the 
HCI-PCMT framework, which is based on the Dowell and Long (1989) 
conception of HCI which distinguishes the interactive worksystem, 
comprising users and computers or devices, from its dom ain of 
application constituting the work of the work system, the Means-Ends 
Abstraction Hierarchy does not make this distinction. The concept of 
domain is the world in which work is performed and is conceived as 
discrete objects. Objects may be both abstract as well as physical and are 
characterised by their attributes. Task goals express specific desired states 
of objects. The desired state expressed by a task goal is the ideal product of 
the task. Task quality thus describes the actual product of a task with 
respect to the desired product (expressed by the task goals). As task 
quality describes the product as a change effected by the task in the 
attribute state of an object (with respect to the desired change), quality 
enables all possible products of a task to be equated and evaluated. Also 
as task quality is separately expressed from the behaviours of the system, 
task quality supports the design of novel systems which cannot be simply 
specified by the behaviours of the old system. Thus, the HCI-PCMT 
framework supports the expression of task quality for the different tasks 
of the EMCRS, in terms of domain object attribute value changes. 
Expressing the EMCRS multiple tasks in this way allows for analysis of
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any co-ordination problems arising from behaviour conflicts where 
particular desired domain object attribute value changes cannot be carried 
out.
Within the Dowell and Long (1989) conception the concept of performance 
is expressed as the effectiveness with which the w ork of the worksystem is 
carried out as a function of the resource costs to the system (the effort etc. 
of performing that work well), and the task quality afforded by this work 
(how well it is performed). Overall performance, thus, expresses whether 
goals have been achieved and at what cost. A design problem is 
diagnosed, if actual performance (Pa) does not equal desired performance 
(Pd), where performance (P) is expressed as task quality (Tq), user costs 
(Uc) and computer (device) costs (Cc). A design solution is prescribed if 
Pa is equal to Pd. W ithout HCI-PCMT supporting this expression of 
performance, the current research would not be able to develop models of 
the EMCRS that diagnose design problems.
Last, the HCI-PCMT framework was developed for analysing planning 
and control for multiple task work systems, and has been shown in 
previous case-studies to diagnose planning and control design problems 
(Smith et al, 1997). Thus the HCI-PCMT framework has an, albeit 
minimalist architecture, to accommodate such planning and control 
systems. The Means-Ends Abstraction Hierarchy is a more general 
framework for analysing complex HCI systems, its purpose is not 
specifically for modelling planning and control in m ultiple task work 
situations, and therefore it does not have a planning and control 
architecture. Thus, although the Means-Ends Abstraction Hierarchy has its 
place in the development of HCI models for complex systems, in this 
instance, the HCI-PCMT framework has been chosen for the modelling for 
the following reasons:
1) The HCI-PCMT framework has the concept of a dom ain of 
application which allows for an expression of task quality that 
enables co-ordination problems to be identified.
2) The HCI-PCMT framework has an expression of performance that 
enables design problems to be diagnosed.
3) The HCI-PCMT framework has a specified planning and control 
architecture for modelling planning and control systems.
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1.7 Data Acquisition and Analysis
Within qualitative research traditions there is a broad spectrum 
of methods -  at one end almost formal methods and at the other end most 
informal methods. Where you locate yourself in this tradition depends on 
access and data acquisition. Access to data of the EMCRS response to an 
actual disaster was not possible due to the confidentiality of such data, 
and the requirements of the current research to publish in the public 
domain. Therefore, the data was acquired from training exercises. 
However, within the current research the constraints on data acquisition at 
the training exercises were at a maximum as no video or audio recording 
device could be used. The data recorded were the notes taken by the 
researcher during the exercises, and therefore the data collection is at its 
most informal.
The HCI-PCMT framework was applied to this data to produce diagnostic 
models of the EMCRS. No formal method is given within the current 
research for application of the HCI-PCMT framework to the data, but an 
informal untested method is given of how to construct models by HCI- 
PCMT framework application. However, the approach used is in the 
tradition of Grounded Theory (Strauss and Corbin, 1990) and is consistent 
with some aspects of this tradition. Grounded Theory is a social-science 
approach to theory building that combines systematic levels of abstraction 
into a framework about a phenomenon, which is verified and expanded 
throughout the study (Adams, 2002). Social science methodologies 
support design only implicitly and indirectly. Grounded Theory is 
therefore not directly applicable in the current research where the aim is to 
produce knowledge that is explicit and supports design directly in the 
form of diagnostic models. Therefore, within the current research an 
attempt is not made to apply Grounded Theory as such - the HCI-PCMT 
framework has different requirements (to produce diagnostic models), but 
there are similarities in the approach taken within the m ethod for model 
construction to the Grounded Theory approach. These similarities are 
identified here to justify the current approach taken.
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The basic idea of the Grounded Theory approach is to analyse data, in 
whatever form, and 'discover' or label variables, called categories concepts 
and properties and their interrelationships. Thus the data is analysed, 
conceptualised and then re-expressed with respect to these variables. To 
enable this conceptualisation to occur in a structured manner, there are 
three major coding stages -  open, axial and selective, in the analysis 
procedure. The open coding stage identifies, names, categorises and 
describes phenomena and identifies the properties of these phenomena 
(categories). The axial coding stage then identifies the high level 
phenomena (e.g. central ideas, events) along with the conditions and 
participants strategies pertaining to those phenomena (e.g. causal 
conditions, intervening conditions, action/interaction strategies). Finally 
the selective coding stage is the process of choosing one category to be the 
core category, and relating all other categories to that category. This 
process is iterative, with continuous validation w ith the raw  data to 
confirm or refute conclusions. The last stage of analysis is the integration 
of process effects which are factors that change over time, so that changing 
factors within the framework can be identified. The ability to perceive 
variables and relationships is termed 'theoretical sensitivity', which refers 
to the researcher's personal degree of sensitivity, depending upon 
previous readings and experience, relevant to the area of study.
The method for model construction (see Chapter 4 Section 4.3) like 
Grounded Theory requires theoretical sensitivity on the part of the 
researcher. The current researcher had experience and knowledge from 
previous applications of the HCI-PCMT framework in other domains (Hill 
et al, 1996); an understanding of the present domain of w ork of the 
EMCRS; and documented information describing the objectives of EMCRS 
behaviours. Also like Grounded Theory the data is analysed, 
conceptualised and re-expressed with respect to the variables categorised. 
The coding of these variables in the HCI-PCMT model construction relate 
directly to the HCI-PCMT framework representation, (where there are 
abstract and physical worksystem structures and an abstract and physical 
domain representation) and the HCI-PCMT framework axioms. Therefore, 
better than Grounded Theory the HCI-PCMT model construction 
separates the variables of the worksystem (user and devices) from the
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variables of the domain (constituting the work of the worksystem). Also 
the HCI-PCMT framework axioms specify the relationships between the 
different variables. However, the coding from the data is similar in nature 
to the coding stages in Grounded Theory, although the stages are not 
carried out in the same order. For example, phase one of the m ethod for 
model construction conceptualises the domain of work of EMCRS, which 
is the core category to which all the other domain categories relate, so this 
is similar in nature to the selective coding stage of G rounded Theory. 
Conceptualisation of the domain sub-objects and their attributes and 
values is carried out in a similar way to the open coding stage, as is 
identification of the abstract and physical worksystem structures. The 
model descriptions of the work of the worksystem with respect to the 
worksystem behaviours and the changes these behaviours effect in the 
domain, have similarities with the identification of action/interaction 
strategies and consequences of these strategies within the axial coding 
stage of Grounded Theory. However, the HCI-PCMT model descriptions 
provide an expression of the effectiveness or performance of the EMCRS 
by showing the quality of work in terms of domain changes, and the 
resource costs to the worksystem in carrying out these changes. The 
Grounded Theory methodology has no such specification of performance.
The above discussion has described the similarities between the Grounded 
Theory approach and the approach used in the current research (the method for 
model construction) to justify this approach. It has also been discussed as to why 
Grounded Theory itself was not deemed applicable within the current research.
1.6 Chapter Summary
This chapter has presented the background to the dom ain of study for the 
research (EMCRS), the background to the approach used (HCI), and the 
aims of the current research: to develop models of the EMCRS that 
support the specification of EMCRS co-ordination design problems and 
reasoning about solutions to such problems. A review of the literature of 
relevant research has also been presented. The framework chosen for 
modelling the HCI-PCMT framework has been briefly outlined - the 
following chapter will present the framework in full.
30
Chapter 2 
HCI-PCMT Framework
Introduction
This chapter presents the HCI-PCMT framework that will be used for 
modelling the EMCRS. Section 1 presents the conceptual background to 
the framework. Section 2 provides the explicit description of the 
framework. Section 3 characterises the differences between the systems 
that have been modelled by the framework to date, and the EMCRS. How 
the current framework will need to be extended, to accommodate these 
differences, will be discussed.
2.1 Background to the HCI-PCMT framework
As described in Chapter 1, a framework was developed earlier to model the 
management, that is, planning and control, of multiple task work (PCMT) in 
office administration (Smith et al, 1992; 1997). To reiterate, the HCI-PCMT 
framework is based on a conception of HCI (Dowell and Long 1989 and 1998). 
The conception distinguishes the interactive worksystem, which comprises users 
and computers or, more generally devices/equipm ent, from its domain of 
application, constituting the work carried out by the worksystem. The 
effectiveness with which work is carried out, that is performance, is a function of 
the quality of the work (how well it is performed), and the resource costs to the 
worksystem (the effort etc. of performing the work that well). Overall 
performance, thus, expresses whether goals have been achieved, and at w hat 
cost. A design problem is diagnosed, if actual performance (Pa) does not equal 
desired performance (Pd), where performance (P) is expressed as task quality 
(Tq), user costs (Uc) and computer (device) costs (Cc). A design solution is 
prescribed if Pa is equal to Pd.
In the Dowell and Long conception, a domain of application (or work domain) is 
described in terms of objects, which may be abstract or physical. Objects are 
constituted of attributes, which have values. The attribute values of an object may 
be related to the attribute values of one or more other objects. An object, at any 
time, is determined by the values of its attributes. The worksystem performs 
work by changing the value of domain objects (i.e. by transforming their actual
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attribute values) to their desired values, as specified by the w ork goal. Attributes 
may be affordant or dispositional. Affordant attributes are transformed by the 
worksystem; their transformation constitutes the work performed. Dispositional 
attributes are relevant to the work (they need to be used by the worksystem), but 
are not changed by the worksystem.
The worksystem is conceptualised as a behavioural system comprising the 
interacting user behaviours (supported by user structures) and computer (device) 
behaviours (supported by device structures). Abstract structures comprise 
representations and processes. Abstract representation structures refer, for 
example, to the worksystem's knowledge, databases or information stores. 
Abstract process structures refer, for example, to the worksystem 's procedures, 
methods or heuristics. Abstract structures support worksystem abstract 
behaviours, when abstract process structures, such as procedures, act on abstract 
representation structures, such as a database. Similarly, worksystem physical 
structures support worksystem physical behaviours. The HCI-PCMT framework 
specifies worksystem structures for the planning and control of multiple task 
work. These structures are expressed at both abstract and physical levels of 
description. Physical structures embody abstract structures and physical 
behaviours embody abstract behaviours. At the abstract level, the framework 
describes the worksystem's cognitive structures. These comprise four process 
structures (planning, controlling, perceiving and executing), and two 
representational structures (plans and knowledge-of-tasks). These structures 
support the planning and control behaviours of the worksystem and are 
distributed across the physical users and devices/equipm ent. The four processes 
support the behaviours of planning, control, perception and execution 
respectively. The physical structures support the physical behaviours, but are not 
differentiated further by the HCI-PCMT framework, as the framework's concern 
is primarily with abstract behaviours associated with planning and control.
The rationale for what to some might appear a 'm inim alist' architecture is 
threefold. First, the general architecture of representations and processes is 
commonly assumed by Cognitive Psychology models in the information 
processing tradition. Second, the architecture was adequate to support the 
construction of the initial HCI-PCMT framework for the domain of secretarial 
office administration. Third, the architecture supported the construction of 
models, whose form and granularity were commensurate with solving user
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interface design problems. The full argument for this set of structures, can be 
found elsewhere (Smith, Hill, Long and Whitefield, 1997), but can be summarised 
as follows:
Influenced by Newell and Simon (1972), much planning research in 
Cognitive Science and Artificial Intelligence has tended to view plans as 
complete and fully-elaborated behaviour sequences, which ensure task 
goal achievement. This view has been underm ined by research into 
planning in HCI. The behaviours of users, who are part of worksystems, it 
has been argued, cannot be regarded entirely as the output of executable 
plans (e.g., Suchman, 1987; Larkin, 1989; Payne, 1991) - rather they are 
often, at least partly, direct responses to the task environment. Within this 
perspective, plans need not be complete and fully-elaborated, but rather 
they may be partial (in the sense that they may specify only some of the 
behaviours to be implemented) an d /o r general (in the sense that some 
behaviours may be specified only generally and not at a level that is 
executable). Such plans might be more generally viewed as "resources' for 
guiding behaviour (Suchman, 1987). Furthermore, if a plan is regarded as 
a resource to guide behaviour it is no longer necessary that it be limited to 
specifying behaviours. Rather it might, instead, specify required states of 
the task or conditions of the environment. Plans, which serve as resources 
for guiding behaviour, rather than as specifications of complete and fully- 
elaborated behaviour sequences, cannot ensure that goals will be 
achieved. This research also undermines the assumption that perception 
precedes planning, which precedes execution. Ambros-Ingerson (1986) 
argued that all planning can precede execution only when:
1. The task environment is static - relevant changes in the task 
environment do not occur after the plan is complete;
2. The task environment is simple enough to be practically modelled - the 
consequence of behaviours can be predicted sufficiently well to 
generate a complete and fully-elaborated behaviour sequence; and
3. The task environment is known - the planner's knowledge of the task 
environment can be complete before planning commences.
Most task environments studied by HCI researchers do not embody these 
assumptions (Young and Simon, 1987). In direct contrast, they are usually 
dynamic, complex, and partly unknown by the planner (e.g., Hollnagel,
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Mancini and Woods, 1988). Execution behaviours in worksystem task 
environments are required to commence before plans are complete and 
fully-elaborated and therefore the perception, execution and planning 
behaviours m ust be temporally inter-leaved - having no necessarily fixed 
order in which to be performed.
When performing a task, a system has to exercise control; that is, it has to 
select the next behaviour to be carried out at each mom ent (e.g. Hayes- 
Roth, 1985). For a system, which constructs complete and fully-elaborated 
plans, controlling is a simple process of selecting behaviours, according to 
the plan and initiating their execution. However, for worksystems, which 
employ plans as resources to guide behaviour, some more complex control 
behaviour is required to select execution behaviours over time - since the 
selection is constrained by, rather than specified by, the plan. Furthermore, 
if a worksystem inter-leaves execution behaviours with planning and 
perception behaviours, controlled sequencing of these behaviours is also 
required.
Consistent with the preceding arguments, the HCI-PCMT framework 
describes the worksystems' cognitive structures for planning and control 
as follows:
At the first (abstract) level of description, Plans are specifications of 
required transformations of domain objects a n d /o r  of required 
behaviours. They may be partial (in the sense that they may specify only 
some of the behaviours or transformations), and they may be general (in 
the sense that some behaviours or transformations m ay be specified only 
generally and not at a level that is directly executable). Planning 
behaviours, thus, specify the required domain object transformations 
a n d /o r behaviours to support those transformations.
Perception and execution behaviours are, respectively, those whereby the 
worksystem acquires information about the domain objects and those 
whereby it carries out work, changing the value of the object attributes as 
desired. Information about domain objects from perception behaviours is 
expressed in the knowledge-of-tasks representation. Control behaviours 
entail deciding which behaviour to carry out next, both w ithin and 
between tasks, but involve more than reading off the next behaviour from 
a complete and fully-elaborated plan.
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The second level of description of planning and control structures is 
physical, wherein the framework describes the distribution of the abstract 
cognitive structures across the physically separate user and devices of 
particular worksystems. The framework, thus, allows the construction of 
alternative models of the distribution of cognitive structures across the 
user and devices, and so supports reasoning about allocation of function 
between users and devices, a major decision in design problem solutions. 
In the office administration domains studied for the development of the 
framework, the physical worksystem was the person plus devices, but not 
a computer. These domains were: secretarial office administration and 
medical reception. This notion of worksystem is som ewhat w ider than that 
used to illustrate Dowell and Long's (1989) conception, and is used here 
for the analysis of to-be-computerised systems.
The outline of the HCI-PCMT framework, including its dom ain of 
application, its worksystem and its performance, is now complete. How 
the framework supports the analysis of multiple task w ork will now be 
outlined.
Multiple task work requires a user, as part of the interactive worksystem, 
to perform distinct, but overlapping tasks. Each task potentially competes 
for worksystem behaviours. Multiple task work represents an im portant 
concern for system designers, as performing overlapping tasks is likely to 
have an effect on work performance. The term 'm ultiple task work7, as 
characterized by the framework, refers to situations, in which more than 
one task is carried out concurrently over relatively long and overlapping 
periods of time. Characterising multiple task work requires a single task 
to be defined. In the framework, a task is considered to be part of the work 
carried out in the domain of the worksystem. A task is thus conceptually 
distinct from the worksystem itself and its behaviours. In one of the 
systems previously analysed by the framework, medical reception, (see 
Hill et al, 1995) a task was expressed as the support of a medical case 
object (i.e. patients consulting with medical practitioners). The medical 
reception domain is an instance of multiple task work, since support is 
provided concurrently for multiple ongoing and temporally overlapping 
medical cases (i.e. for many patients together).
The explicit description of the framework now follows.
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2.2 HCI-PCMT Framework
This section gives a description of those aspects of the framework, that need to be 
exposed for current research purposes i.e. application of the framework to a 
domain other than office administration, where there are m ultiple users at 
multiple levels of command. Thus, there are some aspects that will not be 
applicable in such a domain, and they are, therefore, not presented here. The 
framework is expressed as a set of axioms, based on a partial and selective 
application of Dowell and Long's (1989) conception for HCI. The purpose of the 
HCI framework is to express design problems to aid a designer to reason about 
possible design solutions, in a specify-and-implement type of design practice.
The axioms presented are direct extracts from Smith et al, (1997).
Axiom 2.1 HCI-PCMT design problems: HCI-PCMT design problems 
and their possible solutions, generated by specify-and-implement 
design practice, entail the specification of the implementable 
planning (structures and) behaviours and control 
(structures and) behaviours of the user and devices of the 
worksystem, such that when they interact with the perception 
(structures and) behaviours and execution (structures and) 
behaviours of the user and devices, they carry out multiple task 
work such that the actual level of performance falls within some 
desired level of performance.
Axiom 2.2. HCI-PCMT domain: multiple task work: Relationships 
between domain objects give rise to different levels o f description. 
Abstract objects constitute higher level descriptions of physical 
objects, and some abstract objects may be higher level descriptions 
of other abstract objects.
Vertical relationships exist between the values of the attributes at 
different levels of description. Values of attributes at higher levels 
of description are determined by an emergence relationship to the
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values of attributes at lower levels. Horizontal relationships exist 
between the values of attributes at the same level of description.
A task is the required s ta te  transformation of a single abstract 
object at the highest level of description, including all lower level 
transformations associated through object relationships.
Multiple task work is that domain work in which, at the highest level 
of description, there are typically two or more objects undergoing 
independent, but temporally overlapping work transformations.
A sub-task is some part of the sta te  transformation, which 
constitutes a task. It is a sub-transformation.
Axiom 2.3. HCI-PCMT worksystem: planning and control behaviours 
and structures:
Four types of abstract behaviour are generic to  the worksystem 
and undifferentiated between the users and devices. These 
behaviours are planning, control, perception and execution. The 
four types of abstract behaviour are supported by abstract 
structures, also undifferentiated between users and devices. These 
abstract structures comprise four types of process, corresponding 
to the four types of behaviour. That is, a planning process, a 
controlling process, a perceiving process, and an executing process. 
There are two types of representations: a plan representation and a 
knowledge-of-tasks representation. Figure 1 shows the abstract 
planning and control structures within the framework and their 
relationship.
Perception behaviours are those, whereby the worksystem detects 
and records the values of the domain object attributes. The s ta tes 
of domain objects form the contents of the knowledge-of-tasks 
representation. Perception behaviours update the contents of the
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knowledge-of-tasks representation, based on their reading of the 
domain. Execution behaviours are those, which carry out the work 
of the worksystem directly by transforming the values of domain 
object attributes.
Planning behaviours are those, which specify what and/or how 
tasks will be accomplished in terms of required object s ta te  
transformations and/or required worksystem behaviours. These 
specifications form the content of the plan representation.
Planning behaviours update the contents of the plan 
representation, based on their reading of the contents of the 
knowledge-of-tasks representation and the existing contents of the 
plan representation.
Control behaviours select which behaviours are to  be carried out 
next at any particular time. Control behaviours set the parameters 
of the planning, perceiving and executing processes. Thus, they 
configure the behaviours, supported by those processes, based on 
their reading of the contents of the knowledge-of-tasks 
representation and the contents of the plan representation.
Axiom 2.4 HCI-PCMT performance: Performance is some function 
of: (1) the task quality associated with the multiple task work 
carried out; and (2) the resource costs associated with the 
worksystem structures and behaviours of planning and control 
(incurred by the worksystem as a whole).
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PLANS
KNOWLEDGE
-OF-TASKS
PERCEIVING
EXECUTING
process structure 
representation structure
a process writes to the contents of a 
representation
a process reads from the contents of 
a representation
the controlling process sets the 
parameters of another process
Figure 1 HCI-PCMT Abstract structures
These axioms are to be used in the application of the framework to the EMCRS. 
Section 3.2 below, characterises the differences between the EMCRS and the 
office administration domains, already modelled by the framework, to identify 
where the HCI-PCMT framework will need to be extended to accommodate such 
differences.
A diagrammatic representation of the generic HCI-PCMT framework is shown in 
Figure 2. This representation will be used to apply the framework to the EMCRS.
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MULTIPLE TASK WORK
Task n - 
transformation 
Task 2 - 
transformation
I n K ip e t c __________
Task 1 - 
transformation 
objects 
attributes 
values________
Physical objects
Figure 2 HCI-PCMT Framework
Thus, application of the framework allows for a description of the abstract and 
physical structures of the interactive worksystem and the abstract and physical 
objects of the domain of application (work). The framework defines the 
relationship between the abstract and physical structures of the worksystem, and 
the relationship between the abstract and physical objects of the domain. 
Performance is some function of the task quality, associated with the multiple 
task work carried out, and the resource costs, associated with worksystem 
structures and behaviours of planning and control. The framework will thus 
allow for a description of design problems, as described in Axiom 2.1 above.
2.3 Characterisation of the EMCRS
The characteristics of the EMCRS are believed to be generalisable to other 
similar complex planning and control systems. Thus, extension of the 
HCI-PCMT framework to accommodate the characteristics of the EMCRS, 
would extend the framework for modelling other complex planning and 
control systems, with similar characteristics.
PL A N N IN G  A N D  CONTROL  
ABSTRACT STRUCTURES
KNOWLEDGE,
OF-TASKS PERCEIVING
c o n t r o l l in gPLANNING
EXECUTING
PLANS
user and devices physical 
structures
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The term "multiple task work", as characterized by the framework, 
comprises situations in which more than one task is carried out 
concurrently over relatively long and overlapping periods of time. 
Characterising multiple task work requires a single task to be defined. The 
previous domains modelled by the HCI-PCMT fram ework were 
characterised by one user and their devices. The work of these systems 
was described as support for a functional abstract description of the job, 
which incorporates social and organisational factors. As mentioned earlier, 
the work of medical reception (Hill et al, 1995) was described as the 
support of medical cases, where a medical case is an abstract 
representation of patients consulting with medical practitioners. A single 
task is the support for a single medical case, i.e. a single patient consulting 
with a medical practitioner. The work is multiple task, since support is 
provided concurrently for multiple ongoing and temporally overlapping 
medical cases (i.e. for many patients together).
In the EMCRS, there are multiple agencies, who need to work together 
towards the goal of stabilising the disaster situation. Each of the agencies, 
involved within the EMCRS, has its own set of tasks that it m ust carry out 
in order to achieve the overall goal of stabilising the disaster. These tasks 
are carried out independently from the other agencies; but the behaviours, 
associated with each of these tasks, need to be co-ordinated with the other 
agencies, to maximise the effectiveness of the overall EMCRS response.
The work of the EMCRS can be described as the support of a disaster. 
Unlike the previous systems analysed with the framework, there are 
obviously not multiple disasters, and thus a single task cannot be 
described as support for a single disaster. Rather, a single task would be 
each of the individual agency tasks in support of a disaster. Thus, the 
work of the EMCRS is multiple task, since support is provided 
concurrently for the multiple ongoing and temporally overlapping tasks 
carried out by the individual agencies in response to a disaster. This 
difference in the task description has implications for the application of 
the framework to the EMCRS, and will be one of the areas of extension for 
the framework, that modelling a multi-user planning system requires. 
These implications will be described in detail with respect to the 
framework axioms, once EMCRS data have been gathered for framework
41
application (see Chapter 4). Extending the framework in this way would 
enable application of the framework to other complex systems, where 
there are multiple users or groups of users carrying out independent, but 
concurrent tasks, that need to be co-ordinated for effective performance. 
The EMCRS has more than one level of operation; in fact, potentially three, 
(operational, tactical and strategic), depending on the characterisation of 
the disaster to which response is made. The HCI-PCMT framework has so 
far only been applied to systems with one level of operation. The HCI- 
PCMT framework will need to be extended to accommodate this 
difference. The EMCRS, as well as having more than one level of 
operation, has interactions within and between the levels. Again, the HCI- 
PCMT framework will need to be extended to accommodate these 
interactions. These extensions would enable application of the framework 
to other complex systems, where there is more than one level of operation 
and interactions between the levels. Last, the EMCRS will change over 
time in response to the changing disaster situation. The HCI-PCMT 
framework will need to be extended to accommodate a changing 
worksystem. This last extension would enable application of the 
framework to other systems, which change over time in response to their 
domain. Each of these differences are identified as issues with the 
application of the current HCI-PCMT framework, to model the EMCRS. 
These issues are discussed in detail in Chapter 7. Solutions to these issues, 
and thus extensions to the framework, are presented in Chapter 8.
2.4 Chapter Summary
This chapter has presented the HCI-PCMT framework. The aim of this 
research is to use the HCI-PCMT framework to model the EMCRS. In so 
doing, the scope of the framework will be extended to accommodate the 
differences between the EMCRS and other domains previously modelled. 
Differences between the EMCRS and the other systems, already modelled 
by the framework, have been discussed. These differences constitute the 
areas in which the HCI-PCMT framework will need to be extended, to 
accommodate the EMCRS. These differences are seen as characteristics of 
distributed planning and control systems, comprising more than one user,
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or groups of users, whose activities m ust be co-ordinated for effective 
performance. Therefore, in extending the framework to accommodate the 
EMCRS, it is expected that the framework would be suitable for 
application to other distributed planning and control systems, with similar 
characteristics. The next chapter will present the background to the 
EMCRS data collection.
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Chapter 3 
EMCRS Data
Introduction
Application of the HCI-PCMT framework to model the EMCRS required 
data. Ideally, such data would be from response to an actual disaster. 
However, these data are confidential and the research was required to be 
published in the public domain. One of the main sources of data for the 
modelling was expected to be from public enquiry documents. Having 
read the documentation for the Kings Cross Fire (Fennell, 1988), Clapham 
Rail crash (Hidden, 1989) and Marchioness disaster (Marriott, 1991), and 
others, it became apparent that the information contained in the enquiry 
documents did not provide sufficient detail to inform the model. 
Obviously some valuable information was gleaned from these documents, 
but more detailed information was required, to carry out the modelling.
As discussed in Chapter 1, the specific requirements for the data were: that 
they would include the EMCRS initial phase of disaster response; and that 
EMCRS data should not be at the lowest level of description (i.e. actual 
personnel and equipment at the operational level of command), but m ust 
include details about individual agency roles/ tasks at the different levels 
of operation. A further requirement is that the data be recordable in some 
format for later analysis.
The last possibility for data gathering was thus training exercises. There 
are various different types of training exercise carried out by the 
emergency services, which are set-up to address different types of 
problem. In Section 1 the different types of exercises will be discussed, 
along with which type would be best suited for data gathering, based on 
the above requirements identified. Section 2 discusses the data gathering -  
what different exercises were attended and how data were collected. 
Section 3 summarises this chapter.
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3.1 Type of exercise
Other than actual events, exercises are one way to assess the effectiveness 
of EMCRS in response to major incidents. Exercises bring together those 
who may be involved with responding to an incident and allow 
assessment of their responses under controlled conditions. They are 
useful m anagement tools for giving confidence to those, who may be 
involved in a crisis. Bringing together people from different agencies, to 
work together as a team, enables an understanding of each others' 
strengths and weaknesses and can help identify problems that they each 
may have. There are basically three types of exercise, discussion-based 
and table-top, which are paper based, and live. Each of these may vary 
considerably. This section will discuss each type of exercise in turn and 
identify the merits of each for the present research.
3.1.1 Paper-based exercises
There are two types of paper-based exercise: discussion-based and table- 
top. Both of these types of exercise can be structured in a similar way with 
respect to the exercise directing team. According to Overy (1993), there 
are two types of table-top exercise, the liaison exercise and the team 
building exercise, which can be distinguished in terms of structure by the 
role of the exercise directing team. In the first type, the exercise directing 
team maintains direct personal contact with the players and interacts with 
them as a central or key part of the game. Players representing different 
agencies are usually encouraged to talk to each other. In the second type, 
the exercise directing team tries to stand outside and away from the 
players and most of the interaction is on paper or over the telephone. 
Under the rules of the game, players representing different agencies are 
often only permitted to talk to each other through the exercise directing 
team.
3.1.1.1 D iscussion-based exercises
Discussion based exercises are generally low-cost activities, which are 
often a component of a seminar or other training activity. They are 
designed to inform participants about the organisation and the
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procedures, which would be used to respond to an incident. Discussion is 
usually centred on a given paper-based scenario. Participants representing 
different agencies are formed into groups, often called syndicates, to 
discuss their response/problem s in relation to the scenario. These groups 
usually contain representatives from each of the different agencies 
attending the exercise. Participants explore the scenario, its developing 
circumstances and its consequences. The emphasis is on identifying 
problems and finding solutions rather than on decision making. There are 
often panel discussions for each participating group to discuss their 
findings with a wider audience. The exercise directing team encourage 
interaction between the differing agencies involved in the response. This 
type of exercise falls into what Overy (1993) calls a liaison exercise. Data 
gathered at this type of exercise would, therefore, give high level 
information about the emergency services' response to a disaster scenario, 
focusing on plans and procedures, used by the different emergency 
services, and the identification of potential problems in their disaster 
response. Recording such data may be difficult. The different syndicates 
will be separate from each other, so no recording device could be used, 
when the discussions are within the syndicates.
3.1.1.2 Table top exercises
These are a form of role-play exercise. They are viewed by the services as 
being a very cost-effective and efficient method of testing plans and 
procedures. They may involve participants role-playing agents within a 
scenario, or the participants may comprise members of the team, who 
would be activated in a real emergency. In the liaison exercise, there is 
usually a physical, scale model of a catastrophe, supported by a scenario 
description. Key personnel from each of the agencies involved in the 
emergency operation, sit around the table and describe their individual 
and collective responses. The team building or paper feed exercise uses the 
passing of text between the moderator and participants to simulate the 
communications and the time-course of events during an emergency.
Thus, in a paper feed exercise the participants will be in one room, the 
moderator outside this room. The participants await paper feed 
information from the moderator regarding the emergency scenario, for 
example, a petrol station explosion in the centre of m arket town. Each
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paper feed will have a time stamp on it, i.e. the first feed in this example 
could be 9.00 am. The next feed will be in real-time i.e. it will be presented 
to the participants in real time and will have the scenario time stamp on it. 
For example: "9.05 am Police declare major incident". This paper feed 
would be presented to the participants five minutes after the first feed to 
correspond with the stamped time frame. After each feed, the participants 
who would need to respond to the paper feed information, have to write 
down their response on dockets with time information, and these 
responses are passed between the participants. Data gathered at this type 
of exercise would, therefore, give detailed real time information about the 
disaster response, from each of the agencies involved. As the responses 
are recorded on dockets with time stamps, the data gathered would be the 
actual recorded data from the exercise.
3.1.1.3 Live exercises
These range from a small scale single agency test of one component of 
their response, to a full-scale multi-agency test of the whole response to an 
incident. Live exercises provide the best means of confirming satisfactory 
operation of emergency communications. Live exercises involve the live  
reconstruction of an actual incident' with simulated liv e ' casualties. They 
involve the actual mobilisation of equipment and personnel and involve 
extensive use of 'real buildings and real communications'. They allow the 
different agencies and their personnel to rehearse their roles, to assess 
their preparedness, and to identify co-ordination problems. Live exercises 
are very costly to m ount and are therefore infrequent. Overy (1993) has 
also raised questions about the effectiveness of the learning experience for 
all participants. Live exercises will provide data that is realistic, i.e. the 
emergency services may be in a simulated disaster situation, but their 
responses m ust be as they would be for an actual disaster. Data would be 
at a low level of description, as there would be data for the response of 
every personnel member. However, how to analyse such data may be a 
problem. Each of the emergency services keep a detailed log of all actions 
in response to the disaster. Each service has a different way of logging 
actions. So collating this information across the different services would be 
difficult.
47
The different types of exercises and potential data types, that could be 
gathered from such exercises, have been discussed above. Based on the 
current research requirements, the merits of data from each of these types 
of exercise will now be discussed, so that a suitable type of exercise for 
data gathering can be selected. The requirements for the data, as set out in 
the introduction were: that it would include data on the EMCRS initial 
phase of disaster response, and that EMCRS data should not be at the 
lowest level of description (i.e. actual personnel and equipm ent at the 
operational level of command), but m ust include details about individual 
agency roles/ tasks at the different levels of operation. Also, the data 
should be recordable for later analysis.
• Discussion based exercises would potentially provide data from the 
EMCRS initial response phase. Data would not be at a low level of 
detail, although recording of such data may be difficult due to the set­
up of the exercise.
• Table-top exercises would provide data from the EMCRS initial 
response phase; data would hopefully be at the desired level of 
description (but may be at too low a level); recording of data would be 
easy, as the exercise set-up requires data to be recorded by participants.
• Live exercises would provide the more realistic EMCRS data than 
discussion-based or table-top exercises. Initial response data would be 
present. Data would be at a very low level of description. Recording of 
data would not be a problem as each of the services m ust log their 
actions, but analysis may prove difficult. (Also, due to the expense in 
both time and money of live exercises, they happen very infrequently.)
The type of exercises best suited for the required data would, thus, as a 
first choice be a table-top exercise. Table-top exercises would seem to 
provide data that covers the EMCRS response phase required and at the 
appropriate level of detail. Also, recording of such data w ould be ideal. 
The next section will discuss the actual data gathering.
3.2 Data gathering
There are various specialist training centres in the UK for the emergency 
services. However, there is only one centre where multidisciplinary 
training is provided - The Cabinet Office Emergency Planning College at
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Easingwold (formerly the Home Office Emergency Planning College). The 
aim of the college is to promote and sustain emergency preparedness 
within the United Kingdom through the concept of Integrated Emergency 
Management. Many different training exercises are run  at the centre, that 
cover all aspects of emergency planning. These exercises differ in their 
focus -  from planning for a rock concert for the local authority, to inter­
agency response to a disaster. Some of the exercises are table-top and 
some discussion based. Given the requirements above, first, the exercise 
needed to focus on the EMCRS, and so an exercise which involves the 
emergency services and not just the local authority or other non­
emergency agency, was required. Second, a table-top set-up for the 
training exercise was required. Given these requirements, the first 
exercise attended was the Emergency Services Seminar on Inter-Agency 
Response to Disaster. The information regarding the exercise made it clear 
that it was the most appropriate of all those run by the college, for 
gathering EMCRS data. Further, it was hoped that the set-up would be 
table-top. (The exercises at the college were embedded in seminars. Before 
and after each exercise, there would be presentations by experts, regarding 
various aspects of emergency planning.)
3.2.1 Emergency Services Seminar on Inter-Agency Response
to Major Disaster
Each of the seminars run by the college had a particular remit, which was 
outlined in the college brochure (Emergency Planning College, 1996). For 
justification of this particular seminar as a first choice for data gathering, 
this brochure information is presented.
The information was as follows:
'Are you a senior officer responsible for disseminating good practice in emergency 
preparedness at the local level? If so, you should join this innovative seminar 
which will enable you to work with your counterparts from other uniformed 
services and the local authority in pre-selected, multi-disciplinary district, county 
or regional teams.
'Organised under the auspices ofACPO (Association of Chief Police Officers), 
CACFOA (Chief and Assistant Chief Fire Officers Association), ASA (The 
Ambulance Service Association) and SOLACE (Society of Local Authority Chief
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Executives) to promote a greater understanding of integrated emergency 
management at an operational, tactical or strategic command level, this seminar 
sets out to help you:
• develop consistent good practices across all 'blue light' services in your area of
command;
• identify and resolve any inconsistencies in approach
• identify the common elements needed to mitigate any disaster
• become aware of the help available from other sources.
Applications should be in team format, which should include, wherever possible, 
police, fire, ambulance and local authority emergency planning personnel Where 
appropriate representatives from coastguard and health authorities may also be 
included as team members. This event is especially important for 'shadow' 
authorities and existing unitary authorities.'
From this information it seemed likely that this seminar would provide 
data on EMCRS response to a disaster, at an appropriate level of detail, 
and involving data on the initial response phase.
3.2.1.1 The Seminar
The aim of this seminar was to provide an opportunity for emergency 
services' personnel, who may have a role to play in the dissemination of 
best practice at the operational, tactical and strategic command areas, 
together with others, to study problems which m ight arise from major civil 
emergencies with particular reference to the need for a co-ordinated 
response. The objectives were:
• To develop consistency and good practice in locally based training in 
emergency procedures.
• To study the management of the response to a major civil emergency.
• To be aware of the roles and responsibilities of the emergency services 
and other organisations in responding to a major civil emergency.
• To understand the importance of liaison and co-operation between all 
services and other organisations in responding to a major civil 
emergency.
• To identify the elements which are common to the successful 
management of a major civil emergency.
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• To be aware of government policy regarding emergency preparedness. 
The set-up of the seminar was first to have presentations from experts 
regarding various aspects of inter-agency emergency management. The 
exercise was held on the second day of the seminar. The exercise was 
called Exercise Scorpio and the narrative was as follows:
Exercise Scorpio Narrative
Newford is a market town in the county of Crownshire. The main town centre is 
built around the main A338, which bisects the town in a north/south direction. In 
the centre of the town, a railway, carried on an embankment and bridge, runs 
directly across the town from east to west. From the railway bridge, in a 
northerly direction, the A338 is inclined and at the bottom of the incline is a canal 
with moorings for canal boats. This is a very busy holiday waterway and is a 
popular stopping point.
A t approximately 0930 hours on a weekday during school term time, a tanker 
train en-route from a refinery to an airport fuel depot is derailed, whilst passing 
over a railway bridge.
The bridge, which is a steel Victorian structure, carries the railway over the A338, 
which provides the main access into the town centre. It is market day and there 
are numerous market stalls set up on the side of the roadway on either side of the 
bridge. The market and town are a popular destination for locals and visitors 
from out of the town area, including foreign citizens on sightseeing tours through 
the area. There are a number of housing developments, behind the shops in the 
High Street each side of the railway bridge, and a nursery school with 60 toddlers 
is sited approximately 400 metres away. A cottage Hospital with 30 beds is some 
500 metres to the south east of the bridge and a primary school with 200 pupils 
some 800 metres to the south.
The train consists of a diesel electric locomotive and eight tank cars, each fully  
loaded with 100 tonnes ofAVTUR Aviation Fuel (SIN 1863 with an emergency 
action code 3 (Y) E). During the derailment one of the tank cars is ruptured and 
aviation fuel flows down the sides of the embankment onto the roadway and into 
adjoining properties. Flammable vapours from the fuel have been ignited by an 
open gas burner from a catering caravan.
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At the time the explosion occurred, a tourist bus was passing beneath the railway 
bridge. The bus is carrying 45 tourists of whom 25 are Japanese and German 
nationals.
The explosion has created severe structural damage to the railway bridge, 
premises adjacent to the bridge in an approximate 30 metre radius, and has 
created major leaks in two of the other tank cars. Structural damage of a moderate 
nature has occurred within an approximate 100 metre radius. A t least 50 people 
have been killed, including some of the foreign tourists. Many people have 
received burns from theflashover of the explosion and numerous people are 
trapped and injured in properties beneath the bridge structure and in vehicles on 
the roadway. A  number have also been contaminated by aviation fuel. There are 
numerous fires in the area.
The leaking fuel has run down the road incline to the north of the bridge and is 
entering the canal and watercourses at the bottom of the incline. The river flows 
from east to west but there is no particular flow on the canal. The wind is north 
westerly force 2 to 3. There are several barges, used for residential purposes, 
moored on the canal.
Early information from witnesses suggests youths have been seen running from 
the section of rail track where the derailment took place, and that vandalism may 
be responsible for the derailment.
3.2.1.2 Exercise Procedure
Once present at the seminar, it became apparent that the 'exercise' would 
be discussion-based. Although this was not the first choice for the type of 
exercise, where data could be gathered, the focus of the exercise was on 
the primary requirement for data, that of the EMCRS, so it was decided to 
gather data nevertheless. There were 60 emergency service senior 
personnel members attending the exercise. The emergency service 
personnel were brought together in multi-agency groups, called 
syndicates, to discuss the given disaster scenario. These syndicates, were 
pre-selected, i.e. the members had applied to attend the seminar as a
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group. The exercise directors did not choose the members of the groups. 
These syndicates were comprised of Police, Fire, Ambulance and local 
authority personnel from the same district, county or region. Each 
syndicate was given the scenario narrative and a detailed set of 
instructions to follow.
The instructions for participants were as follows:
Consideration 1: Organisations and their roles/responsibilities
As part of a multi-disciplinary group, you are asked to discuss the incident and 
identify:
the primary roles and responsibilities of the Police, Fire brigade, 
Ambulance service and the Local Authority during the response phase;
other organisations who could also have a role and how those 
organisations could assist the emergency services.
Following the syndicate discussion you should be prepared to discuss your 
findings with another syndicate.
Vufoils and flip charts are available if required.
The discussion should last for approximately 20 minutes.
A member of the Directing Staff will facilitate the discussion session.
Consideration 2: Likely problems to face organisations
As a single disciplinary group you are asked to discuss: - During the early stages 
of the response:
The likely problems which your organisation will face, including 
maintaining normal services;
The main problems facing the other emergency services and indicate how 
you could assist;
If your organisation's priorities are likely to conflict with others.
The group should nominate a spokesperson(s) who will be required to present (5- 
10 minutes) the group's findings during the central discussion session in the 
lecture theatre. Vufoils and flip charts are available if required.
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(It is suggested that this nomination is made early in the exercise.)
Consideration 3: Co-ordination o f response - 3 hours into the incident
In regard to this incident, and as part of a multi-disciplinary group, you are asked 
to consider:
The appropriate incident command structure employed by your own 
organisation and discuss how it aligns and communicates with others. I f there are 
differences, how could the effectiveness of the response be impaired and if so, how 
would you improve it?
How would you AS A GROUP attain and maintain an effective co­
ordinated response to the news media?
The group should consider the appropriate locations for the various 
functions, which would be employed in the response phase and to give reasons for 
those decisions. (Forward control point(s); incident control point(s); inner 
cordon(s); outer cordon(s); access/exit routes; marshalling area(s); rendezvous 
point(s); casualty receiving station(s); ambulance loading point(s); body holding 
area(s);evacuation assembly point(s); evacuee rest centre(s); survivor reception 
centre(s); friends and relatives reception centre).
The group should nominate a spokesperson(s) who will be required to present (5- 
10 minutes) the group's findings during the central discussion session in the 
lecture theatre. Vufoils and flip charts are available if required.
(It is suggested that this nomination is made early in the exercise.)
Consideration 4 was welfare and return to normality. However, as the 
initial response phase data was of primary import for modelling the 
ECMRS, data from this consideration were not necessary and will, 
therefore, not be considered here.
3.2.1.3 Data collection
As discussed above, data collection from discussion based exercises is 
difficult. As each syndicate was located separately, no recording device 
could be used. Therefore, during the syndicate discussions data were 
collected through note taking by the researcher. These notes were an aide-
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memoire for the researcher. General information from the presentations 
was recorded in bullet-point form on a printable white-board. These 
records were printed for the researcher. A further issue with data 
collection at this exercise was that the researcher was allocated to a 
particular syndicate by the exercise director, as the first consideration was 
being discussed. Unfortunately, this syndicate had other ideas and were 
planning their own 'live' exercise and so did not take part in these early 
discussions. As this was the first exercise that had been attended, and it 
was thought that data from a table-top exercise would be more suitable, as 
discussed above, the researcher did not regard this as a problem.
However, once it became apparent that this syndicate would not be 
involved in any of the discussions, the researcher joined another syndicate 
and the presentations given by all the syndicates. Therefore, the data 
collected from this first exercise, only cover Considerations 2 and 3 of the 
exercise.
3.2.2 Metropolitan and Urban area authorities
The second seminar attended was that of the Metropolitan and Urban area 
authorities. From the information given in the emergency planning 
college brochure, it was clear that this was a table-top exercise, which 
would therefore provide data that fits the requirements for the EMCRS 
data collection. Also, it appeared to focus on a disaster and participants 
would be from the emergency services and other organisations, so it 
involved the EMCRS. However, once present at the exercise, it soon 
became clear that this exercise was set-up with a focus for Local Authority 
Emergency planners and not the emergency services. Therefore the focus 
of the data was not primarily on the EMCRS. The data were in fact, 
collected, as they were recorded on dockets, but were not analysed, as not 
being relevant to the present research.
3.2.3 Further data collection
Before attending any other seminar, potentially providing data fitting 
current requirements, further documentation was requested on each 
seminar. It then became clear, that the seminar, where data would fit the 
requirements best, was the Emergency services Seminar on Inter-agency
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Response to Major Disasters, a type of seminar already attended. 
Therefore, it was decided to attend this type of seminar again to gather 
more data. Each running of this seminar involved different emergency 
service personnel, and so even though the seminar presentation was 
identical, the emergency service personnel responses would be different. 
Thus, the data would be complimentary to the first set, but not identical.
3.2.4 Emergency services Seminar on Inter-Agency Response 
to Major Disasters - 2
This type of seminar was attended again. The format of the seminar was 
exactly as that first attended. However, this time the researcher was 
attached to a syndicate that followed the whole exercise. Thus, data were 
recorded for all the considerations given in the exercise procedure. The 
data were recorded in the same way -  by note taking, and receiving the 
pnnt-outs from the whiteboards, after the presentations. There were again 
60 emergency service personnel present with representatives from each of 
the emergency services, and local authority chief executives. The data 
gathered from both of these exercises will be presented in the successive 
chapters, along with the initial models produced from these data.
3.3 Chapter Summary
In summary, this chapter has discussed the different types of exercises 
used within emergency management training and identified the best type 
of exercise for gathering EMCRS data. The exercises attended for 
gathering data have been described. Although these exercises and their 
data collection techniques were not ideal, they did fit the requirements for 
the EMCRS data. The EMCRS initial response phase was included and 
data were at an appropriate level of detail. The raw  data, gathered from 
the two exercises attended, along with an expansion or explanation of the 
data, are presented in Appendices 1 and 2. The successive chapters present 
the initial models developed through application of the HCI-PCMT 
framework to the data.
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Chapter 4 
EMCRS model development -  cycle one
Introduction
This chapter presents the construction of the first EMCRS model, by 
application of the HCI-PCMT framework axioms and representation, to 
the first dataset. Section 1 gives a brief description of the EMCRS data 
gathered from the first attendance at Exercise Scorpio -  Dataset 1 -  the full 
data are in Appendix 1. Section 2 presents HCI-PCMT framework axioms 
for EMCRS. Section 3 presents the method for model construction, and 
uses the method to construct the EMCRS model. Section 4 presents the 
model for Dataset 1. Section 5 describes use of the model for diagnosing 
co-ordination design problems. Section 6 summarises the chapter.
4.1 Exercise Scorpio Data
Due to the limitations of the arrangements for the data collection, (no 
video /  audio recording device could be used), the raw  data were notes 
taken by the researcher. These notes constituted an aide-memoire for the 
researcher of the discussions amongst and presentations by the syndicates, 
during exercise Scorpio. After collection, the raw data were expanded to 
express as much information as possible, as discussed within the 
syndicates. The data are shown in tables in Appendix 1. The tables show 
the raw data on the left hand-side of the table and the more complete data 
on the right-hand side.
The data gathered were the responses given to considerations, posed by 
the exercise co-ordinators, which were presented in Chapter 3. In this first 
data collection, they are limited to responses to the second and third 
questions posed. This outcome was due to the researcher being involved 
in a syndicate who were not following the exercise fully. Also, for the 
Ambulance Service, only the data for their view of the problems that the 
Ambulance Service will face in response to the major incident are 
presented. This outcome is because data were not collected for the 
Ambulance Service on responses to the other questions, as the researcher 
could not be present when this data was offered.
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The data presented in Appendix 1, is in two sections. The first section of 
data was collected from the syndicates which were set up as single 
disciplinary groups (e.g. Firemen). The second section of data was 
collected from the syndicates as multi-disciplinary groups.
To develop the EMCRS models the HCI-PCMT framework needed to be 
applied to the data. This application was twofold, involving application of 
the HCI-PCMT axioms, and application of the HCI-PCMT representation. 
These two applications were carried out together. The application of the 
HCI-PCMT axioms to EMCRS will extend the framework to accommodate 
the EMCRS. These axioms are now presented.
4.2 HCI-PCMT Axioms for EMCRS
The HCI-PCMT axioms presented in Chapter 2 are now expressed in 
terms of the EMCRS. The HCI-PCMT axioms are presented along with the 
HCI-PCMT EMCRS axioms for clarity.
Axiom 2.1 HCI-PCMT EMCRS design problems: HCI-PCMT EMCRS design 
problems and their possible solutions, generated by specify-and- 
implement design practice, entail the specification of the implementable 
planning (structures and) behaviours and control (structures and) 
behaviours of the emergency service personnel and emergency service 
devices of the worksystem, such that when they interact w ith the 
perception (structures and) behaviours and execution (structures and) 
behaviours of the emergency service personnel and emergency service 
devices, they provide support for a disaster, such that the actual level of 
performance falls within some desired level of performance.
Axiom 2.2. HCI-PCMT domain: multiple task work:
Relationships between domain objects give rise to different levels of 
description. Abstract objects constitute higher level descriptions of 
physical objects, and some abstract objects may be higher level 
descriptions of other abstract objects. For the office administration
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domains there are three levels of description: Abstract level 2; Abstract 
level 1; and a Physical level.
EMCRS domain: Multiple task work:
The domain is described at both an abstract and a physical level. At the 
highest level of description (Abstract level 2) is the Disaster object. The 
sub-objects of the domain (Lives sub-object, Disaster Character sub-object. 
Emergency Services sub-object, Disaster Scene sub-object, Property sub­
object, and Environment sub-object) are at a lower abstract level of 
description -  Abstract level 1. At the physical level of description, the 
abstract sub-objects of the domain are realised as physical objects. Abstract 
level 1 objects have realisation attributes whose values specify the physical 
objects of their realisation. These three levels are the same as those for the 
office administration domains.
HCI-PCMT domain
Vertical relationships exist between the values of the attributes at different 
levels of description. Values of attributes at higher levels of description 
are determined by an emergence relationship from the values of attributes 
at lower levels. Horizontal relationships exist between the values of 
attributes at the same level of description.
EMCRS domain
Vertical relationships exist between the values of attributes at different 
levels of description. The realisation relationship between Abstract level 1 
objects and Physical level objects is a many-to-one relationship. The value 
of physical object attributes, determine through emergence, the values of 
Abstract level 1 attributes. In turn, the values of attributes of the Disaster 
object (Abstract level 2) are determined by an emergence relationship from 
the values of attributes at Abstract level 1 - the sub-object attribute values. 
Horizontal relationships exist. There is a relationship between the values 
of the attributes at the same level of description. For example, at Abstract 
Level 1, the Disaster Scene sub-object attribute scene containment value 
contained will require the Lives sub-object emergency services personnel 
safety to have a value of equipped.
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(The words in bold refer to worksystem structures and behaviours or 
domain objects; the words in italics refer to abstract domain object 
attributes; the underlined words refer to domain object attribute values. 
This notation will be used throughout the rest of this thesis.)
HCI-PCMT domain
A task is the required state transformation of a single abstract object at the 
highest level of description, including all lower level transformations, 
associated through object relationships.
EMCRS domain
A  task is the required state transformation of the D isaster object, including 
all lower level transformations of the associated sub-objects.
HCI-PCMT domain
Multiple task work is that domain work in which, at the highest level of 
description, there are typically two or more objects undergoing 
independent, but temporally overlapping work transformations. In office 
administration systems, there are multiple objects at the highest level of 
description.
EMCRS domain
As there is only a single Disaster object, at the highest level of description, 
multiple task work is that domain work in which, at the highest level of 
description, the Disaster objects attributes are undergoing independent, 
but temporally overlapping transformations. This HCI-PCMT extension is 
to accommodate a multi user planning system. (The EMCRS domain thus 
contrasts with the office administration domain, where there are multiple 
objects at the highest level of description.)
HCI-PCMT domain
A  sub-task is some part of the state transformation, which constitutes a 
task. It is a sub-transformation.
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EMCRS domain
The overall task of the EMCRS is to transform the Disaster object to a 
desired level of stability and normality. The primary objectives for 
achieving the desired goal state of the disaster object are 'to  save life, 
prevent escalation of the disaster, to relieve suffering, to facilitate 
investigation of the incident, safeguard the environment, protect property 
and restore normality' (Home Office, 1994). Associated with each of these 
objectives or goals, each of the Emergency Services, involved in the 
EMCRS, has specific tasks to fulfil. It is these tasks, which are described as 
the sub-tasks of the EMCRS. Each of these sub-tasks will have associated 
domain sub-object transformations -  sub-transformations. The required 
transformation of the Disaster Object can be divided into a num ber of sub­
transformations, concerning particular sub-objects and their attributes.
Axiom 2.3. HCI-PCMT zvorksystem: planning and control behaviours and 
structures:
Four types of abstract behaviour are generic to the worksystem and 
undifferentiated between users and devices. These behaviours are 
planning, control, perception and execution, supported by four processes 
and two representations (see Chapter 2, Section 2.1 for full description).
EMCRS worksystem: planning and control behaviours and structures:
Four types of abstract structures and behaviours are modelled, and two 
representations; these behaviours are described in detail with respect to 
the EMCRS in Phase 4 of model development below.
Axiom 2.4 HCI-PCMT performance:
Performance is some function of: the task quality associated with the 
multiple task work carried out; and the resource costs associated with the 
worksystem structures and behaviours of planning and control (incurred 
by the work). (Resource costs are not differentiated between the user and 
devices.)
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EMCRS domain
Performance is some function of: the task quality associated with the 
multiple task work (for example, lives saved, fires contained) and the 
resource costs associated with the worksystem planning and control 
behaviours (for example, plans correct, firemen in place). (As above 
resource costs are not differentiated between the user and devices.)
All the HCI-PCMT axioms have now been re-expressed for the EMCRS.
The next section presents the method for developing the EMCRS model by 
application of these axioms and the HCI-PCMT framework representation.
4.3 Method for model construction
This section describes the method used for constructing the model. This 
description is not a method per se but rather is an initial description of 
how the researcher constructed a model by application of the HCI-PCMT 
framework axioms and representation.
The EMCRS system and domain were modelled, together and iteratively, using 
the HCI-PCMT framework and the data collected from the training session. In 
addition, modelling used researcher experience and knowledge from earlier 
models (Hill et al, 1996); an understanding of the present domain of work - 
managing disasters; and documented information describing the objectives of 
EMCRS behaviours -  see above. Physical domain objects, attributes and values 
were derived from the data. Abstract domain objects (attributes and values) 
were identified from the physical domain objects. EMCRS physical structures 
and behaviours, were derived from the data. The dom ain and the worksystem 
are then expressed using the HCI-PCMT representation.
(The data had offered up potential co-ordination problems within the 
EMCRS. These problems related to conflicts between particular sub-tasks 
being carried out by the different agencies of the EMCRS. Due to the 
complexities of modelling all the EMCRS data, which would involve 
modelling all the different sub-tasks with associated behaviours and 
domain transformations, it was decided that only those sub-tasks 
associated with the identified conflicts would be described by the model. 
Therefore, only structures and behaviours associated with these sub-tasks 
are defined for representation within the model worksystem, and only the
62
sub-object attributes and values associated with these sub-tasks are 
conceptualised for representation within the model domain.)
4.3.1 Phase 1 -  Abstract domain objects
The first phase of model construction was to conceptualise the domain of work 
for the EMCRS worksystem. As described in Chapter 2, and expressed in the 
EMCRS axioms above, the work of the EMCRS is the support of a single D isaster 
Object. This D isaster object is defined at Abstract level 2, the highest level. The 
attributes and values for the Disaster object were conceptualised as stability and 
normality, with values along a continuum. The performance of the EMCRS 
worksystem is expressed by the transformation of the D isaster object's attribute 
values. Each task carried out by the worksystem transforms the attribute values 
of the disaster object. These attribute values change by manipulation of the 
values of the attributes of the sub-objects of the domain. These sub-objects' 
attribute value changes are affected by the sub-tasks of the EMCRS, which are the 
individual agency tasks (also the multiple tasks in EMCRS). The attribute 
normality was conceptualised from the notion that at the beginning of the disaster 
scenario the ’disaster’ is chaos, and the work of the EMCRS is ultimately to 
restore normality, i.e. to bring the disaster under control. Thus, the more 
desirable the level of normality the better the performance of the EMCRS. The 
second attribute -  stability was conceptualised through an understanding of the 
expected overall performance of the EMCRS worksystem - that of stabilising the 
disaster (preventing further loss of life and containing fires and other hazards). 
Both of these attributes' values are changed by the transformation of the sub­
object attribute values. The values for both of these attributes are along a 
continuum. It is not possible to be more explicit about the values as this system is 
so complex. There are multiple users, at multiple levels, carrying out multiple 
tasks. Explicitly identifying individual performance effects is therefore complex, 
and has not been attempted here. However, it is believed that being able to 
express performance through transformations on a continuum will be at a level 
of description appropriate for diagnosing co-ordination design problems.
The other abstract objects, which are sub-objects of the disaster object, were 
conceptualised from: the primary objectives of the EMCRS (see earlier); the 
primary roles/tasks for the emergency services described in Chapter 1; 
information from the exercise narrative; and the data. The sub-objects are the
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Lives sub-object; Disaster Character sub-object; D isaster Scene sub-object; 
Property sub-object, Environment sub-object and Emergency Service sub-object. 
Each of these sub-objects was conceptualised as follows:
Lives sub-object -  is an abstract representation of the people, subjected to the 
disaster. The reasons for conceptualisation are: the prim ary objective of the 
EMCRS is saving lives; the primary task identified by each of the emergency 
services is saving lives; from the narrative, there are foreign and other casualties, 
bodies, trapped people etc; and from the data, rescue and treatm ent of casualties 
is required (Data 1. 4g).
D isaster Character sub-object -  is an abstract representation of information 
relating to the general characteristics of the disaster. One objective of the EMCRS 
is to prevent escalation of the disaster; one role of the Fire Service is to prevent 
escalation of the disaster; from the narrative there has been a goods train crash, 
with leaking aviation fuel; and from the data, the Fire Service need to fight fires 
(Data 1. 4j). Each of these requires the conceptualisation of this sub-object.
D isaster Scene sub-object -  was conceptualised from the requirement to 
represent information, relating to the specific scene, or site of the disaster. An 
objective of the EMCRS is facilitating criminal investigation; one role of the Police 
Service is to preserve the site, one role for the Fire Service is to contain the scene; 
from the narrative, vandalism may be responsible for the derailment; and from 
the data, the inner cordon set-up by Fire Service (Data 1. 4q).
Property sub-object -  was conceptualised from the requirement to represent 
information relating to the physical structures at the site. An objective of the 
EMCRS is protection of property; one role of the Fire Service is protecting 
property; from the narrative, structural damage to buildings and vehicles; and 
from the data, removal of damaged vehicles (Data l.lw ).
Emergency Services sub-object -  was conceptualised from the requirement to 
represent the emergency services equipment that becomes part of the domain.
An objective of the EMCRS is preventing escalation of the disaster; one role of the 
Fire Service is to fight fires; from the narrative, leaking fuels, fires, casualties etc.; 
and from the data, controlling resources and getting access to the scene (Data 1. 
4e, Data 1. 3a).
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Environm ent sub-object -  this sub-object was conceptualised from the 
requirement to represent information relating to environmental issues. An 
objective of the EMCRS is safe-guarding the environment; one role of the Fire 
Service is dealing with chemicals and other hazards; from the narrative, leaking 
aviation fuel is entering the canal and river; from the data, there is floating fuel 
on the river (Datal. 4h).
4.3.2 Phase 2 - Physical domain objects
The second phase was to analyse the data to give the physical level of description 
for the model. The physical objects and attributes are shown in the tables below. 
The objects and attributes are split into groups that relate to the conceptualised 
sub-objects. Table 1 thus, gives the attributes of the 'people' at the incident, 
which relate directly to the Lives object. Where a node could not continue, due to 
lack of space, its attributes are represented in another table, for example, 
survivors. Each table will be explained in turn. Which data points each node 
corresponds to are given in brackets in each node. The data is shown in 
Appendices 1 and 2. Sometimes a node will not be directly traceable to the data 
but will be traceable to the narrative. The Exercise Scorpio narrative is by its very 
nature the emergency services representation of the domain of the disaster. 
Although the following physical domain objects are for model dataset 1, these 
physical objects are the same for model dataset 2. In Chapter 5 where model 
dataset 2 is described only those physical domain objects that are different from 
model dataset 1 are given. Therefore in the following tables reference is given to 
both datasets.
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Dead
(narrative, Data 
2.1r)
Where located 
(Data l.lx; Data 
2.A16; Data 2.1m)
Foreign
(narrative, Data 2.1p)
Survivors
(narrative)
People Dead
(narrative)
Where located 
(Data l.lx; Data 
2.A16; Data 2.1m)
UK
(narrative, Data 2.1g)
Survivors
(narrative)
Evacuees 
(Data 2.8b; Data 
l.lo; Data 2.C6)
Where located 
(Data 1.4k; Data 
l.lo; Data 2.1g))
Mobility 
(Data l.lo; 
Data 2.1g)
ES personnel 
(Data l.li; Data 
1.3g; Data 2.5a; 
Data 2.9a; Data 
2.6c)
Table 1 People object attributes and values (dispositional)
In Table 1, the physical object attributes and values are shown for the people in 
the incident. The attributes and values shown are dispositional, inasmuch as 
they are based on information that the worksystem needs to know about, or 
perceive, but that the work of the worksystem will not change, for example, 
where an evacuee is located. A distinction has been m ade between evacuees and 
survivors. Evacuees are those people who have not been directly affected by the 
incident, but live in the vicinity and so are at risk from the incident and will need 
to be evacuated. Survivors are those people who have been directly affected by 
the incident. The emergency service (ES) personnel are only present as a 
dispositional attribute, with respect to whether they have safety equipm ent or 
not.
Tables 2 and 3 show the physical attributes and values for the node survivors, 
and emergency services personnel respectively, from Table 1 above. These are 
again dispositional attributes. The affordant attributes for these nodes are shown 
in the following tables. The affordant and dispositional attributes and values are
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shown independently to enable a more accurate description of the work of the 
EMCRS. The work is complex, deciding on the relationships between the 
attributes and values is therefore complex, especially for the 'people' or 'lives/ 
Describing the attributes and values separately enables a more systematic 
analysis of the EMCRS domain.
Survivors
(UK,
Foreign)
Mobile
Injured
(narrative; 
Data 1.31; 
Data l.lp )
Inaccessible 
(Data 1.4g)
Trapped
(narrative)
Not trapped
Accessible
Uninjured Inaccessible 
(Data 1.4g)
Trapped 
(narrative) 
N ot trapped
Accessible
Immobile
Injured
(narrative; 
Data 1.31; 
Data l.lp )
Inaccessible 
(Data 1.4g)
Trapped
(narrative)
Not trapped
Accessible
Uninjured Inaccessible 
(Data 1.4g)
Trapped 
(narrative) 
Not trapped
Accessible
Table 2 Survivors physical attributes and values (dispositional)
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Emergency Service (ES) Personnel
Safety equipped 
(Data l.li; Data 1.3g; Data 2.5a; Data 2.6c; 
Data 2.9a)
Safety unequipped
Table 3 ES personnel physical attributes and values (dispositional)
Survivors
Not 
rescued 
(Data 2.C7)
Rescued 
(Data 1.4g; 
Data 2.4i)
Not
triaged
(Data
1.13a)
Triaged
(Data
2.A12)
Transported 
(not treated) 
(Data 1.31)
Information 
recorded at hospital
Treated
(not transported)
Casualty bureau 
logged
(Data 1.31; Data 2.1h; 
Data 2.8c)
Personal information 
recorded
(Data l.lp; Data 1.10b; 
Data 2.1i; Data 2.7k)
Table 4 Survivors physical attributes and values (affordant)
Not rescued
(Data 2.1g; Data
l.lo )
Evacuees Rescued
(Data 2.8b)
Table 5 Evacuees physical attributes and values (affordant)
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Table 4 and 5 show the affordant attributes and values for the nodes 
survivor and evacuees. Affordant attributes are those attributes, whose 
value changes constitute the work of the worksystem. The distinction 
between affordant and dispositional attributes was described in Chapter 2, 
Section 2.1.
Site of 
disaster 
(Data 1.1b)
Inaccessible
site
(narrative; Data 
1.7b; Data 1.1b; 
Data 1.4q)
Market town 
location
(narrative)
Restrict 
access to the 
site
(Data 2.A4; Data 
1.1c)
Contain site 
with outer 
cordon 
(Data 1.1c; Data 
l.lv; Data 1.9b; 
Data 2.A2; Data 
2.A4; Data 2.B2)
Disaster
area
Crime scene 
(Data 1.1b; Data 
1.3j; Data 2.B3)
Preserve site 
for evidence 
(Data 1.1b; Data 
2.1c; Data 2.3a)
Access points 
(Data 1.3a; Data 
2.A4; Data 2.B3; 
Data 2.2a)
Location 
(Data 2.7i; Data 
1.3a; Data 1.4q)
Suitable for 
Fire Service 
(Data 1.3a; Data 
2.4n; Data 2.6b)
Scene of 
disaster 
(Data 1.1b)
Contained by 
inner cordon 
(Data 1.3g; Data 
1.9a; Data 1.4r; 
Data 2.C5; Data 
2.A10)
Table 6 Disaster area physical attributes and values
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Table 6 shows the physical objects attributes and values that relate to the 
Disaster Scene sub-object. The attributes and values both, affordant and 
dispositional are shown. It is not required to separate the two types of 
attribute at this level of description for this object, as the distinction will be 
made at Abstract level 1, the attributes and values of the domain sub­
objects. For all the remaining tables no distinction is made at this level of 
description between the different types of attributes.
Aviation fuel fires
(narrative)
Disaster classification Goods train crash Explosion
(narrative) (narrative)
Aviation fuel fumes
(narrative)
Aviation fuel
(narrative)
Table 7 Disaster classification physical attributes and values
Table 7 shows the object attributes and values that relate to the D isaster 
Character sub-object.
Severely damaged 
(narrative; Data 
2.A10))
Buildings
(narrative)
Damaged
Property Burning
Vehicles
(narrative)
Damaged 
(Data l.lw )
Not burning 
(narrative)
Table 8 Property physical attributes and values
Table 8 shows the physical object attributes and values that relate to the 
Property sub-object of the domain.
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Emergency services Available Usable
equipment (Data 1.4d; Data (Data 1.1c; Data
1.4e; Data 1.7e; Data 1.3a; Data 1.4q;
2.4j; Data 2.2b; Data Data 1.12d; Data
2.7b; Data 2.1b) 2.4n; Data 2.6b; 
Data 2.7i; Data 
2.B8)
Table 9 ES equipment physical attributes and values
Table 9 shows the physical object attributes and values that relate to the 
Emergency services sub-object. The emergency services equipm ent is 
only represented in the domain here with respect to making the 
equipment and available and usable which is part of the work of the 
EMCRS worksystem.
Canal
(narrative)
Environment Waterways Aviation fuel
(narrative) Sewers
(narrative)
contamination 
possible 
(Data 1.4h; Data 
2.A9; Data 2.A17; 
Data 2.4h)
River
(narrative)
Table 10 Environment physical attributes and values
Table 10 shows the physical object attributes and values that relate to the 
Environment sub-object of the domain.
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4.3.3 Phase 3 abstract domain objects attributes and values
The third phase of model development was to conceptualise the attributes 
and values of the sub-objects. As stated above attributes can be affordant 
or dispositional. Dispositional attributes are relevant to the work (they 
need to be perceived by the worksystem), but their transformation does 
not itself constitute work. Affordant attribute value changes constitute the 
work of the EMCRS worksystem. As described in the EMCRS axioms 
above, the attributes and values for the sub-objects, at Abstract Level 1, are 
determined by an emergence relationship with the physical object 
attributes and values. The realisation relationship between Abstract Level 
1 objects and Physical Level objects is a many-to-one relationship. For 
example, for the survivor attribute at the physical level there are many 
values -  triaged, foreign, injured etc. The Lives sub-object does not have a 
survivor attribute with many values. Each identified value at the physical 
level has its own attribute representation at the abstract level, so there are 
survivor V  attributes with singular values (for example, for rescue, there 
is an attribute of survivor rescue status, with values of rescued or not 
rescued). Thus, for this object, there is a many-to-one emergence 
relationship between the attributes and values. The justification for this 
m apping is the knowledge of the work of the EMCRS, and how to 
represent this work so that design problems can be diagnosed. Thus, the 
work of the EMCRS has many sub-tasks carried out by the individual 
agencies of the EMCRS. The transformation of the attribute values of 
Abstract Level 1 comprises this work. To distinguish between the different 
sub-task transformations accurately, the attributes m ust be realised by this 
mapping, so that each individual value change can be demonstrated.
These changes support an accurate description of the task quality of the 
work in reference to the worksystem behaviours, thus, expressing EMCRS 
performance and so design problems. All the sub-object attributes and 
values are shown in the tables below.
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Dispositional attributes Value
Victims location X
Victims nationality Y
Survivor mobility Immobile / mobile
Survivor condition Uninjured/ injured
Survivor location Inaccessible/ accessible
Survivor nationality Z
Evacuees location X
Evacuee mobility Mobile / immobile
Survivors entrapment Not trapped/ trapped
Emergency services 
Personnel safety
Unequipped / equipped
Table 11 Lives sub-object dispositional attributes and values
Affordant attributes Value
Survivor personal information Unrecorded / recorded
Survivor information Casualty bureau un­
logged/logged
Survivor/evacuee rescue status Not rescued/rescued
Survivor treatment status Not treated/treated
Survivor transport status Not transported/transport*
Survivor triage status Untriaged /  triaged
Table 12 Lives sub-object affordant attributes and values
Dispositional attribute Value
Scene/site accessibility Easy/difficult
Location Market town
Affordant attributes Value
Scene containment U ncontained / contained
Site preservation Unpreserved / preserved
Site containment Uncontained/ contained
Access point position Unlocated / located
Access point suitability Unsuitable/suitable
Site status No crime scene/crime scene
Table 13 Disaster Scene sub-object attributes and values
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Dispositional attribute Value
Type Fire, hazardous material, 
explosion
Class Transport
Affordant attributes Value
Fire status U ncontrolled / controlled
Hazardous materials 
status
Uncontrolled/controlled
Explosion status Uncontrolled/ controlled
Table 14 Disaster Character sub-object attributes and values
Dispositional attribute Value
Type Buildings and vehicles
Buildings condition Undamaged /  damaged
Vehicle condition Undamaged /  damaged
Affordant attributes Value
Buildings status Not at risk/ at risk
Vehicles status Not at risk/ at risk
Table 15 Property sub-object attributes and values
Affordant attributes Value
Equipment availability Not available/available
Equipment condition Non-utilizable/utilizable
Table 16 Emergency Services sub-object attributes and values
Dispositional attribute Value
Type Waterway
Affordant attributes Value
Waterway status Not at risk/ at risk
Table 17 Environment sub-object attributes and values 
4.3.4 Phase 4 worksystem structures
Phase 4 of model construction was to describe the EMCRS abstract and 
physical worksystem. The EMCRS abstract worksystem is defined in 
terms of the abstract cognitive structures, identified within the HCI-PCMT 
framework. The physical worksystem structures were identified from
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analysis of the data, from information about EMCRS structures, and 
information about the required personnel and resources for particular 
worksystem behaviours (specified in the roles/ tasks of the different 
services). Thus, from information on the EMCRS, we have commanders at 
the tactical and operational levels of control. From information on 
roles/tasks for the emergency services, and from the data (Datal. la), one 
role of the Police Service is the preservation of the scene for evidence and 
enquiries. Preserving the scene will require Police personnel to manage 
the scene. All the physical structures required for model diagnosis of 
design problems from the identified conflicts are represented in the model. 
These abstract and physical structures are shown in the model below.
The behaviours associated with these structures are as follows: Perception 
behaviours are those, whereby the worksystem acquires information 
about Property, Lives and other domain objects, such as their risk status, 
and records these values. The states of the domain objects form the 
contents of the Knowledge-of-tasks representation. Perception 
behaviours update the contents of the Knowledge-of-tasks representation, 
based on the reading of the domain; for example that there are properties 
at risk. Execution behaviours are those which carry out the work of the 
worksystem by transforming the values of the domain object attributes 
values directly; for example, treating injured survivors at the scene 
transforms the Lives sub-object attribute survivor status from untreated to 
treated. These execution behaviours will in turn transform the Disaster 
object to a more desired level of stability along its continuum. Planning 
behaviours are those that specify what an d /o r how tasks will be 
accomplished in terms of required object state transformations an d /o r 
required worksystem behaviours, for example, that the site should be 
declared a crime scene, which requires Police personnel to patrol it.
Control behaviours select which behaviours should be carried out next, 
based on the contents of the plan and Knowledge-of-tasks representation. 
A plan representation structure embodies the plans used in the combined 
response. These structures are distributed across the different levels of the 
worksystem, i.e. strategic, tactical and operational.
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4.4 Model for Dataset 1
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Figure 1 Model for Dataset 1
Figure 1 shows the Model for Dataset 1. The model shows the abstract and 
physical structures of the worksystem on the left hand-side of the 
diagram. At the abstract level, the three tier structure of the EMCRS, 
operational, tactical and strategic, is depicted (but interactions within and 
between levels are not shown). These abstract structures are distributed 
across the physical worksystem structures. This distribution is not shown 
here, due to the limitations of the representation, but is described in detail 
in the model behaviour conflict descriptions in Chapter 6. The abstract 
structures representation is the same as that shown in Chapter 2. That is, 
an oval depicts a process structure, a rectangle depicts a representation 
structure, a read arrow depicts a process reading from the contents of a 
representation, and a write arrow depicts a process writing to the contents 
of a representation. The physical level shows all those structures that have 
been identified as necessary to inform the abstract structures of the 
worksystem for the conflicts, identified within the data. On the right-hand
76
side, the domain objects, attributes and values are shown, both abstract 
and physical. The physical level objects' attributes and values are not 
shown in full, as they have already been described in full in Section 4.3 
above. The links between the abstract sub-objects and the physical objects, 
shown with a dotted line, define the abstract to physical realisation 
relationship. The full lines between the Disaster object and the other sub­
objects define a part-of relationship. The attributes with a star (*) are 
dispositional. There are issues with the model representation, which relate 
to the EMCRS characteristics, identified in Chapter 2. Thus, the model 
does not represent a changing worksystem, or interactions within and 
between the different horizontal and vertical layers of the system. These 
issues are addressed fully in Chapter 7.
Once constructed, the model can then be used to describe the work of the 
worksystem with respect to the planning, controlling, perceiving and 
executing behaviours and the transformations these behaviours effect in 
the domain. These model descriptions will provide an expression of the 
effectiveness or performance of the EMCRS by showing how well the 
work is performed (the quality of work) in terms of domain 
transformations, and the resource costs to the worksystem for carrying out 
these transformations. Model descriptions have been produced for each 
EMCRS sub-task, where there is a potential co-ordination design issue, as 
identified from the data. These descriptions are given in full in Chapter 6.
4.5 Co-ordination design problems
The EMCRS model has been used to describe tasks carried out by the 
EMCRS, in terms of the planning, control, perception and execution 
behaviours and the transformations these behaviours effect on the 
domain. However, sometimes, behaviours that perform these different 
tasks conflict. These 'conflict' behaviours are used to identify potential 
planning and control co-ordination design problems between agencies.
For example, in the training exercise, the Fire Service set-up an inner 
cordon for safety at the scene and require safety equipm ent to be worn by 
anyone entering the cordon. The Ambulance Service w ant to locate 
casualties at the scene, but for safety reasons (they are not wearing the 
correct equipment), they are not allowed access to the cordon by the Fire
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Service. This between service behaviour 'conflict' may signal a potential 
co-ordination design problem, expressed as overall EMCRS 
ineffectiveness. Performance may be reduced by either hindering goal 
achievement, for example, by reducing life-saving behaviours, an d /o r by 
rendering system resource costs unacceptable, for example, requiring 
excessive personnel effort. Thus, 'conflict' behaviours have been used to 
diagnose EMCRS co-ordination design problems. An explicit EMCRS 
axiom expression of a behaviour conflict is now given to support co­
ordination design problem diagnosis through behaviour conflict 
identification.
A behaviour conflict is described by the model at the second level of 
description (Abstract Level 1), in two cases: either, two or more sub-objects 
are undergoing independent, but temporally overlapping transformations, 
which conflict, for example, the transformation of the D isaster Scene sub­
object when a crime scene is declared (by the Police Service), and the 
transformation of the Disaster Character sub-object whilst preventing 
escalation of the disaster (by the Fire Service); or, two or more attributes of 
a sub-object are undergoing independent, but temporally overlapping 
transformations, which conflict, for example, the transformation of the 
Lives sub-object, when witness information is being recorded (by the 
Police Service), and transformation of the Lives sub-object, when 
survivors are being transported to hospital (by the Ambulance Service). In 
both of these types of conflict, one of the sub-objects will not be 
transformed as desired. A task in EMCRS as described above is, the 
required state transformation of the Disaster object, including all lower 
level transformations of the associated sub-objects. These state 
transformations are realised by the sub-transformations of the sub-objects. 
If a sub-object is not transformed as desired, then the D isaster object will 
not be transformed as desired. Task quality is expressed by desired state 
transformations of the Disaster object. This expression of a behaviour 
conflict, therefore, identifies a the conflict as reducing task quality. The 
model, in addition, allows identification of the worksystem structures and 
behaviours, associated with the behaviour conflict and so allows an 
expression of the resource costs. Performance of the EMCRS is expressed 
as a function of task quality and resource costs. A behaviour conflict is,
78
thus, diagnosed by the model as causing ineffective performance of the 
EMCRS. Thus, a behaviour conflict is diagnosed as a design problem, as 
actual performance does not equal desired performance. The design 
problem diagnosed is a planning and control co-ordination design 
problem. The EMCRS model is an HCI-PCMT model, and thus diagnoses 
planning and control design problems.
How to explicitly diagnose co-ordination design problems from the 
identified conflict behaviours will be described in Chapter 6. Four 
behaviour conflicts were identified in Dataset 1. These were: 
tram pling/scene preservation; cordon restrictions; witness reporting; and 
access of fire appliances. Each of these is described by the model in 
chapter 6.
4.6 Chapter Summary
This chapter has presented the first cycle of model development. The first 
set of data has been discussed, and application of the HCI-PCMT 
framework axioms, and representation, to this data have been described. 
The first model -  Model Dataset 1 has been presented. How this model 
can be used to diagnose co-ordination design problems of the EMCRS 
through behaviour conflict identification, has been described. Issues with 
the current model representation have been identified. The following 
chapter will present the next cycle of model development.
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Chapter 5 
EMCRS model development -  cycle two
Introduction
This chapter presents the second cycle of model construction, using data 
gathered at the second observation of exercise Scorpio -  Dataset 2. The 
method for model construction, presented in Chapter 4, is then applied to 
model these data. Resulting changes in the domain and worksystem 
representations for EMCRS, at both an abstract and physical level with 
respect to Dataset 2, are presented, in Section 2. The model for Dataset 2 is 
presented in Section 3, along with details of behaviour conflicts identified 
by the model.
5.1 Dataset 2
The second seminar attended was identical in format to the first. However, 
this time the researcher was attached to a syndicate that followed the 
complete exercise. Thus, data were recorded for all the considerations 
given in the exercise procedure. The data were recorded in the same way -  
by note taking, and receiving the print-outs from the whiteboards after the 
presentations. There were again 60 emergency service personnel present 
with representatives from each of the emergency services, and local 
authority chief executives. The raw data were expanded as in Dataset 1. 
The raw data and more complete data are presented in a tabular form, in 
Appendix 2.
To develop the EMCRS models, the HCI-PCMT framework was applied to 
the data. This application was twofold, involving the HCI-PCMT axioms, 
and representation. These two stages were carried out together and 
iteratively. The EMCRS framework axioms have already been presented 
in Chapter 4. These axioms remain the same for Dataset 2. The next 
section describes the construction of the EMCRS model this dataset.
5.2 Model construction
The model was constructed using the method for model construction 
described in the previous chapter. Due to the data being collected at a 
second running of the same exercise, exercise Scorpio, the model
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constructed has few differences to the model for Dataset 1. Thus, Dataset 
2 supports the model constructed from Dataset 1, and suggests it is 
typical.
5.2.1 Phase 1 -  abstract domain objects
The domain of work for the EMCRS was conceptualised, as for Dataset 1, 
as the support of a single Disaster Object. The attributes and values for 
the Disaster object were also the same, normality and stability with values 
along a continuum.
The other abstract objects, which are sub-objects of the disaster object, 
were also conceptualised as the same as Dataset 1, i.e. Lives sub-object: 
Disaster Character sub-object; Disaster Scene sub-object; Property sub­
object; Environment sub-object and Emergency Services sub-object. 
Dataset 2 served to reinforce the conceptualisation of these sub-objects. 
Each sub-object is listed below with selected data points from Dataset 2 to 
illustrate this reinforcement.
Lives sub-object: Data 2. C6, Data 2. C7, Data 2.1p, Data 2.4i, Data 2.8b 
refer to people or lives in the domain.
Disaster Character sub-object: Data 2. C l and Data 2. C8 refer to the 
aviation fuel. Data 2. A7 refers to the fires.
Disaster Scene sub-object: Data 2. A6 and Data 2. B1 refer to Police 
cordons, Data 2. A. 10 and Data 2. C5 refer to Fire cordons, Data 2. 2a and 
Data 2.4n refer to access.
Property sub-object: Data 2. lg  and Data 2. 4b refer to the structural 
damage at the site.
Environment sub-object: Data 2.4h, Data 2. A9, and Data 2. 4s all refer to 
the aviation fuel contamination of the river and canal.
Emergency Services sub-object: Data 2. 2b and Data 2.7b refer to 
emergency service resources.
Once the sub-objects of the domain had been defined, the next phase of 
model construction was to define the physical level of description for the 
domain.
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5.2.2 Phase 2 - physical domain objects
The second phase was to analyse the data to give the physical level of 
description for the model. Most of these physical level object descriptions 
were the same as for Dataset 1. The one conflict that had not been 
identified in Dataset 1 was that of decontamination. The addition of 
physical attributes for contamination are shown in the tables below. Also, 
in Dataset 1 witness reporting was identified as a conflict but Dataset 2 did 
not reflect this conflict. Only those tables, where this addition and 
subtraction require changes are shown. All the other tables for physical 
object attributes and values shown in Chapter 4, for Dataset 1, are the 
same for Dataset 2, and so are not shown here. Table 1 shows the changes 
to the physical object dispositional attributes and values for the 'people', 
with the addition of information on contamination.
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Dead Where located
(narrative, Data (Data l.lx; Data
2.1r) 2.A16; Data 2.1m)
Foreign Survivors
(narrative)
Contaminated Dead Where located
(Data 2.6g) (narrative) (Data l.lx; Data 
2.A16; Data 2.1m)
UK Survivors
(narrative)
Evacuees Where located Mobility
(Data 2.8b; Data (Data 1.4k; Data (Data l.lo;
l.lo; Data 2.C6) l.lo; Data 2.1g)) Data 2.1g)
People ES personnel 
(Data l.li; Data 
1.3g; Data 2.5a; 
Data 2.9a; Data 
2.6c)
Dead Where located
(narrative) (Data l.lx; Data 
2.A16; Data 2.1m)
UK Survivors
(narrative)
Evacuees Where located Mobility
(Data 2.8b; Data (Data 1.4k; Data (Data l.lo;
l.lo; Data 2.C6) l.lo; Data 2.1g)) Data 2.1g)
Uncontaminated ES personnel 
(Data l.li; Data 
1.3g; Data 2.5a; 
Data 2.9a; Data 
2.6c)
Foreign Dead
(narrative, Data 
2.1r)
Where located 
(Data l.lx; Data 
2.A16; Data 2.1m)
Survivors
(narrative)
Table 1 People physical attributes and values (dispositional)
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Not 
rescued 
(Data 2.C7)
Treated De­
contaminated 
(Data 2.9b; Data 
2.7h)
Personal 
information 
recorded 
(Data 2.7k; Data 
2.1i; Data 1.10b; 
Data l.lp )
Survivors Contaminated Not de­
contaminated 
(Data 2.6g)
Rescued 
(Data 2.4i)
Triaged
(Data
2.A12)
Not
treated
De­
contaminated 
(Data 2.9b; Data 
2.7h)
Transported
Not de­
contaminated 
(Data 2.6g)
Table 2 Survivors physical attributes and values (affordant)
Emergency 
services personnel
Uncontaminated
Contaminated Decontaminated 
(Data 2.4u)
Table 3 ES personnel physical attributes and values (affordant)
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Evacuees Contaminated
Not 
rescued 
(Data 2.1g)
Rescued 
(Data 2.8b)
De-contaminated 
(Data 2.9b)
N ot de­
contaminated
Table 4 Evacuees physical attributes and values (affordant)
Tables 2, 3 and 4 show the changes to the affordant attributes and values 
for the nodes survivor, evacuees and emergency service personnel, with 
the addition of contamination information.
Uncontaminated
Emergency Available Usable Contaminated Decontaminated
services (Data 1.4d; (Data 1.1c; (Data 2.9b)
equipment Data 1.4e; Data Data 1.3a;
1.7e; Data 2.4j; Data 1.4q;
Data 2.2b; Data
Data 2.7b; 1.12d;
Data 2.1b) Data 2.4n;
Data 2.6b;
Data 2.7i;
Data 2.B8)
Table 5 ES equipment physical attributes and values (affordant)
Table 5 shows the changes to the physical object attributes and values for 
the emergency services equipment object, with the addition of 
contamination information.
These changes to the physical object representation will realise changes in 
the abstract sub-object representations. These changes are discussed in the 
next section.
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5.2.3 Phase 3 - abstract domain objects attributes and values
The third phase of model development was to conceptualise the attributes 
and values of the sub-objects. For Dataset 2 ,the abstract domain sub­
objects attributes and values are as for Dataset 1 except for: those which 
have been realised from the physical object attribute changes relating to 
contamination; and those which are not reflected in these data, relating to 
witness reporting.
Dispositional attributes Value
Emergency services 
Personnel status
Uncontaminated/ contaminated
Survivor/ evacuee 
contamination status
Uncontaminated / contaminated
Table 6 Lives sub-object dispositional attributes and values
Affordant attributes Value
Survivor/evacuee contamination 
status
Contaminated/ decontaminated
Emergency services Personnel 
contamination status
Contaminated/ decontaminated
Table 7 Lives sub-object affordant attributes and values
Dispositional attribute Value
Equipment status Uncontaminated / contaminated
Affordant attributes Value
Equipment contamination 
status
Contaminated / decontaminated
Table 8 Emergency Services sub-object attributes and values
Once the domain sub-objects attributes and values are defined, the next 
phase of model construction is to define the worksystem.
5.2.4 Phase 4 - worksystem structures
Phase 4 of model construction was to describe the EMCRS abstract and 
physical worksystem. The EMCRS abstract worksystem is defined in
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terms of the abstract cognitive structures identified by the HCI-PCMT 
framework. The physical worksystem structures were identified from 
analysis of the data, information about EMCRS structures, and 
information about the required personnel and resources for particular 
worksystem behaviours (specified in the roles/ tasks of the different 
services). The changes to the physical worksystem representation through 
Dataset 2 are shown in Model-Dataset 2, and reflect the data. That is, there 
are additions to the worksystem physical structures with respect to 
contamination as identified above. The additions to the physical 
worksystem structures resulting from this information are reflected in the 
model representation below.
5.3 Model from dataset 2
E M C R S  A b stract W ork system  S tructures
Strategic
T actica l
O perational
EMCRS Abstract Domain Objects
f  D IS A S T E R  O B JE C T
Stab ility  (con tinuum )
. n o rm ality  (con tinuum )
'victims • location*
• nationality1 
survivor/ - mobility* 
evacuees - location* 
survivor • nationality*
• condition*
• entrapment 
survivor /evacuee rescue status 
survivor treatment status 
survivor transport status 
survivor triage status 
survivor /evacuee personal Info, 
survivor /evacuee 
contamination status
L IV E S  S U B -O B JE C T
• mobile/immobile
• accessible/inaccessible
• unlnjured/lqjured
• not trapped/trapped
• rescued/not rescued
• treated/not treated
• transported/not transported 
- triaged/untriaged
• recorded/unrecorded
• contaminated/decontaminated
emergency services personnel safety* * equlpt/unequlpt 
emergency services personnel status* • contamlnated/uncontamlnated
emergency services personnel 
contamination status
• contaminated/decontaminated
location*
scene/site accessibility1 
site status
fbiSAsYEft'^ENE SUft-6ftJEET---- >
market town 
easy/difficult 
crime scene/ 
no crime scene 
scene containment • contained/uncontained
site containment • contalned/uncontalned 
site preservation - preserved/unpreserved
access point position • located/unlocated 
access point suitability - suitable/unsuitable .
7 ^f  n iS A S T FD IS A S T E R  C H A R A C T E R  
S U B -O B JE C T
class* • transport 
type* • fire
• hazardous material
• explosion
status * controlled/uncontrolled 
(for each type)
M  \ !
P R O P E R T Y  S U B -O B JE C T  
type* • buildings
• vehicles 
buildings/vehicles • damaged/ 
condition undamaged
bulldlngs/vehlcles • at risk/not at risk 
status
EM ER G EN C Y  SERV ICES S U B - O b j / c r '  ^
equipment availability • available/unavailable 
equipment condition * utillzable/ non-utillzable 
equipment status* -uncontamlnated/contamlnated 
^equipment contamination status - contaminated/decontaminated
r  E N V IR O N M E N T  SU B -O B JE C T  
type • waterway* 
waterway status • at risk/
V  not at risk
TACTICAL COMMAND
incident officer 
support Miff 
control v chide on ailc 
idephooH
communication equipmcn 
lof of action* taken
support Half 
control vchick on ate 
telephones
commit ic ah op equipment 
log of actions taken
Ambulance service
incident officer 
support ud f 
control vehicle in  Me 
telephones
communication equipment 
log of actions taken
OPERATIONAL COMMAND
f i n  Service 4 commmdera 
fire fighting equipment 
rescue equipment 
decootnniaalion equipment 
communication equipment 
firemen
Pubes Service 
brotit incident offitet 
scene numagemeat personae 
outer cordon personnel 
Rendezvous points personnel 
maohallin* area personnel
ambulance personnel for:
•control of ambulances 
-rescue of bedridden 
•removal of casualties
UK
1^%
People
Foreign
D isaste r area 
scene  o f  site  o f  
d isaste r d isaste r
E m ergency
serv ices
equ ipm en t
Property  
B uild ings vehicles
EM C R S^h^ica^om ah^O bjecte
D isaster 
c lass ifica tion  
goods tra in  c rash< 3 <i f  §
e n v i r o n m e n t
w aterw ays
EMCRS model for dataset 2
The model for Dataset 2 is very similar to the model for Dataset 1. The 
model shows the abstract and physical worksystem on the left hand-side 
of the diagram. At the abstract level, the three tier structure of the EMCRS, 
operational, tactical and strategic is depicted (but interactions within and
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between levels are not shown). These abstract structures are distributed 
across the physical worksystem structures. This distribution is not shown 
here, due to the limitations of the representation, but is described in detail 
in the model behaviour conflict descriptions in Chapter 6. The abstract 
structures representation is the same as that shown in Chapter 2 and as 
reiterated in Chapter 4, in the description of the model for Dataset 1. The 
physical level shows all those structures, that have been identified as 
necessary to inform the abstract structures of the worksystem, for the 
conflicts identified by the data, and include here a structure for 
decontamination. On the right-hand side, the domain objects, attributes 
and values are shown, both abstract and physical. The physical level 
objects attributes and values are not shown in full, as this representation is 
unable to support them. However, they have already been described with 
respect to Dataset 2 in Section 5.2 above. The physical objects attribute 
value changes identified in Section 5.2 are, however, shown -  those that 
relate to contamination. The changes they realise in the abstract domain 
objects attributes and values are also shown. The other change to the 
abstract domain objects attributes and values is with respect to Dataset 2 
not reflecting Dataset 1 as concerns witness reporting. Thus, all references 
to this are removed in model Dataset 2. The links between the abstract 
sub-objects and the physical objects, shown with a dotted line, define the 
abstract to physical realisation relationship. The full lines between the 
Disaster object and the other sub-objects define a part-of relationship. As 
for model Dataset 1, the starred (*) attributes are dispositional.
There are issues with the model representation, as for Dataset 1, which 
relate to the EMCRS characteristics, identified in Chapter 2. Thus, the 
model does not represent a changing worksystem, or interactions within 
and between the different horizontal and vertical layers of the system. 
These issues are addressed fully in Chapter 7.
Once constructed, the model can then be used to describe the work of the 
worksystem with respect to the planning, control, perception and 
execution behaviours and the transformations these behaviours effect in 
the domain. These model descriptions will provide an expression of the 
effectiveness, or performance, of the EMCRS, by showing how well the 
work is performed (the quality of work) in terms of domain
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transformations, and the resource costs to the worksystem for carrying out 
these transformations. Four behaviour 'conflicts' which are potential co­
ordination design problems were identified with the model: 
tram pling/scene preservation; access of fire appliances; cordon 
restrictions; decontamination. These conflicts are therefore the same as 
identified with Dataset 1, with the addition of decontamination and the 
subtraction of witness reporting (Dataset 2 does not identify witness 
reporting as a behaviour conflict). The model identifies these behaviour 
conflicts as co-ordination design problems, as expressed in Section 4.5. 
How explicitly to diagnose co-ordination design problems from the 
identified behaviour conflicts is described in Chapter 6
5.4 Chapter Summary
This chapter has presented the second cycle of model development. The 
set of data collected from the second running of exercise Scorpio has been 
discussed. The method for model construction has been applied to these 
data to produce model -  Dataset 2. This model reflects the differences in 
the two datasets. Four behaviour conflicts have been identified with this 
model, which will be explicitly described in Chapter 6. Issues with the 
current model representation were identified as the same as for model 
Dataset 1, these issues will be addressed in Chapter 7. The following 
chapter will present Model 1, the combined model from the two datasets, 
the method for diagnosing co-ordination design problems and use of the 
method to diagnose each of the different behaviour conflicts, identified by 
the data, as co-ordination design problems.
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Chapter 6 
EMCRS design problem diagnosis
Introduction
This chapter presents EMCRS Model 1 the combined model from both 
datasets and uses it to diagnose EMCRS coordination design problems, by 
means of behaviour conflict identification. Section 1 presents EMCRS 
Model 1. Section 2 presents the diagnosis method for identifying co­
ordination design problems from the behaviour conflicts. This method for 
diagnosis is then applied. Section 3 presents each stage of the application 
of the method and, thus, diagnoses EMCRS co-ordination design 
problems. Finally, Section 4 discusses appropriate performance expression 
with EMCRS Model 1.
6.1 EMCRS Model 1 - Combined Datasets 1 and 2
E M C R S A bstract W orksystem  S tructures
I KNOWLEDGE-OF-TASKS I
Strategic
T actical
O perational
EMCRS Abstract Domain Objects
TACTICAL COMMAND
incident officer 
support staff
idephune*
communkauuo equipaion
Polk* S*rvic* 
incident officer 
support auTT 
control vehicle on eilc 
telephone*
communication equipment 
log of actions taken
Ambulance service
incident officer
telephones
communication equipment 
log of actions taken
OPERATIONAL COMM ND
4 .-Sate**
fue nybtng equipment
decontamination equipment 
conununicmiao equipment
Police Sortie* 
bronze incident officer 
acene management penonne 
outer cordon personnel 
Rendezvous puinta peraaone 
marshalling area personnel 
casualty bureau personnel
Ambulance Service 
ambulance personnel for
-rescue of bedridden 
Ambulances
D IS A S T E R  O B JE C T
S tab ility  (con tinuum ) 
n o rm ality  (con tinuum )
victims • location*
- nationality* 
survivor/ • mobility* 
evacuees • location* 
survivor - nationality*
• condition*
• entrapment 
survivor /evacuee rescue status 
survivor treatment status 
survivor transport status 
survivor triage status 
survivor /evacuee personal Info, 
survivor /evacuee casualty bureau Info. • recorded/unrecorded 
survivor /evacuee
contamination status • contaminated/decontaminated
emergency services personnel safety* • equlpt/unequlpt 
emergency services personnel status* • contamlnated/un* 
emergency services personnel 
contamination status
L IV E S  S U B -O B JE C T
- uninjured/injured
- not trapped/trapped
- rescued/not rescued
- treated/not treated
- transported/not transported
- trlaged/untrlaged 
recorded/unrecorded
( D ISA ST E R  SC E N E  S U B -O B JE C T  
location* - market town
scene/site accessibility*- easy/dlfflcult 
site status • crime scene/
no crime scene 
scene containment • contalned/uncontalned 
site containment • contalned/uncontalned
site preservation - preserved/unpreserved 
access point position • located/unlocated 
access point suitability • suitable/unsuitable
7
D IS A S T E R  C H A R A C T E R  
S U B -O B JE C T  
class* • transport 
type* • fire
- hazardous material
- explosion
status - controlled/uncontrolled 
(for each type)
T~T
PR O P E R T Y  SU B -O B JE C T  
type* • buildings
• vehicles 
buildings/vehicles - damaged/ 
condition undamaged
buildings/vehicles - at risk/not at risk 
status
E M E R G E N C Y  S E R V IC E S  S U B -O B JE C T  
equipment availability • available/unavailable 
equipment condition - utiUzable/ non-utiitzable 
equipment status* -uncontamlnated/contamlnated 
equipment contamination status - contaminated/decontaminated
E N V IR O N M E N T  SU B -O B JE C T  
type * waterway* 
waterway status • at risk/ 
not at risk
fo re ig n
SP
D isaster a rea  
scene o f  site  o f  
disaste r d isaste r
8 8 § S. |
f l  1*1I 1 8 5
E m ergency
serv ices
equ ipm en t
Property  
Build ings vehicles
EMCR^Ph^sjcal^D^
D isaster
c lassifica tion
goods tra in  crash
< x  <
S ’ *2. S'
o' 8. s’
en v iro n m en t1
w aterw ays
Figure 1 EMCRS Model 1
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Figure 1 shows EMCRS Model 1, the model constructed by application of 
the HCI-PCMT framework to the combined Datasets 1 and 2. EMCRS 
Model 1 shows all the abstract and physical structures of the worksystem 
identified from both datasets, on the left hand-side of the diagram. At the 
abstract level, the three tier structure of the EMCRS, operational, tactical 
and strategic is depicted (but interactions within and between levels are 
not shown). These abstract structures are distributed across the physical 
worksystem structures. This distribution is not shown here, due to the 
limitations of the representation, but is described in detail in the model 
behaviour conflict descriptions in Section 2 below. The abstract structures 
representation is the same as that shown in Chapter 2, Figure 1. That is: an 
oval depicts a process structure; a rectangle depicts a representation 
structure; a read arrow depicts a process reading from the contents of a 
representation; and a write arrow depicts a process writing to the contents 
of a representation. The physical level shows all those structures that have 
been identified as necessary to inform the abstract structures of the 
worksystem for the conflicts identified within both Datasets. On the right- 
hand side, the domain objects, attributes and values are shown, from both 
datasets, both abstract and physical. The physical level objects attributes 
and values are not shown in full, as this representation cannot support this 
depiction. They have already been described in detail in Chapter 4, Section 
4.3 and Chapter 5, Section 5.2. The links, between the abstract sub-objects 
and the physical objects, shown with a dotted line define the abstract to 
physical realisation relationship. The realisation relationship has a many- 
to-one mapping, as described in the method for model construction phase 
three (Chapter 4, Section 4.3). The full lines between the Disaster object 
and the other sub-objects define a part-of relationship. The attributes with 
a star (*) are dispositional, that is they need to be perceived by the 
worksystem, but are not changed by it.
Although a strategic level of command is represented in Model 1, (and in 
the models shown in Chapters 4 and 5), this is for completeness of the 
EMCRS representation. The structures of the strategic level are not 
referred to in the model descriptions presented in Section 6.3. The reason 
is because, although a strategic level of command was set up  in the 
exercise and so is, thus, included in the representation, this command level
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is not activated in the initial response phase to the exercise. The data for 
the modelling are only from the initial response phase, and therefore do 
not refer to the strategic command level. It is often the case that a strategic 
level of command is not activated in major incidents, until later in the 
response, or sometimes not at all, if it is decided that it is not required. 
There are issues with the model representation, which relate to the 
EMCRS characteristics identified in Chapter 2. Thus, the model does not 
represent a changing worksystem, or interactions within and between the 
different horizontal and vertical layers of the system. These issues are 
addressed fully in Chapter 7
Once constructed, Model 1 is used to diagnose EMCRS co-ordination 
design problems, through application of the method for diagnosis. These 
Model 1 diagnoses are given in Section 6.3. The next Section describes the 
method for co-ordination design problem diagnosis.
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6.2 The method for co-ordination design problem diagnosis
Table 1 presents the method for co-ordination design problem diagnosis.
Method
stages
Action Example for clarification
1 From data, identify tasks carried out by 
each agency in response to the scenario, 
where there are potential conflicts
Set-up of inner cordon by the Fire Service; access 
to casualties for triage without regulation safety 
equipment by the Ambulance Service.
2 Use Model 1 to describe the behaviours 
associated with each task and the 
corresponding desired domain sub­
object transformations.
Desired domain sub-object transformations are 
those transformations that would be carried out, if 
an agency’s behaviours are not hindered. For the 
above example, one desired domain sub-object 
transformation for the Ambulance Service would 
be: Lives sub-object attribute survivor triage 
status from untriaged to triaged
3 Identify behaviour conflicts i.e. which 
domain sub-object transformations will 
hinder other domain sub-object 
transformations
From the above example, the Fire Service 
behaviours of transforming the Disaster Scene 
sub-object attribute scene containment from 
uncontained to contained has hindered the 
Ambulance Service behaviours and corresponding 
domain sub-object transformations
4 Use Model 1 to identify whether other 
domain sub-object transformations that 
will be hindered as a 'knock on effect' 
from the initial conflict behaviour
For example, the Ambulance Service not being 
able to transform the Lives sub-object attribute 
survivor triage status from untriaged to triaged 
will mean that the Lives sub-object attribute 
survivor treatment status cannot be transformed 
from not treated to treated. Also, as the 
Ambulance Service cannot access the casualties, 
the Fire Service will have to move the casualties to 
the edge of the cordon to enable triage to take 
place. In so doing, the Fire Service will reduce 
their fire fighting and property protection 
behaviours, as personnel will need to be taken 
away from these tasks to carry out rescue 
behaviours and will therefore not be able to 
transform the Disaster Character sub object 
attribute fire status from uncontrolled to 
controlled, and the Propertv sub-object attributes 
of buildines/vehicles status from at risk to not at 
risk.
5 Identify the performance effect of the 
hindered domain sub-object 
transformations by referring to the 
overall common objectives and priorities 
of the EMCRS (i.e. to save life, to 
prevent escalation of the disaster etc.). 
The primary priority for all services is to 
save life. Therefore, hindering any 
domain sub-object transformation that 
reduces life saving by the EMCRS will 
have the greatest impact on performance
In the current example, hindering triage and 
subsequent treatment transformations by the 
Ambulance Service of the Lives sub-object, will 
greatly affect the performance of the EMCRS with 
respect to the primary priority of saving life. 
Reducing the fire fighting and property protection 
behaviours by the Fire Service will have an effect 
on the secondary priority of preventing escalation 
of the disaster.
Thus, Model 1 gives a performance expression of 
actual performance being less than planned/desired 
performance, as a performance deficit, is shown 
for both agencies.
Table 1 Method for Co-ordination Design Problem Diagnosis
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This method is now applied and the diagnoses from this application are 
described in the following sections.
6.2.1 Method Stage 1 - Identifying potential conflicts
The training scenario questions included one on inter-agency conflicts. 
From the data recorded in responses to this question, five sets of conflicts 
were identified. Each of these conflicts is now described as identified in 
the data.
• Conflict 1: Trampling/ scene preservation -  Due to information in 
the Exercise Scorpio narrative, i.e. that is vandalism is suspected, the 
Police Service declare the site as a crime scene (Data 1. lb, Data 2. B2). 
Thus, the Fire Service are required not to trample the site, as any evidence 
of a crime m ust be preserved (Data 1. 4o, Data 2. 6a). Avoiding trampling 
of the site slows the rescue of casualties and hinders prevention of 
escalation of the fires by the Fire Service. (Data 1. 4o, Data 1. 5a). The 
Police Service behaviours of preserving the site, conflict, with the Fire 
Service behaviours of casualty rescue, and fire containment.
• Conflict 2: Cordon restrictions -  Due to information in the Exercise 
Scorpio narrative, regarding structural damage to buildings and a number 
of fires at the scene, the Fire Service set up an inner cordon to contain the 
scene (Data 1. 3g, Data 1. 4r, Data 2. C5). The Fire Service are responsible 
for the safety of all personnel within the cordon (Data 1 .4b, Data 2. 4d, 
Data 2. 4o). Access is restricted to those with regulation safety equipment 
(Data 1. 6a, Data 1. 3g, Data 2. 6c). The Ambulance Service need access to 
locate casualties and either treat them at the scene, or transport them to 
hospital. The Ambulance Service do not have regulation safety equipment 
and are not allowed access to the casualties (Data 2. 5a, Data 2. 9a). The 
Fire Service task of containing the scene conflicts with the Ambulance 
Service task of locating and treating casualties.
• Conflict 3: Decontamination -  Due to information in the Exercise 
Scorpio narrative, regarding contamination of casualties, there is a need 
for decontamination. The Fire Service have the decontamination 
equipment (Data 2. 4u) and should therefore be responsible for 
decontamination. The Ambulance Service require all contaminated 
personnel, casualties, and ambulances to be decontaminated at the site,
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before the casualties can be transported (Data 2. 7h). The Fire Service reject 
their responsibility for decontamination (Data 2. 6g), as they are too busy 
preventing escalation of the disaster. However, any contaminated 
ambulance or casualty arriving at a hospital will shut down that hospital 
for the rest of the emergency (Data 2. 9b). The Fire Service task of 
preventing escalation of the disaster, conflicts with the Ambulance Service 
task of decontaminating casualties, and other contaminated personnel and 
equipment.
• Conflict 4: Witness reporting - Due to information in the Exercise 
Scorpio narrative, where vandalism is suspected as being the cause of the 
incident, the incident is declared a crime scene. Therefore, there is a need 
to treat all at the scene as witnesses (Data 2. B3). The witnesses may be 
casualties, and as such may be taken away to hospital. The Police Service 
want to be able to record witness information, before they leave the scene 
(Data 1 3.1, Data 1. Ip). The Police Service set up a casualty bureau, 
through which all casualties should be cleared, before being transported 
elsewhere (Data 2. lh). The Ambulance Service personnel attem pt to 
record the personal details of casualties, for possible later interview, before 
they are transported, but the most serious cases will be immediately sent 
to hospital. (Data 2. 7k). The Police Service task of witness reporting, 
conflicts, with the Ambulance Service task of transporting casualties.
• Conflict 5: Access of fire appliances -  Information from the Exercise 
Scorpio narrative, states that there is aviation fuel flowing down the sides 
of the embankment on to the roadway, and there are num erous fires in the 
area. The Fire Service need to stem the flow of aviation fuel (Data 2 Cl), 
and need to fight fires and prevent escalation of the disaster (Data 1. 4d) 
and will, therefore, need access for their fire appliances. The Police Service 
decide where the access points to the site will be, taking into account 
access and egress for all the agencies (Data 1. li, Data 2. A4, Data 2. B2). 
These access points may not be suitably located for the Fire Service, (Data 
1.3a, Data 2. 2a, Data 2. 4n), such that, they cannot utilise their equipment 
and therefore cannot carry out their tasks. The Police Service task of 
setting up  access points conflicts with the Fire Service task of accessing the 
scene for fire fighting and prevention of escalation of the disaster.
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Stage one of method application is now complete, and has thus identified 
five conflicts. The next stages of the diagnosis method are now applied to 
each identified conflict, to diagnose co-ordination design problems. Co­
ordination design problems are diagnosed, if actual performance does not 
equal desired performance.
6.4 Method application to identified conflicts
6.4.1 Conflict 1 - Trampling/scene preservation
Method Stage 2
The conflict arose as follows: the Police Service operational commander 
(physical structure) carries out perception behaviours that update his 
knowledge-of-tasks representation with the information that youths have 
been seen running from the scene. He then carries out control behaviours 
that direct him to consult his major incident plan. The plan specifies that, 
if there is evidence of vandalism, then the site should be declared a crime 
scene and that the scene should not be trampled to preserve the evidence. 
Based on this plan and the knowledge-of-tasks (about the vandalism), the 
operational commander then carries out control behaviours that direct 
him to consult the operational plan for preserving the site as a crime 
scene. The operational commander then carries out control behaviours 
that direct him to carry out planning behaviours, based on the operational 
plan and the knowledge-of-tasks. The planning behaviour specifies how 
the site should be declared a crime scene and how the site should be 
preserved. The operational commander then carries out control 
behaviours that direct him to carry out an execution behaviour of 
declaring the site a crime scene and specifying its preservation. This 
execution behaviour is carried out by the Police Service operational scene 
management personnel, informing the Fire and Ambulance Service 
operational personnel, that the site is now a crime scene, and specifying 
that only minimal trampling is now allowed, by all emergency service 
personnel in order to preserve the site. These physical object 
manipulations transform the abstract Disaster Scene sub-object's attribute 
site status from no crime scene to crime scene, and site preservation from un-
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preserved to preserved, thus transforming the Disaster object's attribute 
normality to a more desired level along its continuum.
At the same time, the Fire Service operational commander (physical 
structure) carries out perception behaviours that update his knowledge- 
of-tasks with the information that there are a num ber of casualties at the 
scene and a number of fires. He then carries out control behaviours that 
direct him to consult his major incident plan. According to his plan, lives 
must be saved and prevention of escalation of the disaster m ust be carried 
out. He then carries out control behaviours that direct him to carry out 
planning behaviours to specify in the operational plan how escalation of 
the disaster should be prevented and how lives should be saved. Based on 
this plan and the knowledge-of-tasks, he then carries out control 
behaviours that direct the execution behaviours of preventing escalation 
of the disaster by controlling the fires, and saving lives by rescuing the 
casualties. These execution behaviours are carried out by the Fire Service 
operational personnel, i.e. the firemen and their fire fighting equipment, 
fighting the fires, and the firemen and their rescue equipment rescuing 
casualties. It is the manipulation of the physical casualties that transforms 
the abstract Lives sub-object attribute survivor rescue status from not 
rescued to rescued, and the manipulation of the physical fire that 
transforms the Disaster Character sub-object attribute fire status from 
uncontrolled to controlled. Both these manipulations in turn affect the 
Disaster object's desired level of stability.
Method Stage 3
However, as the Police Service have declared the site a crime scene, the 
Fire Service are only allowed to carry out minimal trampling, so that the 
site is preserved for evidence gathering. Therefore, the Fire Service 
operational personnel, when attempting to carry out their execution 
behaviours of rescuing the casualties, are only allowed to carry out 
minimal trampling, which slows rescue of casualties. Slowing rescue of 
casualties means that the Fire Service cannot transform the abstract Lives 
sub-object attribute survivor rescue status from not rescued to rescued and 
thus, cannot transform the Disaster object to a more desired level of 
stability. Likewise, slowing control of the fire by attempting not to trample
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the site, means that the Disaster Character object7s attribute fire status 
cannot be transformed from uncontrolled to controlled, and therefore, the 
Disaster objects' stability cannot be transformed to a more desired level. A 
behaviour conflict has, thus, been identified.
Method Stage 4
No specific 'knock on effect7 identified for this behaviour conflict.
Method Stage 5
The Police Service behaviours of preserving the scene have conflicted with 
the Fire Service behaviours of rescue and fire containment and have been 
identified as a behaviour conflict by Model 1. This conflict results in a co­
ordination design problem, which may relate here to reduced overall 
EMCRS performance, either through hindered goal achievement (e.g. the 
site not being preserved or the survivors not being rescued) or through 
unacceptable system resource costs (e.g. Police working too hard, Fire 
Service trying not to trample). The model diagnoses an EMCRS co­
ordination design problem as actual overall performance being less than 
desired performance with respect to the EMCRS common objectives. This 
co-ordination design problem relates to the common EMCRS objectives, 
i.e. to save life (casualties not rescued); to prevent escalation of disaster; 
(fire not contained); and to facilitate criminal investigation (vandals not 
caught). For this design problem, the model describes a performance 
deficit, related to hindered goal achievement and unacceptable resource 
costs for the Police and Fire Services. Trampling by the Fire Service 
reduces the chances of the vandals being caught by the Police Service. The 
Police Service will have to work harder to gather evidence if the site has 
been trampled. Carrying out minimal trampling reduces rescue of 
casualties, and containing of the fire by the Fire Service. The Fire Service 
will have to work harder when trying not to trample.
EMCRS Model 1 is a design-oriented model intended to constitute HCI 
substantive design knowledge to support the diagnosis of EMCRS design 
problems. An EMCRS design problem is diagnosed as actual performance 
not being equal to desired performance. Design knowledge supports 
design practice as the diagnosis of design problems and the prescription of
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design solutions. Prescription of design solutions is outside the remit of 
the current research, but potential design solutions will be suggested to 
clarify the nature of the design problem diagnoses. Design-oriented 
models should enable designers to reason about potential design solutions 
to the diagnosed design problems. One design problem diagnosis by the 
EMCRS model, has just been described. The EMCRS model will support 
reasoning about potential design solutions to this problem, as the model 
allows identification of the cognitive structures within the system, which 
may be causing the design problems, i.e. planning, control, perception, 
execution, plans and knowledge-of-tasks. Thus, for the current design 
problem, reasoning about a potential design solution is as follows: The 
execution behaviours of the Police Service (declaring the site a crime scene 
and insisting on minimal trampling to preserve the scene) have been 
identified as part of the cause of the identified design problem. How these 
behaviours came about can be identified by the EMCRS model. It was the 
planning and control behaviours of the operational commander that 
instigated these execution behaviours. Thus, the design problem might be 
related to EMCRS planning or control - the data do not make this clear. 
However, a potential solution to this problem is the re-design of planning 
and control, as expressed by the EMCRS model, for the operational 
commanders, as supported by devices/equipm ent/training etc. that 
results in desired performance.
Below are tabular representations of the domain object attribute value 
changes for each of the tasks involved in the behaviour conflict. The 
desired changes are those that would be carried out, if there was no 
behaviour conflict identified. The actual changes are those which occur as 
a consequence of the behaviour conflict. These tabular descriptions of the 
object attribute transformations are presented as an aid to the reader in 
understanding the behaviour conflict identification, in method Stage 3. 
Attributes that are starred with '* ' are dispositional, and are not changed 
by the EMCRS; but need to be perceived by it. Within the tables (desired) 
refers to desired performance, and (actual) to actual performance. Where it 
is not specified whether a transformation is desired or actual, is when 
actual performance equals desired performance. (Tabular descriptions are 
given for the tasks in each behaviour conflict. The information specified
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here, relating to these descriptions is the same for all the tabular 
descriptions given in the following sections.)
Police Service task of preserving the site as a crime scene
Disaster object
Attribute Initial value Transform Final value
Normality Abnormal ---------->(desired) Less abnormal
Normality Abnormal ---------->(actual) Abnormal
Disaster Character sub-object
Attribute Initial value Transform Final value
Cause * Not known Non-accidental
Disaster Scene sub-object
Attribute Initial value Transform Final value
Site status No crime scene ----------- > Crime scene
Site preservation Unpreserved ---------->(desired) Preserved
Site preservation Unpreserved --------- >(actual) Unpreserved
Fire Service task of saving lives
Disaster object
Attribute Initial value Transform Final value
Stability Unstable ----------> (desired) Less unstable
Stability Unstable ---------->(actual) Unstable
Lives sub-object
Attribute Initial value Transform Final value
Survivor 
condition *
Not known Injured
Survivor rescue 
status
Not rescued --------- >(desired) Rescued
Survivor rescue 
status
Not rescued --------- >(actual) Not rescued
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Fire Service task of preventing escalation of the disaster
Disaster object
Attribute Initial value Transform Final value
Stability Unstable ----------> (desired) Less unstable
Stability Unstable ---------->(actual) Unstable
Disaster Character sub-object
Attribute Initial value Transform Final value
Type Unknown Fire
Fire status Uncontrolled ---------->(desired) Controlled
Fire status Uncontrolled ---------->(actual) Uncontrolled
6.4.2 Conflict 2 - Cordon restrictions
Method Stage 2
The behaviour conflict arose as follows: The Fire Service operational 
commander (physical structure) carries out perception behaviours that 
update his knowledge-of-tasks with the information that there are 
structurally damaged buildings, fires and leaking hazardous fuels. He 
then carries out control behaviours that direct him to consult the major 
incident plan. The plan specifies that the Fire Service is responsible for 
setting up an inner safety cordon, when there are hazards and dangers at 
the scene, and maintaining the safety of all those within the scene. Based 
on this plan, and the knowledge-of-tasks (about the fires etc.), the 
operational commander carries out control behaviours that direct him to 
consult the operational plan for setting up of a cordon. The operational 
plan gives guidance for cordon set-up and regulations. The operational 
commander then carries out control behaviours that direct him to carry 
out planning behaviours, based on the operational plan and the 
knowledge-of-tasks. The planning behaviour specifies how the inner 
cordon should be set-up and what the regulations are for entering it. The 
operational commander then carries out control behaviours that direct 
him to carry out an execution behaviour of setting up the cordon. This 
execution behaviour is carried out by the operational personnel (firemen) 
setting up the cordon and maintaining specified safety regulations. This
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physical object manipulation transforms the abstract Disaster Scene sub­
object's attribute scene containment from un-contained to contained, thus 
transforming the Disaster object attribute of stability to a more desired 
level along its continuum. (At the same time, other operational firemen 
and their fire equipment are controlling the fire and stabilising buildings, 
transforming the attributes of the Property and Disaster Character sub­
objects, which are again transforming the Disaster objects stability 
attribute towards its desired level.)
The operational commander then carries out control behaviours that 
direct him to inform the tactical incident officer of the inner cordon set-up. 
(Some kind of internal communication behaviour is carried out to inform 
the incident officer about the cordon set-up.) The tactical incident officer 
(and his communication equipment) then carries out perception 
behaviours, which update his knowledge-of-tasks about the inner cordon 
set-up. The tactical incident officer then carries out control behaviours 
that direct him to consult his plan to assess the resources required for the 
set-up. He then carries out planning behaviours to specify the resources 
required for this task.
At the same time, the operational Ambulance Senior officer (tactical level), 
(with his communication equipment) is carrying out perception 
behaviours that update his knowledge-of-tasks with the information that 
there are a number of casualties at the scene. He then carries out control 
behaviours that direct him to consult his major incident plan. According 
to the plan, casualties must be triaged and then either treated at the scene 
an d /o r transported to hospital. He then carries out control behaviours 
that direct him to carry out planning behaviours to specify in the 
operational plan which personnel are required to triage, treat an d /o r 
transport the casualties. Based on this plan and the knowledge-of-tasks, 
he then carries out control behaviours to direct the execution behaviours 
of triaging, treating an d /o r transporting casualties. These execution 
behaviours are carried out by the Ambulance Service operational 
personnel for triage and treatment with their ambulances for transport. It 
is the manipulation of the physical casualties, which transforms the 
abstract Lives sub-object attributes survivor triage status from untriaged to 
triaged, survivor treatment status from not treated to treated and survivor
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transport status from not transported to transported. In turn these sub­
object transformations, change the Disaster object's desired level of 
stability.
Method Stage 3
However, the Ambulance Service operational senior officer (tactical level, 
and his communication equipment) has not carried out perception 
behaviours that update his knowledge-of-tasks, that the scene is now 
contained, and regulation safety equipment is required to enter it. 
Therefore, when the Ambulance Service personnel attem pt to carry out 
their execution behaviours, they do not fulfil the proper safety 
requirements, which would allow them to enter the inner cordon. 
Therefore, the execution behaviours of triaging, treating an d /o r 
transporting casualties cannot be carried out. Thus, they cannot transform 
the abstract Lives sub-object attributes and so cannot transform the 
Disaster object to a more desired level of stability. Thus, a behaviour 
conflict has been identified.
Method Stage 4
The primary objective of EMCRS is to save life. In order to try to increase 
the desired level of stability of the Disaster object, the Lives object 
attribute values m ust be changed. Therefore, the Fire Service m ust carry 
out rescue execution behaviours to move the survivors to the edge of the 
inner cordon, so that the Ambulance Service can carry out their execution 
behaviours and, thus, increase the stability of the disaster object.
However, the Fire Service carrying out rescue execution behaviours will 
decrease the resources available for performing the execution behaviours 
of controlling the hazard, thus decreasing the effectiveness of the response 
to the secondary objective of preventing escalation of disaster. The 
outcome is that the performance of the EMCRS is reduced even further.
Method Stage 5
The Fire Service behaviours of containing the scene have conflicted with 
the Ambulance Service behaviours of triaging, treating an d /o r 
transporting casualties, and result in a behaviour conflict. This behaviour
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conflict results in a co-ordination design problem, which may relate to 
reduced overall EMCRS performance, either through hindered goal 
achievement (e.g. lives not saved) or through unacceptable system 
resource costs (e.g. excessive fire-fighter workload). The model diagnoses 
an EMCRS co-ordination design problem as actual overall performance 
being less than desired performance with respect to the EMCRS common 
objectives. This co-ordination design problem relates to the common 
EMCRS objectives, i.e. to save life (casualties not rescued); to prevent 
escalation of disaster (fire not contained). Model 1 describes a performance 
deficit, related to hindered goal achievement and unacceptable resource 
costs for the Ambulance and Fire Services. Containment of the scene with 
safety requirements by the Fire Service reduces casualty triage and 
treatment (life saving) by the Ambulance Service. The Ambulance Service 
having to wait to treat casualties will increase their treatment workload. 
The Fire Service scene entrance safety requirements excluding the 
Ambulance Service, reduces Fire Service fire containment, as they have to 
rescue casualties to the edge of the scene. The Fire Service workload will 
thus increase.
A design problem diagnosis by the EMCRS model has been described. To 
authenticate this design problem diagnosis, a potential design solution to 
this problem will now be suggested. The execution behaviours of the Fire 
Service (setting up an inner cordon and maintaining specified safety 
regulations) have been identified as part of the cause of the identified 
design problem. How these execution behaviours came about can be 
identified by the model. These execution behaviours were instigated by 
the planning and control behaviours of the Fire Service operational 
commander. Thus, the design problem might be related to planning or 
control - the data do not make this clear. However, a potential solution to 
this problem is the re-design of planning and control, as expressed in the 
EMCRS model, for the operational commanders, as supported by 
devices/ equipm ent/training etc. that results in desired performance 
Below are tabular representations of the domain object attribute value 
changes for each of the tasks involved in the behaviour conflict. The 
descriptions have the same format as described above for Conflict 1.
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Fire Service task of set-up of inner safety cordon
Disaster object
Attribute Initial value Transform Final value
Stability Unstable ----------> (desired) Less unstable
Stability Unstable ---------->(actual) Unstable
Property sub-object
Attribute Initial value Transform Final value
Type * Unknown Buildings
Buildings 
condition *
Unknown Damaged
Buildings status At risk ---------->(desired) Not at risk
Buildings status At risk ---------->(actual) At risk
Disaster Scene sub-object
Attribute Initial value Transform Final value
Scene containment Uncontained ------------> Contained
Disaster Character sub-object
Attribute Initial value Transform Final value
Type * Unknown Fire
Type * Unknown Hazardous
materials
Fire status Uncontrolled --------- >(desired) Controlled
Fire status Uncontrolled ---------->(actual) Uncontrolled
Hazardous 
materials status
Uncontrolled --------- >(desired) Controlled
Hazardous 
materials status
Uncontrolled --------- >(actual) Uncontrolled
Lives sub-object
Attribute Initial value Transform Final value
Survivor rescue 
status
Not rescued ----------- > Rescued
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Ambulance Service task of treating and transporting 
casualties
Disaster object
Attribute Initial value Transform Final value
Stability Unstable ---------->(desired) Less unstable
Stability Unstable ---------->(actual) Unstable
Lives sub-object
Attribute Initial value Transform Final value
Survivor 
condition *
Not known Injured
Emergency 
services personnel 
safety *
Unequipped Unequipped
Survivor triage 
status
Untriaged ---------->(deSired) Triaged
Survivor triage 
status
Untriaged ---------->(aCtual) Untriaged
Survivor 
treatment status
Not treated ---------->(deSired) Treated
Survivor 
treatment status
Not treated --------- >(actual) Not treated
Survivor transport 
status
Not transported ---------->(desired) Transported
Survivor transport 
status
Not transported ---------->(aCtual) Not transported
6.4.3 Conflict 3 - Decontamination
Method Stage 2
The Fire Service operational commander (physical structure), carries out 
perception behaviours that update his knowledge-of-tasks representation 
with the information that there are a number of aviation fuel fires and a 
number of structurally damaged buildings. He then carries out control
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behaviours that direct him to consult his major incident plan. The plan 
specifies that the Fire Service are responsible for protecting property and 
containing the fire. Based on this plan and the knowledge-of-tasks 
(regarding the fires, structurally damaged buildings), he then carries out 
control behaviours that direct him to carry out planning behaviours to 
specify in the operational plan, how property should be protected and 
how the fire should be contained. He then carries out control behaviours 
that direct him to carry out execution behaviours of protecting property 
and containing the fire. These execution behaviours are carried out by the 
Fire Service operational personnel i.e. the firemen and their equipment. 
These physical object manipulations transform the abstract Property sub­
object attribute buildings status from at risk to not at risk, and the Disaster 
Character sub-object attribute fire status from uncontrolled to controlled. 
The Disaster Character sub-object attribute transformations will in turn 
transform the Disaster object attribute stability to a more desired level, and 
the Property sub-object attribute transformation will transform the 
attribute Disaster object attribute normality to a more desired level.
At the same time, the Ambulance Service operational safety officer 
(physical structure), carries out perception behaviours that update his 
knowledge-of-tasks representation with the information that a num ber of 
casualties have been contaminated with aviation fuel. He then carries out 
control behaviours that direct him to consult his major incident plan. The 
plan specifies that the Ambulance Service need to determine priority of 
decontamination in conjunction with the Fire Service. Based on this plan 
and the knowledge-of-tasks (the contamination of casualties), the 
operational safety officer then carries out control behaviours that direct 
him to consult the operational plan. The plan specifies that the 
Ambulance Service operational personnel must liaise with the Fire Service 
with regards to decontamination of casualties. The plan also specifies that 
any operational personnel who handle a contaminated casualty, m ust be 
decontaminated, as must any equipment that comes into contact with 
contamination. Based on this plan and the knowledge-of-tasks, the 
operational safety officer then carries out control behaviours that direct 
him to carry out planning behaviours to specify how the operational 
personnel should deal with decontamination in conjunction with the Fire
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Service. The operational safety officer then carries out control behaviours 
that direct him to carry out an execution behaviour of decontaminating 
the casualties. This execution behaviour is carried out by the operational 
Ambulance Service personnel liaising with the Fire Service for 
decontaminating the casualties. This physical object manipulation 
transforms the abstract Lives sub-object attribute survivor contamination 
status from contaminated to decontaminated, which will in turn increase 
the Disaster object's attribute stability.
Method Stage 3
However, when the Ambulance Service operational personnel attem pt to 
carry out the execution behaviour of decontamination of casualties they 
are unable to. Although the Fire Service have decontamination equipment, 
in their current operational plan, decontamination of casualties is not 
specified. The Fire Service operational personnel are busy carrying out 
their execution behaviours, as specified in their operational plan. The Fire 
Service would have to reduce resources, available for containing the fire 
and protecting property, in order to carry out decontamination. Therefore, 
the Ambulance Service operational personnel cannot carry out their 
execution behaviours of decontamination of casualties and cannot 
therefore transform the Lives sub-object attribute survivor contamination 
status from contaminated to decontaminated and thus, cannot in turn 
transform the Disaster object to a more desired level of stability. Thus, a 
behaviour conflict has been identified.
Method Stage 4
Not executing decontamination of casualty behaviours has a severe knock- 
on effect for Disaster stability. This outcome arises because any 
emergency service personnel, handling contaminated casualties, also 
become contaminated, as does any emergency service equipment (for 
example, placing a contaminated casualty in an ambulance contaminates 
that ambulance). Not being able to transform the Lives sub-object 
attribute survivor contamination status from contaminated to 
decontaminated has a negative effect on other sub-object attribute values. 
The Lives sub-object attribute emergency services personnel status will
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change from uncontaminated to contaminated, and the Emergency 
Services sub-object equipment status attribute from uncontaminated to 
contaminated. These are dispositional attributes -  their changes are not 
brought about by the work of the worksystem, but the changes need to be 
perceived by the worksystem as they will effect the work. Any 
contaminated piece of emergency service equipment, for example, an 
ambulance, leaving the scene will be out of action for the rest of the 
disaster, as will any hospital that receives a contaminated 
ambulance/casualty. The overall effect of non-decontamination, 
therefore, has an important effect on EMCRS performance with respect to 
Disaster stability.
Method Stage 5
The Fire Service behaviours of protecting property and fire containment 
have conflicted with the Ambulance Service behaviours of 
decontamination of casualties and result in a behaviour conflict. This 
behaviour conflict results in a co-ordination design problem, which relates 
to reduced overall EMCRS performance, either through hindered goal 
achievement (casualties not decontaminated) or through unacceptable 
system resource costs (e.g. emergency service equipment and personnel 
out of action). The model diagnoses an EMCRS co-ordination design 
problem as actual overall performance being less than desired 
performance with respect to the EMCRS common objectives. This co­
ordination design problem relates to the common EMCRS objectives, i.e. to 
save life (contaminated casualties not transported); to prevent escalation of 
disaster (fire not contained, property not protected). For this design 
problem, the model describes a performance deficit, related to hindered 
goal achievement and unacceptable resource costs for the Ambulance 
Services. Fire containment and property protection by the Fire Service 
have not enabled decontamination by the Ambulance Service. Ambulance 
Service resource costs will increase as contaminated Ambulance Service 
personnel and equipment will be put out of action.
A design problem diagnosis by the EMCRS model has, thus, been 
described. To support this design problem diagnosis, a potential design
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solution to this problem will now be suggested. The execution behaviours 
of the Ambulance Service (decontaminating casualties in conjunction with 
the fire service) have been identified as part of the cause of the identified 
design problem. How these execution behaviours arose can be identified 
by the model. These execution behaviours were prom pted by the planning 
and control behaviours of the Ambulance Service operational safety 
officer. Thus, the design problem might be related to planning or control - 
the data do not make this clear. However, a potential solution to this 
problem is the re-design of planning and control, as expressed in the 
EMCRS model, for the operational safety officers, as supported by 
devices/equipm ent/training etc. that results in desired performance. 
Below are tabular representations of the domain object attribute value 
changes for each of the tasks involved in the behaviour conflict. The 
format for the tables is as described above, for Conflict 1.
Fire Service task fire containment
Disaster object
Attribute Initial value Transform Final value
Stability Unstable -------------> Less unstable
Disaster Character object
Attribute Initial value Transform Final value
Ty pen Not known Fire/hazardous 
material
Fire status Uncontrolled ----------- > Controlled
Fire Service task protecting property
Disaster object
Attribute Initial value Transform Final value
Normality Abnormal ----------- > Less abnormal
Property sub-object
Attribute Initial value Transform Final value
TypeO Not known Buildings
Buildings status At risk ----------- > Not at risk
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Ambulance Service task of decontamination
Disaster object
Attribute Initial value Transform Final value
Stability Unstable --------- >(deSired) Less unstable
Stability Unstable ----------->(actual) Unstable
Lives sub-object
Attribute Initial value Transform Final value
Survivor
contamination status
Contaminated -------->(deSired) Decontaminated
Survivor
contamination status
Contaminated ---------->(aCtual) Contaminated
Emergency services 
personnel status (*)
Uncontaminated Contaminated
Emergency Services sub-object
Attribute Initial value Transform Final value
Equipment status 
(*)
Uncontaminated Contaminated
6.4.4 Conflict 4 -  Witness reporting
Method Stage 2
The Police incident officer (tactical level with communication equipment), 
carries out perception behaviours that update his knowledge-of-tasks 
with the information that youths have been seen running from the scene. 
He then carries out control behaviours that direct him to consult his major 
incident plan. The plan specifies that, if there is evidence of vandalism, 
then the site is declared a crime scene and anyone present within the scene 
at the time of the accident should be classed as a witness. Based on this 
plan and the knowledge-of-tasks (about the vandalism), the incident 
officer then carries out control behaviours that direct him to consult the 
operational plan for witness reporting. The operational plan specifies that 
all witnesses' names and addresses should be recorded through a casualty
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bureau. Based on this plan and the knowledge-of-tasks, the incident 
officer then carries out control behaviours that direct him to carry out 
planning behaviours, to specify in the operational plan that a casualty 
bureau should be set-up and all witnesses should be logged through it. 
The incident officer then carries out control behaviours that direct him to 
carry out an execution behaviour of logging all witnesses. (The incident 
officer then carries out some kind of internal communication behaviour to 
inform the operational officers to set up the casualty bureau.) This 
execution behaviour is carried out by casualty bureau operational 
personnel logging all witnesses before they leave the scene. This physical 
object manipulation transforms the Lives sub-object attribute survivor 
information from casualty bureau unlogged to casualty bureau logged. In 
turn, this transformation changes the Disaster object attribute of normality 
to a more desired value along its continuum.
At the same time, the Ambulance Service incident officer (tactical level 
with communication equipment), carries out perception behaviours, that 
update his knowledge-of-tasks with the information that there are a 
number of casualties at the scene. He then carries out control behaviours 
that direct him to consult his major incident plan. The plan specifies that 
casualties should be triaged at the scene and then be either treated at the 
scene or transported to hospital. Based on this plan and the knowledge- 
of-tasks (about the casualties), the incident officer then carries out control 
behaviours that direct him to carry out planning behaviours to specify in 
the operational plan, what personnel and equipment are required for 
treating and transporting casualties. Based on this plan and the 
knowledge-of-tasks, he then carries out control behaviours that direct him 
to carry out the execution behaviours of triaging casualties and either 
treating them at the scene or transporting them to hospital. (The incident 
officer then carries out some kind of internal communication behaviour to 
inform the operational officers to triage, an d /o r to treat, or to transport 
casualties.) These execution behaviours are carried out by operational 
Ambulance Service personnel for triage, treatment and transportation, and 
their equipment. It is the manipulation of the physical objects that 
transforms the abstract Lives sub-object attribute survivor triage status from 
untriaged to triaged, the attribute survivor treatment status from either
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untreated to treated an d /o r survivor transport status from not transported 
to transported depending on the triage results. These transformations will 
in turn change the attribute stability of the Disaster object to a more 
desired level.
Method Stage 3
However, the Ambulance Service operational personnel carry out triage 
execution behaviours, that prioritise treatment and need for transportation 
to hospital. The most serious cases, triaged as priority, will be 
immediately transported to hospital. These casualties will not necessarily 
be logged by the Police casualty bureau. Therefore, the Police Service 
operational personnel cannot carry out their execution behaviours of 
logging all witnesses at the casualty bureau, and thus, cannot transform 
the Disaster object attribute normality to a more desired level. However, 
delaying transportation of the most serious casualties to hospital by 
waiting for them to be casualty bureau logged, will delay the execution 
behaviours of transporting casualties, thus, not transforming the Lives 
sub-object attribute survivor transport status from not transported to 
transported, and therefore, not enabling transformation of the Disaster 
object attribute stability to a more desired level. Thus, a behaviour conflict 
has been identified.
Method Stage 4
Not carrying out transport execution behaviours has a knock-on effect, as 
this would not enable the treatment of the casualties at the hospital. Also, 
the ambulances for transportation will become unavailable, as they are 
tied up at the scene, thus transforming the Emergency Services sub-object 
attribute equipment availability from available to unavailable, further 
reducing the performance of the EMCRS in, again, not transforming the 
Disaster object to a more desired level of stability.
Method Stage 5
Therefore, triage and transportation behaviours by the Ambulance Service 
have conflicted with the Police Service behaviours of logging witnesses 
and result in a behaviour conflict. This behaviour conflict results in a co­
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ordination design problem, which relates to reduced overall EMCRS 
performance, either through hindered goal achievement (e.g. witnesses 
not logged), or through unacceptable system resource costs (e.g. more 
Police manpower required). The model diagnoses an EMCRS co­
ordination design problem as actual overall performance being less than 
desired performance with respect to the EMCRS common objectives. This 
co-ordination design problem relates to the common EMCRS objectives, 
i.e. to save life (casualties not transported and treated); and to facilitate 
criminal investigation (cause of incident unidentified). For this design 
problem, the model describes a performance deficit, related to hindered 
goal achievement and unacceptable resource costs for the Police Service. 
Not logging the casualties for witness reporting, by the Police Service, 
would reduce the success of the Police Service enquiry into the cause of 
the disaster. Delay in transporting casualties to hospital would reduce 
lives saved by the Ambulance Service. The Police Service workload will 
increase as they will have to chase up witness information.
A design problem diagnosis by the EMCRS model has, thus, been 
described. To support this design problem diagnosis, a possible design 
solution to this problem will now be suggested. The execution behaviours 
of the Police Service (logging all witnesses) have been identified as part of 
the cause of the identified design problem. How these execution 
behaviours came about can be identified by the model. These execution 
behaviours were prom pted by the planning and control behaviours of the 
Police Service incident officer. Thus, the design problem m ight be related 
to planning or control - the data do not make this clear. However, a 
potential solution to this problem is the re-design of planning and control, 
as expressed in the EMCRS model, for the incident officers, as supported 
by devices/equipm ent/training etc. that results in desired performance. 
Below are tabular representations of the domain object attribute value 
changes for each of the tasks involved in the behaviour conflict. The 
format of these tables is as described for Conflict 1 above.
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Police Service task logging all witnesses
Disaster object
Attribute Initial value Transform Fmal value
Normality Abnormal ---------->(desired) Less abnormal
Normality Abnormal ----------->(actual) Abnormal
Disaster Character sub-object
Attribute Initial value Transform Final value
Cause (*) Non-accidental Non-accidental
Lives sub-object
Attribute Initial value Transform Final value
Survivor
information
Casualty bureau 
unlogged
---------->(deSired) Casualty bureau 
logged
Survivor
information
Casualty bureau 
unlogged
----------->(actual) Casualty bureau 
unlogged
Ambulance Service task of triaging and treating/transporting 
casualties
Disaster object
Attribute Initial value Transform Final value
Stability Unstable ---------->aCtual Less unstable
Lives sub-object
Attribute Initial value Transform Final value
Survivor 
condition (*)
Injured Injured
Survivor triage 
status
Untriaged -------------> Triaged
Survivor 
treatm ent status
Not treated -------------> Treated
Survivor transport 
status
Not transported -------------> Transported
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6.4.5 Conflict 5 -  Access of Fire appliances
Method Stage 2
The Police Service incident officer (tactical level w ith communication 
equipment) carries out perception behaviours that update his knowledge- 
of-tasks with the information that there has been a train crash on a bridge 
over a road, which is the main thoroughfare for the town. He then carries 
out control behaviours, that direct him to consult his major incident plan. 
The plan specifies that the Police Service are responsible for m anaging the 
site of disaster including locating access points for all the emergency 
services. Based on this plan and his knowledge-of-tasks (about the 
disaster site location), he then carries out control behaviours that direct 
him to carry out planning behaviours to specify in the operational plan, 
where the access points for the emergency services should be positioned. 
Based on this plan, he then carries out control behaviours that direct him 
to carry out an execution behaviour of setting up  the access points. (He 
then carries out some type of internal communication behaviour to inform 
the operational personnel to set-up the access points). This execution 
behaviour is carried out by the Police Service operational personnel, 
setting up the access points. This physical object m anipulation transforms 
the Disaster Scene sub-object attribute access point position from unlocated 
to located. This outcome in turn will transform the Disaster object 
attribute stability to a more desired level.
At the same time, the Fire Service incident officer (tactical level with 
communication equipment), carries out perception behaviours that 
update his knowledge-of-tasks with the information that there are 
aviation fuel fires, structurally damaged buildings and trapped people at 
the site of the disaster. He then carries out control behaviours that direct 
him to consult his major incident plan. The plan states that the Fire 
Service are responsible for containing the fire, protecting property and 
rescuing trapped casualties. Based on this plan and the knowledge-of- 
tasks (about the situation), the Fire Service incident officer then carries out 
control behaviours, that direct him to carry out planning behaviours to 
specify in the operational plan what Fire Service equipm ent is required for 
the Fire Service response. Based on this plan and the knowledge-of-tasks, 
he then carries out control behaviours that direct him to carry out
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execution behaviours of making available the required equipment. (The 
incident officer will carry out some kind of internal communication 
behaviour to inform the operational personnel about m aking the 
equipm ent available). This physical object m anipulation transforms the 
Emergency Service sub-object attribute equipment availability from 
unavailable to available. The Fire Service incident officer then carries out 
perception behaviours that update his knowledge-of-tasks with the 
information that the appliances are available. He then carries out control 
behaviours, that direct him to carry out perception behaviours to update 
his knowledge-of-tasks with the information of w hether the access points 
have been located for the available appliances. He then carries out control 
behaviour that directs him to carry out planning behaviour to specify in 
the operational plan of how the appliances can locate the access points. 
Based on this plan and this knowledge-of-tasks (about the location of 
access points), he then carries out control behaviours that direct him to 
carry out an execution behaviour of moving the fire appliances to the 
access points in readiness for fighting the fire, protecting property, and 
rescuing the trapped casualties. (The incident officer will carry out some 
kind of internal communication behaviour to inform the operational 
personnel to move the fire appliances to the access points). This execution 
behaviour is carried out by the operational Fire Service personnel, moving 
the fire appliances to the access points. Manipulation of the physical fire 
appliances will transform the Emergency Services sub-object attribute 
equipment condition from non-utilizable to utilizable.
Method Stage 3
However, when the Fire Service operational personnel attem pt to carry 
out their execution behaviours of making the equipm ent ready for fire 
containment, rescue and property protection execution behaviours, they 
find that the access points for their appliances are unsuitable and 
therefore, they cannot transform the Emergency Service sub-object 
attribute equipment condition from non-utilizable to utilizable. and in turn 
they cannot transform the Disaster object to a more desired level of 
stability. Thus, a behaviour conflict is identified.
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Method Stage 4
As a knock-on effect the Fire Service cannot m anipulate the physical 
casualties or fight the fires and therefore, cannot transform the abstract 
Disaster Character sub-object attribute fire status from uncontrolled to 
controlled; or the Property sub-object attribute building status from at risk 
to not at risk, or the Lives sub-object attribute survivor rescue status from 
not rescued to rescued. In turn, they cannot transform the Disaster object 
to a more desired level of stability and normality.
Method Stage 5
The Police Service behaviours of locating the access point, have conflicted 
with the Fire Service behaviours of making the fire appliances utilisable 
for rescue, property protection and fire containment and so result in a 
behaviour conflict. This behaviour conflict results in a co-ordination 
design problem, which relates to reduced overall EMCRS performance, 
either through hindering goal achievement (e.g. lives not saved) by the 
Fire Service, or through unacceptable resource costs (excessive fire-fighter 
workload) for the Fire Service. The model diagnoses an EMCRS co­
ordination design problem as actual overall performance being less than 
desired performance with respect to the EMCRS common objectives. This 
co-ordination design problem relates to the common EMCRS objectives, 
i.e. to save life (survivors not rescued); to prevent escalation of the disaster 
(fire not contained); to protect property (property not protected); and to 
prevent escalation of the disaster (appliances not usable due to unsuitable 
access points). For this design problem, the model describes a performance 
deficit, related to hindered goal achievement and unacceptable resource 
costs for the Police Service. The Police Service having unsuitable access 
points for appliances will reduce the Fire Services' behaviours of rescue, 
property protection and fire containment, increasing resource costs to the 
Fire Service to an unacceptable level.
This ineffective performance relates to the common EMCRS objectives, i.e. 
a design problem diagnosis by the EMCRS model has been described. To 
support this design problem diagnosis, a possible design solution to this 
problem will now be suggested. The execution behaviours of the Police
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Service (locating access points) have been identified as part of the cause of 
the identified design problem. How these execution behaviours came 
about can be identified by the model. These execution behaviours were 
instigated by the planning and control behaviours of the Police Service 
incident officer. Thus, the design problem might be related to planning or 
control - the data do not make this clear. However, a potential solution to 
this problem is the re-design of planning and control, as expressed in the 
EMCRS model, for the incident officers, as supported by 
devices/ equipm ent/training etc. that result in desired performance.
Below are tabular representations of the domain object attribute value 
changes for each of the tasks involved in the behaviour conflict. The 
format of the descriptions is as given for Conflict 1 above.
Police Service task setting up access points
Disaster object
Attribute Initial value T ransform Final value
Stability Unstable -------------> Less unstable
Disaster Scene sub-object
Attribute Initial value Transform Final value
Location (*) Market town Market town
Scene/ site 
accessibility (*)
Difficult Difficult
Access point 
position
Unlocated -------------> Located
Fire Service task fire containment
Disaster object
Attribute Initial value Transform Final value
Stability Unstable ---------->(deSired) Less unstable
Stability Unstable ----------->(actual) Unstable
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Emergency Services sub-object
Attribute Initial value Transform Final value
Equipment
availability
Unavailable -------------> Available
Equipment
condition
Non-utilizable ----------->(desired) Non-utilizable
Equipment
condition
Non-utilizable ----------->(actual) Utilizable
Disaster Scene sub-object
Attribute Initial value Transform Final value
Access point 
position
Unknown Located
Access point 
suitability (*)
Not known Unsuitable
Disaster Character sub-object
Attribute Initial value Transform Final value
Type(*) Not known Fire/hazardous 
material
Fire status Uncontrolled ---------->(deSired) Controlled
Fire status Uncontrolled ----------->(actual) Uncontrolled
Fire Service task protecting property
Disaster object
Attribute Initial value Transform Final value
Normality Abnormal ---------->(desired) Less abnormal
Normality Abnormal ----------->(actual) Abnormal
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Emergency Services sub-object
Attribute Initial value Transform Final value
Equipment
availability
Unavailable -------------> Available
Equipment
condition
Non-utilizable ----------->(desired) Non-utilizable
Equipment
condition
Non-utilizable ----------->(actual) Utilizable
Property sub-object
Attribute Initial value Transform Final value
T ypef) Not known Buildings
Buildings status At risk ---------->(desired) Not at risk
Buildings status At risk ----------->(actual) At risk
Fire Service task of rescuing casualties
Disaster object
Attribute Initial value Transform Final value
Stability Unstable ---------->(desired) Less unstable
Stability Unstable ----------->(actual) Unstable
Emergency Services sub-object
Attribute Initial value Transform Final value
Equipment
availability
Unavailable -------------> Available
Equipment
condition
Non-utilizable ----------->(deSired) Non-utilizable
Equipment
condition
Non-utilizable ----------->(actual) Utilizable
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Lives sub-object
Attribute Initial value Transform Final value
Survivor rescue 
status
Not rescued ---------->(desired) Rescued
Survivor rescue 
status
Not rescued ----------->(actual) Not rescued
6.5 Performance expression
Each of the behaviour conflicts identified has now been described by the 
model, so diagnosing potential co-ordination design problems. However, 
defining effective performance of the EMCRS has proved complex, due to 
trade-offs between the individual agencies' performances. The model 
describes the actual overall combined agency performance with respect to 
EMCRS common objectives, and their priorities. This expression of 
performance does not take into account the individual agencies' priorities 
for these objectives, as specified in their own individual plans. For 
example, from Behaviour Conflict 1, the Police Service wish to preserve 
the disaster site as a 'crime scene' (vandalism is suspected), and to catch 
the criminals, and so require the Fire Service not to tram ple the site. The 
Fire Service, will slow the rescue of casualties, and make them less 
effective in fire prevention, if they do not trample the site. Model 1 
describes the 'actual' overall combined agency performance with respect 
to EMCRS common objectives. The co-ordination problems identified, 
thus, do not take account of the performance trade-offs between agencies. 
For this behaviour conflict Model 1 describes an overall EMCRS 
performance deficit which derives from the Police and Fire Services. 
Trampling by the Fire Service reduces the chances of the vandals being 
caught. Carrying out minimal trampling reduces rescue of casualties and 
control of the fire. These overall deficits derive from the common 
objectives, i.e. to save life (casualties not rescued); prevent escalation of 
disaster; (fire not controlled); and facilitate criminal investigation (vandals 
not caught).
However, each agency has its own disaster plan. These plans describe 
agency functions/tasks and their priorities. To accurately express overall
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EMCRS performance, account m ust be taken of these plans. For example, 
the Fire Service plan states: 'Investigation work will not take precedence 
over the necessity to rescue casualties, fight fires, or the protection of lives 
and property from fire or further deterioration. Every effort m ust be made 
by the Fire and Rescue Commander to preserve the scene intact/ (Chief 
and Assistant Chief Fire Officers' Association, 1994). Thus, the Fire Service 
should keep their trampling to a minimum, to preserve other Fire Service 
behaviours. Thus, for this co-ordination problem, there is no Fire Service 
performance deficit, as the actual performance effected by minimal 
trampling, is equal to the planned performance, which allows effects of 
minimal trampling. Thus, although there is still a Police Service 
performance deficit (minimal trampling still reduces vandal 
apprehension), the overall EMCRS performance deficit is less than was 
identified by Model 1 -  the Combined Agency Model.
There is a need, therefore, to decompose the EMCRS into its parts and for 
each agency to be modelled individually with respect to its plans. These 
single agency (SA) models describe planned individual agency 
performance with respect to the combined agency actual performance, 
that is, overall EMCRS actual performance. Model 1 can then be re­
interpreted with the help of the SA models, to diagnose more effectively 
overall EMCRS performance, as concerns planning and control co­
ordination problems. These single agency models will be presented in 
Chapter 7.
6.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter has presented Model 1 the combined model from both 
datasets, and used it to diagnose EMCRS coordination design problems, 
by means of behaviour conflict identification. A diagnosis m ethod for 
identifying co-ordination design problems has been presented and its 
application demonstrated. Five EMCRS co-ordination design problems 
have been diagnosed. However, accurately expressing performance of 
these co-ordination design problems has been identified as a problem. 
Single Agency (SA) models have been proposed as a solution to this 
problem. These models will be presented in Chapter 7, along with
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solutions to the other issues identified, in Section 6.1 above, w ith regards 
to the model representation.
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Chapter 7 
Model Issues
Introduction
Chapter 6 presented EMCRS Model 1, the model derived from combining 
Dataset 1 and Dataset 2. All the conflicts, within the data, were identified 
with the m ethod for diagnosis, as EMCRS co-ordination design problems. 
However, there are issues with the model, both with respect to its 
representation and with respect to the model expression of EMCRS 
performance. The representation issues have been briefly outlined in 
Chapters 2, 4, 5 and 6. The performance expression issue was outlined in 
Chapter 6. This chapter will now address each of these issues in turn and 
offer solutions. These solutions are to be implemented in EMCRS Model 
2, which is presented in Chapter 8. The issues are how to represent: (i) a 
changing worksystem; (ii) a system with more than one level of operation, 
and with interactions between the levels; and (iii) system performance 
with trade-offs between different parts of the system. These issues are 
considered common to modelling such complex systems. Each of these 
issues will be discussed and solutions offered. In Chapter 9, these issues 
will be generalised.
7.1 Issue 1: how to represent a changing worksystem
The first issue relates to the model representation. The configuration of 
the EMCRS changes over time. At the beginning of the disaster, there 
were fewer emergency personnel and devices/equipm ent, than after the 
major incident was declared, when many more personnel and 
devices/equipm ent were required. Also as time moves on, the EMCRS 
will continue to change in response to the domain, for example, a trapped 
person may require specialist equipment to rescue them, which will need 
to be brought to the scene. The models shown in earlier chapters fail to 
represent this changing worksystem. One solution to this issue is to 
represent the changing worksystem by using a time-line and '+' for the 
additional structures. Thus, 'snapshots' of the worksystem structures 
could be taken w ithin specified time periods, which relate to specific tasks
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being carried out. This representation would be an extension to the HCI- 
PCMT framework representation to accommodate a changing 
worksystem. The time-sliced periods need to be specified carefully with 
respect to the domain, so the actual worksystem structures, required for 
particular tasks, are represented. For example, when the Fire Service set 
up the inner cordon, with safety requirements for entry, Fire Service 
personnel are required to be in charge of the cordon, so that no emergency 
personnel can enter the cordon w ithout regulation safety equipment. 
Model 2 will be shown in Chapter 8, which will include the time-line, and 
'+ ' for additional structures as a solution to this issue. The behaviours of 
the worksystem are supported by the worksystem structures. 
Representation of worksystem structures over time will, therefore, enable 
specification of worksystem behaviours over time.
7.2 Issue 2: how to represent a system with more than one 
level of operation and interactions between the levels
The second issue, like the first, relates to the model representation. The 
EMCRS comprises multiple agents within a complex three-tier command 
structure. The HCI-PCMT framework has so far only m odelled domains 
with a single level of operation. Thus, interactions between the different 
horizontal and vertical layers of the system are not presum ed by the 
present framework. Thus, HCI-PCMT needed to be further developed to 
accommodate these additional interactions. To represent the interactions 
between the levels of this system, the different structures of the levels 
also need to be taken into account. That is, for example, the tactical level 
does not carry out execution behaviours directly, execution behaviours 
being carried out by the operational level. The tactical level only 
’perceives’ by means of the operational level. The tactical level is not in 
direct contact with the disaster, the operational level perceives 
information and passes it to the tactical level. Thus, the structures of the 
tactical level would not require an executing process as such. They 
would, however, require some form of output communication to the 
operational level to guide execution and some form of input 
communication, in order to perceive information from the operational 
level. These input and output communication structures w ould also be 
required for interaction between the horizontal levels of the worksystem, 
to allow for communication between the different agencies. These input
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and output communications and the differing structures for each 
command level will be shown in Model 2 in Chapter 8. This 
representation is an extension to the HCI-PCMT fram ework to 
accommodate systems with more than one level of operation and 
interactions between the levels.
7.3 Issue 3: accuracy of EMCRS performance expression
The third issue concerns the accuracy of specifying EMCRS performance. 
Conflict behaviours have been described by means of EMCRS Model 1 as 
co-ordination design problems. However, understanding w hat effect these 
co-ordination design problems have on overall EMCRS performance is 
complex, because there are trade-offs between different parts of the 
system. EMCRS Model 1 describes the actual overall combined agency 
(CA) performance with respect to EMCRS common objectives, and their 
priorities. This expression of performance does not take into account the 
individual agencies' priorities for these objectives, as specified in their own 
individual plans. For example, it may be more im portant for the Fire 
Service to pu t out fires than to rescue people, and the resource costs for 
their behaviours are acceptable. In the EMCRS model description of 
Behaviour Conflict 2 (inner cordon restrictions see Section 6.4.2), the Fire 
Service stop fighting fires to rescue casualties, increasing their workload, 
which can be interpreted as ineffective performance, as not fighting fires 
will not enable the domain sub object attribute value changes (Disaster 
Character sub-object attribute fire status from uncontrolled to controlled), 
and so will not enable the transformation of the Disaster object attribute 
stability to a more desired level. However, this performance may not be 
ineffective. Each agency has its own responsibilities w ith weightings for 
each task, some of which are specified in their plans. It m ay be that the 
Fire Service interpret rescue behaviours as primary within this situation, 
as the Fire Service objective of saving life needs to be maintained, as well 
as ensuring that none of the Ambulance Service are injured, by excluding 
them from the scene, and that resource costs for these behaviours are 
acceptable. As a result, the level of stability of the Disaster object is not 
decreased with respect to loss of life. In this case, then, some conflict or 
interaction of behaviours may not lead to ineffective performance. Some 
expression of individual agency desired performance is required, to
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moderate, and so to express more accurately, EMCRS performance. There 
is a need, therefore, to model each agency individually with respect to its 
own plans. These Single Agency models would describe individual 
agency performance with respect to overall EMCRS actual performance. 
EMCRS Model 1 could then be re-interpreted with the help of the single 
agency models, to diagnose more accurately overall EMCRS performance. 
Development of Single Agency models will become part of the EMCRS 
model diagnoses of co-ordination design problems. Therefore, additions 
need to be m ade to the method for co-ordination design problem 
diagnosis presented in Chapter 6. These additions will be Stages 6 and 7 
of the method. Stage 6 is presented in Table 1 below, as it is applied in this 
chapter, and as it relates to Single Agency model development. Stage 7 
relates to re-expressing EMCRS combined agency performance with 
respect to the Single Agency models. This stage is applied and presented 
in Chapter 8.
Method
stages
Action Example for clarification
6 Produce Single Agency 
models, which describe the 
planned performance for each 
agency with respect to the 
identified co-ordination 
problems. These models are 
text-based and use the 
individual agencies' 
contingency plans for 
response to major incidents as 
the reference for planned 
behaviours.
Extracts from the Ambulance service 
model:
The Ambulance safety officer 
liaises closely with safety officers of the 
other agencies, particularly the Fire 
safety officer
The Ambulance safety officer assumes 
responsibility for:
Ensuring that the correct level of 
protective clothing is worn.
Extracts from the Fire Service model: 
Non-fire service personnel entering the 
Fire Service cordon m ust be made 
aware of, and conform to, Fire Service 
safety procedures
Second only to the prevention of 
further catastrophe, priority should be 
given to the treatm ent and recovery of 
casualties from the site
Table 1 Method for Co-ordination Design Problem Diagnosis Stage 6
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The Single Agency models for each agency are now presented. The 
models were developed using method Stage 6 above. These models are 
not a model representation as such, but are more descriptive models.
They are models, in as much as they represent the planned individual 
agency behaviours in a structured way with respect to the identified 
behaviour conflicts. These structured model descriptions were suitable for 
the current purposes of identifying planned performance for individual 
agencies. They describe only those behaviours, associated with the 
behaviour conflicts/co-ordination design, problems identified by EMCRS 
Model 1. They describe the behaviours of each agency w ith respect to 
their planned performance. The plans used were the generic emergency 
procedures manuals, produced by the individual agencies, as a guide for 
each local authority to specify their own more detailed and local, plans. 
These plans were used, and not the more detailed plans of each local 
authority for the following reasons. First, the data used for the model 
were gathered at an emergency management training scenario, where the 
trainees were representatives from the UK. Therefore, no specific local 
authority plan was used in response to the training scenario (an individual 
officer may have knowledge of their local plan, but this knowledge was 
not specifically taken into account). Also, during the exercise, the trainees 
only had access to the generic plans. Second, according to information 
provided by the Home Office Emergency Planning Department, local 
authority plans differ importantly with respect to their usefulness -  some 
local authorities are much better at local planning than others. Therefore, 
to have used a specific local authority plan could have biased the Single 
Agency models with respect to either 'good or bad planning'. Third, the 
data gathered are analysed with respect to the roles/ tasks that each 
agency needs to carry out in response to a disaster. Thus, the data have not 
been analysed at a lower level of description, for example, how the Fire 
Service should access fire hydrants for controlling the fire. This lower 
level of description was absent from the data. The local authority plans for 
individual agencies would contain information at this lower level of 
description, but which could not be accessed or used here.
The plans used were: for the Police Service, the Emergency Procedures 
Manual (Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), 1997); for the Fire
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Service, the Fire Service Major Incident Emergency Procedures Manual 
(Chief and Assistant Chief Fire Officers Association (CACFOA), 1994); and 
for the Ambulance Service, Ambulance Service Operational Arrangements 
for Civil Emergencies (The National Health Service Ambulance Service, 
1994).
The following sections present the Single Agency m odels for the Police, 
Fire and Ambulance Services. In Chapter 8, these Single Agency models 
will be cross-referenced to the EMCRS combined agency Models 1 and 2, 
to express more accurately EMCRS performance.
7.4 Single Agency Models
7.4.1 Police Service Single Agency Model
Three different behaviour conflicts have been identified by the training 
scenario data, which involve the Police Service, and which have then been 
diagnosed by the model as co-ordination design problems. The Single 
Agency model describes only those behaviours, associated with the 
behaviour conflicts with other agencies. In this section, each of the 
behaviour conflicts, in which the Police Service is implicated, is first 
reiterated for clarification. Then, information regarding each of these 
conflicts, taken from the Police Service plans, will be presented. Last, the 
planned performance for the Police Service for each conflict is presented.
Police Service conflict with other agencies 
Police and Fire Services
The Police Service are trying to preserve the scene - the Fire Service are 
containing the hazard, rescuing casualties and tram pling the area.
The Fire Service need good access for their appliances - the Police Service 
decide where access should be, which is not necessarily where the Fire 
Service w ant it.
Police and Ambulance Services
The Police Service need to be able to talk to the witnesses. The witnesses 
may be casualties, and as such may be taken away to hospital. The Police 
Service set up a casualty bureau, through which all casualties should be
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cleared, before being transported anywhere. It is im portant that the 
Ambulance Service make sure the Police Service receive the information 
about the casualties that need hospital treatment, for possible interview 
later.
Extracts from the general Police Service plan:
(All extracts are in italics.)
Behaviour Conflict 1: Trampling/scene preservation
• Police (P) P. 1.1) Section 1 5.4 When it becomes apparent that no further life
can be saved, other considerations take precedence: preservation of the scene; 
protection of property; investigation.
• P. 1.2) Section 2.1.2 Inner cordon - to provide immediate security of the
incident site (which must be treated as a 'scene of crime' and preserved as 
such).
• P. 1.3) Section 7.1.3. The disaster scene must always be treated as a 'scene of 
crime' and its protection is vital to preserve evidence. This treatment must 
not, however, take precedence over the rescue of survivors and consequently 
some initial disturbance will always take place.
• P. 1.4) Section 7.2.1 Once the rescue and victim recovery phases of the 
operation are complete, an extensive search of the scene must be undertaken to 
recover items for evidential or identification purposes and to identify and 
position wreckage etc.
Police planned performance
The planned performance for the Police Service is to attem pt to preserve 
the scene, but not to let scene preservation behaviours take precedence 
over life saving behaviours.
Behaviour Conflict 4: Witness reporting
• P. 4.1) Section 3.3.1 Once rescued the removal of the injured to designated 
hospitals requires close liaison with the Ambulance Service and the Medical 
Officer in charge at the scene.
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• P. 4.2) Section 3.3.3 To co-ordinate removal of the injured, the Ambulance
Service, after consultation with the other emergency services as to location, 
routing and signing, will set up: a casualty clearing station; ambulance 
loading points; ambulance parking point; and ambulance control point.
• P. 4.3) Section 3.3.5 Police will liaise with the medical and ambulance incident 
officers to maintain a count of all persons processed through the casualty 
clearing station with details of the hospitals to which they have been taken.
• P. 4.4) Section 5.3.5.1 Casualty information
This information is forwarded to the Bureau from hospitals and, where the 
individual may have a minor injury not requiring hospitalisation, from the 
scene and survivor!evacuee reception centres, by police documentation teams. 
The information may be passed by telephone, fax, computer link etc., or by 
completed records, being delivered to the bureau. Good practice is for a 
Casualty Bureau operator to be dedicated to liaise with a particular hospital or 
reception centre.
Individual officers responsibilities (Appendix D)
• P. 4.5) Casualty receiving station officer
i) Responsible to the Incident Officer
ii) Liaise with the medical or ambulance officer in charge and request resources as 
required.
Hi) Liaise with the ambulance officer and log numbers of casualties processed and 
to which hospitals they have been sent.
• P. 4.6) Incident control post co-coordinator
i) Establish and maintain close liaison with other on-site emergency and support 
services. Monitor the response of those other services, anticipating the needs of 
the Police Incident Officer.
• P. 4.7) Ambulance Loading point officer
i) Liaise with ambulance staff.
ii) Ensure unrestricted access and egress for ambulances.
Police planned performance
The planned performance for the Police Service is to attem pt to log details
of all casualties in the casualty bureau but not to delay casualties and to
obtain the information at the hospitals as required.
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Behaviour Conflict 5: Access of fire appliances
• P. 5.1) Section 1.6.7 Incident control post responsible for controlling access to
the scene, ensuring that only authorised personnel and vehicles are present 
and, where appropriate, have been logged in.
• P. 5.2) Section 2.6 Traffic Control
i) Immediate action must be taken to ensure free passage of emergency traffic to 
and from the site and to prevent congestion at the scene and in the surrounding 
area.
ii) Wherever possible a 'one way' system, with defined access and exit routes for 
essential services, should be implemented to ensure the rapid attendance of 
emergency vehicles at the scene and to facilitate the unimpeded removal of 
casualties to hospital. If there is only one access route, 'turning areas' must be 
identified and supervised to avoid congestion.
Individual officers responsibilities (Appendix D)
• P. 5.3) First officer at the scene
i) Access - best routes for emergency vehicles, parking, turning points, routes 
blocked, and suitable rendezvous points
• P. 5.4) Police incident officer
i) Ensure that action has been taken to organise: priority traffic routes for 
essential services; and parking for essential service vehicles.
• P. 5.5) Incident control post co-coordinator
i) Control Access to the scene and issue passes.
• P. 5.6) Traffic manager
i) Ensure that the following have been designated, if required, and inform all 
relevant services of: rendezvous points; marshalling areas; access and exit 
routes for essential services; emergency routes to hospitals; diversions for non- 
essential traffic; and turning areas.
Police planned performance
The planned performance for the Police Service is to set-up the access
points, if possible in sites, where emergency vehicles can have rapid
attendance at the scene, and control these access points.
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7.4.2 Fire Service Single Agency Model
The Single Agency model for the Fire Service describes its behaviours with 
respect to its planned performance. The model describes only those 
behaviours, associated with the identified behaviour conflicts with other 
agencies. Four behaviour conflicts have been identified from the training 
scenario, involving the Fire Service. Each of these behaviour conflicts will 
be described here, as for the Police Service. Then, extracts from the Fire 
Service plan relating to these conflicts is provided. Last, the planned 
performance for the Fire Service for each conflict is presented.
Fire Service conflicts with other agencies 
Police and Fire Services
The Police Service are trying to preserve the scene - the Fire Service are 
containing the hazard, rescuing casualties and tram pling the area. The Fire 
Service know that the scene needs to be preserved, bu t during their 
containment of the hazards and rescue behaviours, they know that they 
will tram ple the site, which will not help the Police Service in evidence 
gathering.
The Fire Service need access for their appliances. The Police Service decide 
where the access points will be, taking into account access and egress for 
all the agencies (these access points may not be as desired for the Fire 
Service).
Fire and Ambulance Services
The Fire Service set up an inner cordon and are responsible for safety of all 
personnel within the cordon - the Ambulance Service do not have 
regulation safety equipm ent and are not allowed access to the casualties. 
The Fire Service have decontamination equipment. Therefore, it is their 
responsibility to decontaminate any casualties, emergency service 
personnel and ambulances, before they leave the scene. However, the Fire 
Service do not necessarily see decontamination as their responsibility, as 
they are busy containing the incident. The Ambulance Service require all 
contaminated personnel, casualties and ambulances to be decontam inated 
at the site, before the casualties can be transported.
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Extracts from the Fire Service plan 
Behaviour Conflict 1: Trampling/scene preservation
• Fire (F) F. 1.1) Section 6.6.1.2 The scene will be treated as a 'scene of crime',
until it is found to be otherwise by the Police. The protection of the scene and 
the preservation of evidence are therefore vital.
• F. 1.2) Section 6.6.1.5 Investigation work will not take precedence over the 
necessity to rescue casualties, fight fires, or the protection of lives and property 
from fire or further deterioration. Every effort must be made by the Fire and 
Rescue Commander to preserve the scene intact. In the case of known, or 
suspected terrorist action, the necessity to fight fires and rescue casualties, etc. 
must be considered in liaison with the Police Incident Officer, having 
particular regard for the safety of personnel and the need to preserve evidence.
Fire Service planned performance
The planned performance is to try to keep trampling to a minimum, but 
not to allow non-trampling behaviours to take precedence over fire 
fighting or rescue of casualties.
Behaviour Conflict 5: Access of Fire appliances
• F. 5.1) Section 3.3.7 Rendezvous points
Initially, all fire appliances will be directed to the immediate scene of the 
incident. However, as soon as practical, rendezvous points should be 
established to assist in controlling the responding assistance. The identification 
and management of a rendezvous point is a police responsibility with a single 
site being the preferred option. Its location should be determined by 
consultation between the emergency services.
• F. 5.2) Section 3.3.8 Marshalling Area
At many incidents, a marshalling area will be established, in liaison with the 
Police, to which resources arriving will be directed, pending their deployment.
• F. 5.3) Section 4.4.5 Outside the inner cordon, the Police will be co-ordinating 
operations, particularly to control access to the incident site.
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Fire Service planned performance
The planned performance for the Fire Service is first to direct their
appliances to the immediate scene, and then to rendezvous points set-up
by the Police Service. These rendezvous points are not access points. The
Police Service have control over access.
Behaviour Conflict 3: Decontamination
No mention of decontamination in the general Fire Service plan.
Fire Service planned performance
There is no planned performance for the Fire Service for decontamination.
Behaviour Conflict 2: Cordon restrictions
• F. 2.1) Section 4.4.4 I f  there is a fire, the possibility of fire, a chemical or 
explosive hazard, or a situation exists, where access to the immediate scene is 
likely to lead to an escalation of the incident, the Police, in liaison with the Fire 
Service, will provide an inner cordon around the incident to enable the Fire 
Service to exercise control of fire fighting and rescue operations.
• F. 2.2) Section 4.4.5 The Fire Service have responsibility for the safety of all 
persons working within the inner cordon, and will liaise with the Police 
regarding, who should be allowed access.
• F. 2.3) Section 4.4.6 In exceptional circumstances, the Police inner cordon may 
be unsuitable for the control of Fire Service operations. This unsuitability may 
be due to it being too extensive an area, or for the need for other agencies to 
work within it, independently of the Fire Service. I f  this is the case, the Fire 
and Rescue Commander may establish a Fire Service cordon, to control those 
areas, where Fire Service personnel are working to restrict access to them. This 
action should be progressed in consultation with the Police and Ambulance 
Incident Officers.
• F. 2.4) Section 4.4.7 Non-Fire Service personnel entering the Fire Service
cordon must be made aware of, and conform to, Fire Service safety procedures.
• F. 2.5) Section 4.4.13 Second only to the prevention of further catastrophe (e.g. 
gas or other explosion), priority should be given to the treatment and recovery 
of casualties from the site.
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• F. 2.6) Section 4.5.3 Incident Control Post - maintaining close liaison with 
other emergency services and support services.
• F. 2.7) Section 8.5.1 It is essential that all personnel working within the inner 
cordon (or Fire Service cordon) are suitably protected against the hazards that 
may be encountered at a major incident.
It should be noted that during Exercise Scorpio no distinction is made 
between the inner cordon and the Fire Service cordon, i.e. they are both 
referred to as inner cordons. It is the Fire Service 'inner' cordon, to which 
the Ambulance Service are not allowed access w ithout the regulation 
protective clothing. There is an outer cordon at the road junction, and an 
inner cordon at the canal 600m from the site, and another inner cordon 
100m, around the site under fire service control.
Fire Service planned performance
The planned performance is to set-up the cordon in consultation with the 
Ambulance Service, and, if necessary, recover casualties.
7.4.3 Ambulance Service Single Agency Model
The Single Agency model for the Ambulance Service describes the 
behaviours of this agency with respect to its planned performance. The 
Single Agency model describes only those behaviours, associated with the 
identified behaviour conflicts with other agencies. Three different 
behaviour conflicts have been identified from the training scenario, which 
cause co-ordination problems, for the Ambulance Service. Each of these 
behaviour conflicts will be described here, as for the other Single Agency 
models for clarification. Then extracts from the Ambulance Service plan, 
relating to these conflicts will be cited. Last, the planned performance for 
the Ambulance Service for each conflict is presented.
Ambulance conflicts with other services 
Fire and Ambulance Services
The Fire Service set up  an inner cordon and are responsible for safety of all 
personnel within the cordon - the Ambulance Service do not have 
regulation safety equipm ent and are not allowed access to the casualties. 
The Ambulance Service require sensible restrictions (laid dow n by the Fire
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Service) in the inner cordon, so that their personnel can have access to 
casualties.
Any ambulance, Ambulance Service personnel or casualties, which have 
come into contact w ith a hazardous substance, will need to be 
decontaminated, before leaving the scene. If not, then an ambulance can 
be out of operation for the whole of the incident, and if a contaminated 
ambulance arrives at a hospital, then that hospital will be out of action for 
the whole of the incident too. Decontamination should be carried out by 
the Fire Service, as they have the equipment, but the Fire Service do not 
like taking responsibility for decontamination, as they have other 
priorities, such as, preventing escalation of the incident.
Police and Ambulance Services
The Police Service need to be able to talk to the witnesses. The witnesses 
may be casualties, and as such may be taken away to hospital. The Police 
Service set up a casualty bureau, through which all casualties should be 
cleared, before they are transported anywhere. It is im portant that the 
Ambulance Service make sure that the police receive the information 
about the casualties, that need hospital treatment, for possible later 
interview.
Extracts from the Ambulance Service Plan:
Behaviour Conflict 2: Cordon restrictions
• Ambulance (A) A. 2.1) Section 8 The primary areas of Ambulance
responsibility are:
i) The saving of life, in conjunction with the other emergency services.
ii) The treatment and care of those injured at the scene, either directly or in 
conjunction with medical personnel.
Individual officers responsibilities
• A. 2.2) The Ambulance safety officer
i) Role 3 assumes responsibility for ensuring that the correct level of protective 
clothing is worn.
ii) Role 4 liaises closely with safety officers of the other agencies, particularly the 
Fire safety officer
• A. 2.3) The Ambulance incident officer decides, whether additional Ambulance
Service equipment is required
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• A. 2.4) Forward incident officer maintains a high profile liaison with the other 
agencies on site.
Ambulance Service planned performance
The planned performance for the Ambulance Service is to liaise with the 
other agencies, specifically with the Fire Service in this instance, so that the 
regulation safety equipment required is known and acted upon. Planned 
performance would ensure that the Ambulance Service officers arrive at 
the inner cordon set-up with the required level of safety equipment. Then, 
the officers can enter the cordon to treat the injured.
Behaviour Conflict 3: Decontamination
Individual officers' responsibilities
• A. 3.1) The Ambulance safety officer
Role 6 seeks appropriate advice for the Ambulance Incident Officer and/or 
Forward Incident officer of the correct treatment and procedures in cases of 
contamination of casualties, personnel, and vehicles/equipment.
Ambulance Service planned performance
The planned performance is to find out treatment and procedures for 
contaminated personnel, casualties and equipment, but the plan does not 
specify where the appropriate advice should come from, or who should 
act on the advice, once it is obtained.
Behaviour Conflict 4: Witness reporting
• A. 4.1) Section Casualty documentation: 1 Ambulances should not be delayed at
the scene in order to obtain personal details of individual casualties, which will 
be obtained by the police at the receiving hospitals.
Ambulance Service planned performance
The planned performance for the Ambulance Service is to send the 
casualties to hospital as required, not worrying about recording details.
All the Single Agency models have now been presented. These models 
will be cross referenced with the EMCRS combined agency Models 1 and 2 
in the following chapter.
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7.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter has described all the issues identified during the 
development of Model 1. Each issue has been described in turn and 
solutions have been proposed. These will be implemented in EMCRS 
Model 2 presented in the following chapter. A solution to one issue, to 
enable accurate performance expression through the EMCRS models, is 
Single Agency models. These Single Agency models have been presented 
above. In Chapter 8, the Single Agency models will be used to re-describe 
the performance effects of the identified co-ordination design problems. 
Cross referencing between the Single Agency and Combined Agency 
Models will produce more accurate performance expressions, presented in 
Chapter 8.
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Chapter 8 
EMCRS Model 2
Introduction
This chapter presents EMCRS Model 2, in Section 1. EMCRS Model 2 is the 
combined agency model for the same data, used for EMCRS Model 1, but 
with all the issues, identified in Chapter 7, addressed. That is, EMCRS 
Model 2 has representations for: a changing worksystem, and a system 
where there is more than one level of control, and interactions between the 
levels. The other issue discussed in Chapter 7 was that of accurately 
expressing performance with EMCRS Combined Agency (CA) Models. 
Single Agency models for each of the emergency services were presented 
in Chapter 7, as a means of identifying more clearly individual agency 
performance with respect to their own contingency plans. The 
performance effects of the co-ordination design problems, identified by 
the CA Models (EMCRS Models 1 and 2), can now be re-expressed, taking 
into account Single Agency performance, as described by the Single 
Agency models. These performance expressions are presented in Section 2. 
For each of the co-ordination design problems, the following performance 
expressions will be given: the actual performance as expressed by the CA 
models; the planned performance as expressed by the Single Agency 
Models, and the re-expressed performance, identified by relating the 
differing model expressions.
8.1 EMCRS Model 2
Figure 1 presents EMCRS Model 2. It shows all the abstract and physical 
structures of the worksystem on the left side of the diagram. The abstract 
structures representation is the same as that shown in Chapter 2, Figure 1, 
and as used for the previous EMCRS models (see Chapters 4, 5 and 6).
That is, an oval depicts a process structure, a rectangle depicts a 
representation structure, a read arrow depicts a process reads from the 
contents of a representation, and a write arrow depicts a process writes to 
the contents of a representation. The links between the abstract sub-objects 
and the physical objects, shown with a dotted line, define the abstract to
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physical realisation relationship. The relationship has a many-to-one 
mapping, as described in the method for model construction Phase 3 
(Chapter 4, Section 4.3). On the right side, the model shows the EMCRS 
domain. The abstract domain objects, their attributes and values are the 
same as for EMCRS Model 1. The physical domain is represented over 
time corresponding to the EMCRS physical worksystem. Due to 
difficulties with representing the whole model in one diagram, some of the 
wording may be difficult to read. Therefore, each part of the model is 
presented in turn w ith its representation to aid understanding.
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Figure 2 EMCRS Worksystem physical structures
Figure 2 shows the EMCRS Model 2 worksystem physical structures. The 
three tier structure of the EMCRS is represented for each agency. To 
represent the changing EMCRS worksystem, the physical worksystem is 
represented over time, with timelines and '+ ' for additional structures.
The first timeline is 0 minutes, i.e. at the start of the incident. The only 
structure in the physical worksystem at 0 minutes is one member of the 
emergency services at an operational level. At the beginning of any 
incident, the first person of the emergency services to arrive, m ust assess 
the situation and report back to base. This person will be an operational 
personnel member. The second timeline is 60 minutes. A major incident is 
declared after 15 minutes, which is when the EMCRS is activated. One 
hour into the incident, the EMCRS is fully operational. The additional 
structures, represented in the physical worksystem after 60 minutes, are 
those structures that support the behaviours of the worksystem at this 
time. Thus, the physical structures of the worksystem relate directly to the 
physical domain. For example, firemen and fire-fighting equipm ent 
controlling the aviation fuel fires. All the physical structures, that could be 
inferred from the data, are represented. The last timeline is 180 minutes. 
The EMCRS is 'stood down', i.e. it is no longer required for the
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management of the incident, at 4 hours. Therefore, at 180 minutes the 
EMCRS structures support behaviours that are bringing the incident 
under control. There will be additional personnel for each agency along 
with more equipment, and specialist personnel to support behaviours, 
such as crime scene investigation by the Police. These timelines could be 
changed for other domains. The timelines correspond directly with the 
timelines used for the physical domain objects. This representation is an 
extension to the HCI-PCMT framework to accommodate changing 
worksy stems.
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Figure 3 EMCRS Abstract worksystem structures and behaviours
Figure 3 shows the EMCRS abstract worksystem structures and 
behaviours for Model 2. The abstract structures are representations and 
processes that support the behaviours of the worksystem. In Figure 3, an 
oval depicts a process structure, a rectangle depicts a representation 
structure, a read arrow depicts a process reads from the contents of a 
representation, and a write arrow depicts a process writes to the contents
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of a representation. Shown at the strategic level, the process structures 
are: planning; controlling; and perceiving, and the representation 
structures are: plans and knowledge-of-disaster object transformations 
(knowledge-of-tasks). At the tactical and operational levels, the 
behaviours of the worksystem are shown i.e. planning, control, perception, 
and execution (only at the operational level, to be discussed below). Thus, 
Figure 3 represents the abstract structures and the abstract behaviours 
these structures support. The multiple agency, three tier nature of the 
EMCRS is represented, showing the distribution of the HCI-PCMT 
framework abstract structures across each level, and between levels. The 
interactions between levels are represented by input and output corns, 
(communications). At the strategic and tactical levels, there is no 
executing process represented, just output communications, as the 
strategic and tactical level of command interact indirectly with the domain 
through the operational level. It is only the operational level of command 
that transforms the EMCRS abstract objects directly. Therefore, it is only 
the operational level of command that has an executing process. The 
strategic level does not have separate structures and behaviours for each 
of the agencies, as at the strategic level, there is a senior co-ordinating 
group, with one representative from each agency, working together as a 
single group. This representation is an extension to the HCI-PCMT 
framework to accommodate systems, in which there is more than one level 
with interactions between them.
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Figure 4 EMCRS Physical domain objects
Figure 4 shows the EMCRS physical domain objects attributes and values 
for Model 2. These physical objects are the same as those conceptualised 
for Model 1. The physical domain objects are represented over time. The 
timelines correspond directly with the timelines in the EMCRS physical 
worksystem for EMCRS model 2. Thus, the objects and attributes shown 
in Figure 4 correspond to the EMCRS worksystem behaviours at those 
times. For example, at 0 minutes the behaviours of the EMCRS are to 
perceive the domain and update the knowledge-of-tasks about the 
situation. At 0 minutes the physical domain, represents information about 
the disaster scenario (a representation of information in the Exercise 
Scorpio narrative). At 60 minutes, the physical domain reflects the 
behaviours of the worksystem, for example triage and treatm ent of 
casualties, containment of the scene with a cordon, and partial control of 
the fires. Emergency service personnel are now represented as part of the 
domain, but only if they are contaminated. Emergency service personnel 
are obviously part of the EMCRS worksystem. Contaminated personnel 
will become part of the domain as it will be the work of the EMCRS to 
decontaminate the personnel. Also, at 60 minutes, emergency service 
equipm ent become part of the domain . The reason is because making 
equipm ent available and usable is part of the work of the EMCRS. Last, at 
180 minutes the physical objects represented include contaminated
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emergency service equipment. Contaminated equipm ent will require 
work by the EMCRS to decontaminate it. Other physical objects are 
buildings stabilised and fires controlled, which relate to the worksystem 
behaviours at this time. Only some of the physical objects attributes and 
values are shown here, due to space limitations of the representation. The 
full set has been described elsewhere (see Chapter 4, Section 4.3, and 
Chapter 5, Section 5.2).
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Figure 5 EMCRS Abstract domain objects
Figure 5 shows the EMCRS abstract domain objects attributes and values 
for Model 2. These are the same as those for Model 1, and as identified in 
Chapter 4. The full lines between the Disaster object and the other sub­
objects define a part-of relationship. The attributes w ith a star (*) are 
dispositional; that is they need to be perceived by the worksystem  but are 
not changed by it. These abstract objects are realised by the physical 
objects of the domain. It is not necessary to represent the abstract domain 
over time. All the abstract objects' attributes and values are represented in 
the domain. Therefore, abstract object attributes can be directly identified 
that correspond to the physical object attributes, as required.
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EMCRS Model 2 has been presented. It is a Combined Agency (CA) model 
as it represents all the agencies within the EMCRS combined response (as 
is EMCRS Model 1.) These CA models have been used to identify 
behaviour conflicts within the EMCRS and thus, to diagnose co-ordination 
design problems. The performance expressions, associated with these CA 
models, have been identified as not being accurate. Single Agency (SA) 
models have been developed to rectify this problem. The SA and CA 
models are now related to give more accurate EMCRS performance 
expressions, for the five co-ordination design problems. Relating the 
models is Stage 7 of the method for design problem diagnosis, presented 
in Chapter 6. Method Stage 7 is given in Table 1 below and is applied in 
Section 8.2.
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Method
Stage
Action Example for clarification
7 Refer to the Single Agency models of 
individual agency planned performance 
to accurately express EMCRS 
performance.
The Single Agency model for the Ambulance 
Service shows that the planned performance for 
the Ambulance Service is to liaise with the other 
agencies, specifically with the Fire Service in this 
instance, so that the regulation safety equipment 
required is known and acted upon. Planned 
performance would ensure that the Ambulance 
Service officers arrive at the inner cordon set-up 
with the required level of safety equipment. Thus, 
the officers can then enter the cordon to treat the 
injured. The actual performance of the Ambulance 
Service was to arrive at the Fire Service cordon 
and not to be allowed access, due to a lack of 
regulation safety equipment. Thus, the officers 
cannot enter the cordon, and cannot treat the 
injured. Therefore, actual performance is less than 
planned performance.
The Single Agency model for the Fire Service 
shows that the planned performance for the Fire 
Service is to set-up an inner fire cordon making 
sure that other emergency service personnel are 
informed of the set-up and regulation safety 
procedures. The set-up of the Fire Service cordon 
was not progressed with the knowledge of the 
Ambulance Service. Thus, the actual performance 
is less than the planned performance in this 
respect. Secondly, the Fire Service actual 
performance is to recover the casualties to the 
edge of the Fire Service cordon, so that the 
Ambulance Service personnel can triage them. 
This performance would equal planned 
performance, as second only to the prevention of 
escalation of the disaster, priority should be given 
to the treatment and recovery of casualties from 
the site. However, the rescue function only has to 
be carried out, because the Fire Service cordon 
had been set-up with restrictions without 
consulting the Ambulance Service. Thus, overall 
actual performance with respect to this task is less 
than planned performance.
Thus, the Single Agency models show a 
performance deficit for both the Ambulance and 
Fire Services’ response in respect to this co­
ordination problem. The performance expression 
from the Combined Agency models also shows a 
performance deficit for both agencies, so in this 
case is accurate.
Table 1 Method for Co-ordination Design Problem Diagnosis Stage 7
8.2 Perform ance expression
In this section, performance expressions for each of the co-ordination 
design problems, identified by the CA models (EMCRS Models 1 and 2)
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are given, first with respect to CA models and then with respect to the 
Single Agency (SA) models. The different model expressions are then 
related to provide a more accurate expression of performance for each 
problem. (In this instance, and for the purposes in hand here, desired 
performance is considered to be planned performance. Desired 
performance is desired task quality and acceptable user costs.) Reference is 
given to individual data points in Datasets 1 and 2, by number, and also to 
individual sections in the Single Agency Models.
8.2.1 Co-ordination Design Problem 1 Trampling/scene 
preservation
8.2.1.1 Performance expression of CA m odels
Extract from Exercise Scorpio narrative: 'Early information from witnesses 
suggests youths have been seen running from the section of rail track 
where the derailment took place and that vandalism may be responsible 
for the derailment.' Due to this information in the narrative the Police 
declare the site as a crime scene. (Data 1. lb; Data 2. B2). The Fire Service 
are thus expected to behave accordingly in attempting not to trample the 
evidence. (Data 1. 4; Data 2. 6a) The Fire Service behaviour of carrying out 
minimal trampling will affect their performance by slowing rescue of 
casualties and slowing containment of the fire. (Data 1. 4o; Data 1. 5a)
Even minimal trampling will affect the preservation of the scene, and so 
will affect the Police Service behaviours of preserving the site, and thus 
catching the vandals. (Data 1. 3j; Data 1. 6b; Data 2. lc; Data 2. 3a; Data 2. 
5d; and Data 2. 6a). The CA models describe an overall performance 
deficit for the EMCRS, through either (a) hindered goal achievement: 
trampling by the Fire Service reduces the chances of the vandals being 
caught by the Police Service; carrying out minimal tram pling reduces 
rescue of casualties and containing of the fire by the Fire Service; or (b) 
unacceptable system resource costs: Police Service working too hard; Fire 
Service trying not too trample. The CA models, thus, describe a 
performance deficit for the EMCRS, as both the Police and the Fire 
Services have reduced performance for their tasks.
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8.2.1.2 Performance expression of Single A gency M odels
8.2.1.2.1 Planned performance fo r the Police Service
From the Single Agency model, the Police planned performance is to 
preserve the crime scene as much as possible, so that the criminals can be 
apprehended, but not to let this concern take precedence over the saving 
of life (P. 1.3). The Police plan specifies that saving of life takes precedence 
over preserving the scene. (P. 1.1). Therefore, the planned performance for 
the Police Service is to attempt to preserve the scene, but not to let scene 
preservation behaviours take precedence over life saving behaviours.
8.2.1.2.2 Planned performance fo r the Fire Service
From the Single Agency model, the planned performance for the Fire 
Service is to make every effort to preserve the scene intact, and to liaise 
with the Police Service about the need to preserve evidence, but not to let 
investigation work take precedence over the necessity to rescue casualties, 
fight fires etc. (F. 1.2). The protection of the scene and preservation of 
evidence are vital (F. 1.1), so the Fire Service m ust try not to tram ple the 
site. Thus, the planned performance is to try to keep tram pling to a 
minimum, but not to allow non-trampling behaviours to take precedence 
over fire fighting or rescuing casualties.
8.2.1.23 Cross- referencing the models
The Police Service actual performance has a priority of preserving the 
scene and not saving lives, which will give acceptable Police Service 
resource costs (reducing the rescuing performance of the Fire Service, by 
trying to enforce reduced trampling). Thus, the actual Police Service 
performance is much less than their planned performance for an 
additional reason than hindrance of crime preservation behaviours, and 
Police workload too high, identified by the CA models. The actual 
performance of the Fire Service is to attempt not to tram ple the site, 
reducing their effectiveness for saving life. However, the planned 
performance is that they should attempt not to trample, but not let this 
take precedence over life saving etc. Therefore, the actual performance of 
the Fire Service, in attempting not to trample, will not affect task quality; 
rescue of casualties is expeditious, as they will not let non-tram pling 
behaviours take precedence over life saving; and the system resource costs
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will be acceptable: Fire Service trample appropriately. Thus, the actual 
performance is equal to the planned performance, so there is no 
performance deficit for the Fire Service.
8.2.1.3 R elating the M odels
The following representation gives a very clear illustration of the 
performance expression from the CA models and the SA models. Relating 
the two expressions, illustrates how the SA planned performance 
expressions affect the overall EMCRS performance expression.
The CA models describe actual performance not being equal to planned 
performance, as a performance deficit that is identified for both Police and 
Fire Services. The overall performance deficit can be re-interpreted using 
the SA models as follows: (SA1 is the Fire Service Single Agency model 
expression and SA2 is the Police Service Single Agency model expression.) 
If the Fire Service (SA1) actual performance equals its planned 
performance (their trampling behaviours are appropriate and do not 
reduce their effective fire containment and casualty rescue), but the Police 
Service (SA2) actual performance is less than its planned performance 
(their crime scene preservation behaviours, hindered by Fire Service 
trampling, cause the Police to work too hard, and reduce their effective 
vandal apprehension), then CA actual performance (CA Pa) is less than 
the CA planned performance, given SA planned performance (CA (SA) 
Pp). However, the performance deficit (CA Pa < CA (SA) Pp) from the CA
(SA) model is less than the performance deficit (CA Pa < CA Pp) of the CA
model (the CA (SA) model identifies only the Police Service as having a 
performance deficit). Thus, the overall EMCRS performance deficit is less 
than originally identified by the CA models.
Thus, CA Pa < CA Pp (as Pa<Pp for both agencies).
If SA1 Pa = Pp and SA2 Pa < Pp,
then CA Pa < CA (SA) Pp
and (CA Pa < CA (SA) Pp) < (CA Pa < CA Pp).
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8.2.2 Co-ordination Design Problem 2: Cordon Restrictions
8.2.2.1 Performance expression of CA m odels
Extract from Exercise Scorpio narrative: the explosion has created severe 
structural damage to the railway bridge, premises adjacent to the bridge in 
an approximate 30 metre radius and has created major leaks in two of the 
other tank cars. Structural damage of a moderate nature has occurred 
within an approximate 100 metre radius. In the light of this information, 
the Fire Service actual performance is to set up two inner cordons at 600m 
for explosion protection, which is at the canal, and 100m for structural 
damage (for clarity the 100m cordon will now be called the Fire Service 
cordon.) (Data 2. A10). The CA models describe 'actual' Fire Service 
behaviours of setting up an inner cordon to contain the disaster. (Data 1. 
3g; Data 1. 4r; Data 2. C5). The Fire Service are responsible for personnel 
safety therein (Data 1. 4b; Data 2. 4d; Data 2. 4o). Entry into the cordon 
requires regulation safety equipment (Data 1. 6a; Data 1. 3g; Data 2. 6c). 
The cordon, however, was set-up without informing the Ambulance 
Service, of the regulation safety equipment required for entering it. The 
CA models describe the 'actual' Ambulance Service behaviours of arriving 
at the scene, w ithout regulation safety equipm ent and so are refused entry 
(Data 2. 5a; Data 2. 9a). W ithout entry, their task quality is reduced as they 
cannot carry out triage and so, cannot prioritise casualty transfer to 
hospital. This will increase the workload of the Ambulance Service, more 
personnel and ambulances will be required to transport the casualties, as 
delay in casualty treatment will require more casualties to be sent to 
hospitals. The Fire Service has to move casualties to the edge of the 
cordon, for Ambulance Service triage (Data 2. 4i). These Fire Service 
casualty rescue behaviours reduce the task quality of the Fire Service for 
fire containment, and increase Fire Service workload. The CA models 
describe EMCRS actual performance as being less than desired 
performance, as a performance deficit is identified for both Fire and 
Ambulance Services.
8.2.2.2 Performance expressions of S ingle A gency M odels
8.2.2.2.1 Planned performance fo r  the Fire Service
From the Single Agency model, the planned performance for the Fire 
Service was to set-up an inner safety cordon (F 2.1) and to consult with the
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Police and Ambulance Service, regarding the cordon set-up (F. 2.3). 
Responsibility m ust be taken for all those within the cordon (F 2.2.), and 
all personnel working within the inner cordon m ust be suitably protected 
(F 2.7). Non-Fire Service personnel m ust be m ade aware of, and conform 
to, the Fire Service safety procedures (F 2.4). Priority should be given to 
the treatment and recovery of casualties from the site (F 2.5). Therefore, 
the planned performance was to set-up the cordon in consultation with the 
Ambulance Service and, if, necessary recover casualties.
8.2.22.2 Planned performance fo r the Ambulance Service
From the Single Agency model, the planned performance for the 
Ambulance Service is the saving of life in conjunction with the other 
emergency services (A 2.1i), and treatment and care of those injured at the 
scene (A 2.1ii). The Ambulance Safety officer is responsible for ensuring 
that the correct level of protective clothing is worn (A 2.2i), and should 
liaise closely with the safety officers of the other agencies, especially the 
Fire Safety Officer. Thus, the planned performance for the Ambulance 
Service is to liaise with the other agencies, specifically with the Fire Service 
in this instance, so that the regulation safety equipm ent required is known 
and can be worn. Planned performance would ensure that the Ambulance 
Service officers arrive at the inner cordon set-up w ith the required level of 
safety equipment. Thus, the officers can then enter the cordon to treat the 
injured.
8.2.2.3 Cross-referencing the M odels
The set-up of the Fire Service cordon was not progressed w ith the 
knowledge of the Ambulance Service. Thus, the actual performance of the 
Fire Service is less than the planned performance in this respect, as the 
Ambulance Service should have been consulted about the cordon set-up, 
and Fire Service workload increases as they have to rescue casualties. 
Second, the Fire Service actual performance is to recover the casualties to 
the edge of the Fire Service cordon, so that the ambulance personnel can 
triage them. This performance would equal planned performance, as 
second only to the prevention of escalation of the disaster, priority should 
be given to the treatm ent and recovery of casualties from the site, and the 
extra Fire Service workload required is therefore acceptable. However, the 
rescue function only has to be carried out, because the Fire Service cordon
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had been set-up with restrictions without consulting the Ambulance 
Service. Thus, overall actual performance with respect to this task is less 
than planned performance, as the extra Fire Service workload is 
unacceptable in having to rescue casualties. Therefore, actual performance 
for the Fire Service does not equal planned performance. The actual 
performance of the Ambulance Service was to arrive at the Fire Service 
cordon and not to be allowed access, due to a lack of regulation safety 
equipment. Thus, the officers cannot enter the cordon, and cannot treat 
the injured, which increases Ambulance Service workload. The actual 
performance does not equal the planned performance as the Ambulance 
Service have not been informed of the inner cordon and do have the 
required level of safety equipment, so cannot carry out their triage 
behaviours as desired, and Ambulance Service workload is increased.
8.2.2.4 R elating the m odels
The CA models describe actual performance as not being equal to planned 
performance, as a performance deficit is identified for both Fire and 
Ambulance Services. The overall performance deficit can be re-interpreted 
using the SA models as follows: (SA1 is the Fire Service Single Agency 
model expression and SA2 is the Ambulance Service Single Agency model 
expression.)
If the Fire Service (SA1) actual performance is less than its planned 
performance (their failure to inform the Ambulance Service of the cordon's 
set-up reduces fire containment, as they have to move casualties, instead 
of fire fighting, which increases their workload), and the Ambulance 
Service (SA2) actual performance is less than its planned performance 
(their casualty access behaviours reduced, increasing their workload),
(Fire Service failure to inform them of the cordon set-up), and so also 
casualty assessment and prioritisation), then the CA actual performance 
(CA Pa) is less than the CA planned performance, given the SA 
performance (CA (SA) Pp). The performance deficit (CA Pa < CA (SA) Pp) 
of the CA (SA) model is equal to the performance deficit (CA Pa < CA Pp) 
of the CA model. A performance deficit occurs for both Fire and 
Ambulance Services. Thus, the overall EMCRS performance deficit 
identified by the CA model, in this instance, is accurate.
Thus, CA Pa < CA Pp (as Pa<Pp for both agencies.)
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If SA1 Pa < Pp and SA2 Pa < Pp,
then CA Pa < CA (SA) Pp and (CA Pa < CA (SA) Pp) = (CA Pa < CA Pp).
8.2.3 Co-ordination Design Problem 3: Decontamination
8.2.3.1 Performance expressions of CA m odels
The Exercise Scorpio narrative states that there is severe structural damage 
to both to the railway bridge and premises adjacent to the bridge and there 
are also num erous fires in the area. The Fire Service actual performance is 
to protect property and to contain the fires. (Data 1. 4d; Data 1. 4j; Data 2. 
A7). Extract from Exercise Scorpio narrative: 'A num ber have also been 
contaminated by aviation fuel.' In the light of this information, the Fire 
Service actual performance is to recognise the need to set-up 
decontamination areas for fire-fighters and others (Data 2. 4u). (This need 
does not mean, however, that they actually set up the areas.) The 
Ambulance Service are responsible for decontamination. The Ambulance 
Service actual performance, in response to the narrative, is to attem pt to 
carry out decontamination. Flowever, the Ambulance Service do not have 
decontamination equipm ent and have to carry out decontamination in 
conjunction with the Fire Service. The Fire Service have decontamination 
equipment, but do not see it as their responsibility to decontaminate 
ambulances and others, who are not Fire Service personnel (Data 2. 6g). 
Any casualty, that is not decontaminated, before being pu t in an 
ambulance, will contaminate that ambulance (Data 2.7h). Any ambulance 
leaving the site, w ithout being decontaminated, will be out of action for 
the rest of the incident, and if any hospital receives a contaminated 
casualty, then that hospital is deemed contaminated and cannot be used 
for the duration of the incident (Data 2.9b). Therefore, the CA models 
describe EMCRS actual performance as being less than desired 
performance, as a performance deficit is identified for the Ambulance 
Service. Ambulance Service task quality is reduced as they cannot carry 
out their decontamination tasks; Ambulance Service resource costs 
increase as non decontamination will contaminate Ambulance Service 
personnel and equipm ent and thus put them out of action.
8.2.3.2 Performance expressions of S ingle A gency M odels
8.23.2.1 Planned performance fo r the Fire Service
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There is no mention of decontamination in the Fire Service Single Agency 
model. Therefore, the planned performance for the Fire Service equals its 
actual performance, as they negate responsibility for decontamination.
8.2.3.2.2 Planned performance fo r the Ambulance Service
The Ambulance Service Single Agency model does not specifically state 
that the Ambulance Service are responsible for decontamination. 
(However, the Ambulance Service are responsible for decontamination, 
and this is specified with respect to the overall EMCRS (Dealing with 
disaster, 1994)), (and the Ambulance personnel know that they are 
responsible for decontamination too.) The Ambulance Service does not 
have decontamination equipment and so cannot carry out the 
decontamination, on their own. The Single Agency model states, that the 
Ambulance Service safety officer should seek appropriate advice for the 
Ambulance Incident Officer an d /o r Forward Incident officer of the correct 
treatment and procedures in cases of contamination of casualties, 
personnel, vehicles/equipment'. (A. 3.1) The plan does not specify, where 
the appropriate advice should come from, or who should act on the 
advice, once it is obtained. Therefore, there is nothing in the Ambulance 
Service model about who is responsible for decontamination, the planned 
performance is to find out treatment and procedures for contaminated 
personnel, casualties and equipment.
8.2.3.3 Cross-referencing the m odels
The actual performance for the Ambulance Service, identified from the CA 
models, was to attem pt to carry out decontamination, but having no 
means of decontamination see this as the Fire Service's responsibility, 
increasing Ambulance Service resource costs to an unacceptable level. The 
planned performance for the Ambulance Service from the Single Agency 
model was to find out treatment and procedures for contaminated people 
and equipment, with acceptable resource costs. The actual performance is 
thus less than the planned performance, in that the appropriate 
procedures for decontamination have not been applied, giving 
unacceptable resource costs (contaminated ambulances etc.). The actual 
performance is not less than the planned performance, because 
decontamination has not be carried out, which w ould have been expected, 
as the Single Agency model planned performance for the Ambulance
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Service does not state that they are responsible for decontamination.
There is, thus, an issue with the plans, which will be discussed in the 
following section.
The actual performance of the Fire Service was not to take responsibility 
for decontamination, and therefore, ambulances etc. will leave the site 
contaminated. However, as the Fire Service plan does not specify planned 
behaviour for decontamination, it can only be assumed that the actual 
performance of the Fire Service equals its planned performance. The 
Single Agency model for the Ambulance Service, thus, shows a 
performance deficit, as the Ambulance Service does not m anage to find 
out the treatm ent and procedures for contaminated casualties etc.
8.2.3.4 R elating the m odels
The CA models describe EMCRS as actual performance not being equal to 
planned performance, as a performance deficit is identified for the 
Ambulance Service. The overall performance deficit can be re-interpreted, 
using the SA models as follows: (SA1 is the Fire Service Single Agency 
model expression and SA2 is the Police Service Single Agency model 
expression.)
If the Fire Service (SA1) actual performance equals its planned 
performance (their fire-fighting and property protection behaviours being 
carried out according to their plan (their non-decontamination behaviours 
also are according to their plan) and resource costs for both tasks are 
acceptable), and the Ambulance Service (SA2) actual performance is less 
than its planned performance (their behaviours regarding 
decontamination not being carried out according to their plan, increasing 
their resource costs), then CA actual performance (CA Pa) is less than the 
CA planned performance, given SA planned performance (CA (SA) Pp). 
Therefore, the performance deficit (CA Pa < CA (SA) Pp) from the CA 
(SA) model is equal to the performance deficit (CA Pa < CA Pp) of the CA 
model. Thus, the overall EMCRS performance deficit, originally identified 
by the CA models, is accurate.
Thus, CA PA < CA Pp (as Pa<Pp for Ambulance Service).
If SA1 Pa = Pp and SA2 Pa <Pp, 
then CA Pa < CA (SA) Pp
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and (CA Pa < CA (SA) Pp) = (CA Pa < CA Pp)
However, there is obviously a major concern with the plans in relation to 
this co-ordination issue. As described by the EMCRS model description, 
the knock-on effect of not decontaminating either casualties, vehicles or 
emergency service personnel will have a catastrophic effect on overall 
EMCRS performance for the whole disaster. The plans for both the Fire 
and Ambulance Service with respect to decontamination should be 
changed. For the Fire Service, as they are the only service with 
decontamination equipment, there should be specialist personnel allocated 
to operate the equipm ent to support the Ambulance Service in 
decontamination. In this way, the Fire Service will not have to take 
personnel away from their primary objectives of fighting fires and 
protecting lives and property. For the Ambulance Service, the plan should 
state that they are responsible for decontamination in conjunction with the 
Fire Service. This plan is only operationalisable if the Fire Service plan is 
changed accordingly.
8.2.4 Co-ordination Design Problem 4: Witness reporting
8.2.4.1 Performance expressions o f the CA m odels
Due to information arising in the Exercise Scorpio narrative, regarding 
vandalism being suspected for the cause of the incident, it is declared a 
crime scene. Therefore, there is a need to treat all the people at the scene as 
witnesses (Data 2. B3). The Police Service want to be able to record 
witness information before the latter leave the scene (Data 1 3.1; Data 1.
Ip). The narrative also states that there are a num ber of casualties at the 
scene. The Police Service set up a casualty bureau, where records relating 
to any persons who have been involved in the incident, are kept (Data 2. 
lh). The Police Service actual performance is to set up a casualty bureau 
and attem pt to record details of all casualties at the scene and pass this 
information to the bureau, with acceptable resource costs. The Ambulance 
Service actual performance in response to the casualties is to triage, and 
treat a n d /o r  transport casualties to hospital, with acceptable resource 
costs. (Data 2 A 12) The Ambulance personnel should attem pt to record 
the personal details of casualties, but the most serious cases will be
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immediately sent to hospital. (Data 2 7k). The Police Service will not be 
able to record details of the most severely injured at the scene. Therefore, 
the CA models describe EMCRS actual performance as being less than 
desired performance, as a performance deficit is identified for the Police 
Service. They cannot carry out their logging tasks, and so increase their 
workload in having to track down casualty information.
8.2.4.2 Performance expressions o f S ingle A gency m odels
8.2.4.2.1 Planned performance fo r  the Police Service
The Single Agency model for the Police Service states that the Police 
Service should liaise with the Ambulance Service to m aintain a count of 
casualties and details of the hospitals to which they have been sent. (P.
4.3). It does not state that the Police Service should delay the casualties 
from being sent, but information will be forwarded from hospitals (P. 4.4). 
The casualty receiving station officer will liaise with the Ambulance officer 
and log to which hospitals casualties have been sent (P. 4.5). Therefore, the 
planned performance for the Police Service is to attem pt to log details of 
all casualties in the casualty bureau, but not to delay casualties. 
Information should be obtained at the hospitals, as required.
8.2A.2.2 Planned performance fo r  the Ambulance Service
The Single Agency model for the Ambulance Service states that the 
Ambulance Service should not delay in sending the casualties to hospital. 
The Police Service can record the personal details of the casualties at the 
hospital (A. 4.1). The planned performance for the Ambulance Service is to 
send the casualties to hospital, as required, not worrying about recording 
details.
8.2.4.3 Cross-referencing the m odels
The actual performance as expressed by the CA models for the Police 
Service is that the Police Service cannot log in the casualty bureau the most 
severe casualties, who have been sent straight to hospital. The planned 
performance is that information will be sent to the casualty bureau from 
the hospitals and that the Police Service should not delay casualty 
transportation by trying to log casualty details beforehand. Thus, the 
actual performance for the Police Service is equal to the planned
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performance. The resource costs deemed unacceptable w ith respect to 
tracking down witness information are acceptable costs w ith respect to the 
plan. The actual performance for the Ambulance Service, as expressed by 
the CA models, is to send the most serious cases straight to hospital 
w ithout recording personal details. The planned performance is that the 
Ambulance Service should not delay in sending casualties to hospital by 
attempting to record personal details. The actual performance for the 
Ambulance Service is thus equal to its planned performance.
8.2.4.4. R elating the M odels
The CA models describe EMCRS actual performance as not being equal to 
desired performance, as a performance deficit is identified for the Police 
Service. The overall performance deficit can be re-interpreted, using the 
SA models as follows: (SA1 is the Police Service Single Agency model 
expression and SA2 is the Fire Service Single Agency model expression)
If the Police Service (SA1) actual performance equals its planned 
performance (their non casualty bureau logging of serious casualties being 
according to their plan), and the Ambulance Service (SA2) actual 
performance is equal to its planned performance (their not delaying 
casualties to record details being according to their plan), then CA actual 
performance (CA Pa) is equal to the CA planned performance, given SA 
planned performance (CA (SA) Pp). The performance deficit (CA Pa = CA 
(SA) Pp) from the CA (SA) model is, therefore, less than the performance 
deficit (CA Pa < CA Pp) of the CA model (the CA (SA) model identifies no 
performance deficit for either agency). Thus, the overall EMCRS 
performance deficit is less than originally identified by the CA models. 
Thus, CA Pa < CA Pp (as Pa < Pp for Police Service)
If SA1 Pa = Pp and SA2 Pa = Pp,
then CA Pa = CA (SA) Pp
and (CA Pa = CA (SA) Pp) < (CA Pa < CA Pp)
However, the Police Service believe that not recording personal details of 
witnesses at the scene, is likely to lead to that information being 
unrecorded. This outcome m ust mean that the plans for the receiving 
hospitals to pass information to the casualty bureau are not effective.
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W ithout this information the criminal investigation by the police will be 
hampered. There is, therefore, an issue with the plans. The fact that the 
Police Service would rather delay casualties from being transported to 
hospital to gather witness information, which will produce a much greater 
deficit on overall EMCRS performance, (as the prim ary priority for all 
agencies is to save life), shows that there needs to be a change in the plans.
8.2.5 Co-ordination Design Problem 5: Access of fire appliances
8.2.5.1 Performance description of CA m odels
Due to information in the Exercise Scorpio narrative, a major incident is 
declared. At a major incident, the Police are responsible for access (Data 1. 
li; Data 2 A4; Data 2. B2), which is often chaotic (Data 1.1c). Therefore, the 
actual performance of the Police Service is to set-up access points to the 
scene for all the emergency Services. From the Exercise Scorpio narrative, 
there is aviation fuel flowing down the sides of the embankment onto the 
roadway, and there are num erous fires in the area. The Fire Service need 
to stem the flow of aviation fuel (Data2 Cl), and need to fight fires and 
prevent escalation of the disaster (Datal. 4d) and will therefore need 
access for their fire appliances. The actual performance of the Fire Service 
is to attem pt to stem the flow of the aviation fuel and to fight the fires, but 
they find that, due to poor access point location (Datal.3a; Data2.2a;
Data2. 4n), they cannot utilise their equipm ent and therefore cannot carry 
out their tasks. Therefore, the CA models describe EMCRS actual 
performance as being less than desired performance. W ithout access for 
the fire appliances the Fire Service cannot carry out their fire containment, 
and property protection behaviours, and Fire Service workload is 
increased accordingly.
8.2.5.2 Performance expressions of the S ingle A gency m odels
8.2.5.2.1 Planned performance fo r the Police Service
From the Single Agency model, the planned performance for the Police 
Service is that they are responsible for setting up access points (P. 5.6), and 
that the first officer on the scene should identify the best routes for the 
emergency vehicles, parking, turning etc (P. 5.3). The incident control post 
is responsible for controlling access to the scene (P 5.1), and if possible a
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'one way' system with defined access and exit routes for essential services, 
should be set-up to ensure rapid attendance of emergency vehicles at the 
scene (P. 5.5ii). Thus, the planned performance for the Police Service is to 
set-up the access points, if possible in sites where emergency vehicles can 
have rapid attendance, and control the access points.
S.2.5.2.2 Planned performance fo r the Fire Service
From the Single Agency model, the planned performance for the Fire 
Service is to direct all fire appliances to the immediate scene initially (F. 
5.1), and then to rendezvous points set-up by the Police Service (but in 
consultation with the Fire Service with regards to location) (F.5.1). The 
Police Service are responsible for control of access to the incident site (F.
5.3). The planned performance for the Fire Service is, therefore, first to 
direct their appliances to the immediate scene, to carry out their fire 
fighting and escalation prevention behaviours, and then to rendezvous 
points set-up by the Police Service. However, these rendezvous point 
locations should be decided in consultation between the two services. 
These rendezvous points are not access points to the scene. A rendezvous 
point is a location, where emergency vehicles should be sent to await 
directions to the scene. Thus, the planned performance for access of 
appliances is that the Fire Service should be involved in determining 
where the rendezvous points are, but not where the access points are 
located -  access points are not mentioned per se in the Fire Service Single 
Agency plan, but control of access is deemed a Police responsibility.
8.2.5.3 Cross-referencing the m odels
The actual performance for the Fire Service was that they sent their 
appliances to the access points set-up by the Police Service, bu t could not 
utilise their vehicles. They could not carry out their Fire Service 
behaviours in response to the incident, as the access points to the scene 
were not suitably located. The planned performance for the Fire Service is 
to send their vehicles to access points set-up by the Police, who exert 
control over access to the site. Therefore, the planned performance is 
equal to actual performance, inasmuch as the Fire Service has sent their 
vehicles to the Police access points, with acceptable resource costs, so there 
is no performance deficit for the Fire Service. (However, the actual
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performance, regardless as to whether it equals planned performance or 
not, is not satisfactory performance, as the Fire Service need good access 
for their appliances. There is a performance deficit for the Fire Service, as 
they cannot carry out their transformation behaviours, and have 
unacceptable resource costs. This would imply that the Single Agency 
plans for the Fire and Police Service should be changed to allow better 
liaison between the Police and the Fire Service with regards access.) The 
actual performance of the Police Service is to locate and set-up the access 
points to the scene, which equals the planned performance.
8.2.5.4 R elating the m odels
The CA models describe EMCRS actual performance as not being equal to 
desired performance, as a performance deficit is identified for the Fire 
Service. The overall performance deficit can be re-interpreted using the SA 
models as follows: (SA1 is the Police Service Single Agency model 
expression and SA2 is the Fire Service Single Agency model expression.)
If the Police Service (SA1) actual performance equals its planned 
performance (their access set up behaviours have been carried out 
according to their plan), and the Fire Service (SA2) actual performance is 
equal to its planned performance (their vehicles being sent to the access 
points, according to their plan), then CA actual performance (CA Pa) is 
equal to the CA planned performance, given SA planned performance (CA 
(SA) Pp). The performance deficit (CA Pa = CA (SA) Pp) from the CA (SA) 
model, is therefore, less than the performance deficit (CA Pa < CA Pp) of 
the CA model (the CA (SA) model identifies no performance deficit for 
either agency). Thus, the overall EMCRS performance deficit is less than 
originally identified by the CA models.
Thus, CA Pa < CA Pp (as Pa<Pp for Fire Service).
If SA1 Pa = Pp and SA2 Pa = Pp,
then CA Pa = CA (SA) Pp
and (CA Pa = CA (SA) Pp) < (CA Pa < CA Pp)
However, the fact that the Single Agency model for the Police Service 
shows no performance deficit, does not reflect the fact that the access 
points, although suitable from the Police Services perspective, are
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obviously not suitable for the Fire Service. In the Police Service Single 
Agency model, rendezvous points and marshalling areas m ust be set up  in 
consultation with the Fire Service. It is obvious from this co-ordination 
problem, that access points also need to be set up in consultation with the 
Fire Service. The Police Service plans should be changed to reflect this. 
Likewise, although there is no performance deficit shown for the Fire 
Service from the Single Agency model, this outcome does not reflect the 
fact that the Police Service location of the access points are unsuitable for 
the Fire Service and their vehicles cannot be utilised. The Fire Service plan 
specifies that rendezvous points and marshalling areas, although a Police 
responsibility, should be set-up in consultation with the Fire Service. The 
Fire Service plan should also state that access points should be set-up in 
consultation with the Fire Service.
8.3 Chapter Summary
This Chapter has presented EMCRS Model 2, the combined agency model 
for the same data used for Model 1, but w ith all the issues identified in 
Chapter 7 addressed. The model has been described, showing how the 
identified issues have been represented in the model. The second part of 
the chapter has addressed the problem of performance expression by the 
combined agency (CA) models (EMCRS Models 1 and 2). The performance 
effects of each of the identified co-ordination design problems have been 
re-expressed by cross-referencing the Single Agency performance 
expressions, as described in the Single Agency models. These new 
performance expressions have given rise to issues w ith the current 
contingency plans for each of the emergency services. These issues will be 
discussed in greater detail in the following chapter.
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Chapter 9 
Discussion and Conclusions
Introduction
This chapter presents a discussion of the thesis. Section 1 reiterates the 
aims of the research and discusses whether these aims have been met i.e. 
whether EMCRS models have been produced, that diagnose EMCRS co­
ordination design problems and support reasoning about solutions to 
these problems. How the HCI-PCMT framework needed to be extended 
to produce these diagnostic models will also be addressed. Section 2 
generalises the extensions to the HCI-PCMT framework for modelling 
multi-agent, multi-level command, multiple task w ork situations. Section 
3 discusses the short-comings of the present research and areas for future 
work, which have implications for the w ider development of substantive 
knowledge to support HCI design practices. The last section gives a 
summary of the thesis.
9.1 Meeting the aims of the research
The aim of the present research was to develop models of the EMCRS that 
support the diagnosis of EMCRS co-ordination design problems and the 
reasoning about solutions to these problems. In the EMCRS model 
development, the scope of an existing framework (HCI-PCMT) was 
extended to accommodate the EMCRS. The HCI-PCMT framework was 
developed for modelling single user, multiple task planning and control 
work. Using the framework to model the EMCRS aimed to extend the 
scope of the framework to accommodate multiple user, m ultiple task 
planning and control work. The resultant models served to diagnose 
EMCRS coordination design problems. These models constitute 
substantive HCI knowledge to support directly the diagnosis of design 
problems and allow reasoning about design solutions (and thus, 
indirectly, the prescription of design solutions). A diagnosis m ethod for 
application of the framework was also to be proposed. The following 
sections discuss whether each of these aims have been met.
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9.1.1 EMCRS diagnostic models
This research has developed a set of (HCI-PCMT) EMCRS models. To 
demonstrate whether these models are diagnostic, they need to be able to 
diagnose design problems, such that a designer can reason about design 
solutions to these problems. The remit of this research is not to prescribe 
design solutions. However, an attempt will now be m ade to propose 
solutions, primarily to clarify the nature of the proposed design problems, 
and thus demonstrate the applicability of these models. Diagnosing design 
problems requires ineffective performance to be identified, with respect to 
the quality of the work and the resource costs to the system in carrying out 
this work. Behaviour conflicts were diagnosed by the models as causing 
ineffective performance of the EMCRS, (with respect to task quality and 
resource costs), and were thus diagnosed as design problems.
The EMCRS models identified five co-ordination design problems. These 
co-ordination design problems are diagnosed as EMCRS actual 
performance not being equal to desired performance. Initial solutions to 
these design problems have already been presented in Chapter 6, when 
the design problem diagnoses by EMCRS Model 1, were presented.
Having identified the planned performance of the agencies for these 
design problems in Chapter 8, more explicit design solutions can now be 
suggested.
9.1.1.1 Co-ordination D esign  Problem 1: Tram pling/scene  
preservation
This co-ordination design problem was diagnosed as ineffective 
performance of both the Police and the Fire Services. The Police Service 
reduce their chances of catching vandals, if the Fire Service trample the 
site. The Police Service will have to work harder to gather the evidence if 
the site has been trampled. The Fire Service not tram pling the site reduces 
their rescue of casualties and fire containment. The Fire Service will have 
to work harder in trying not to trample. In Chapter 6, the execution 
behaviours of the Police Service (declaring the site a crime scene and 
insisting on minimal trampling to preserve the scene) were identified as 
part of the cause of the design problem. The behaviours that affected the 
Police Service execution behaviours of preserving the scene were the
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planning and control behaviours of the operational commander. Planning 
behaviour as specified in the model is based on the plans and the 
information in the knowledge-of-tasks representation (in this case, for 
example, knowledge about the vandals). It has now been shown in 
Chapter 8, that the plan that the operational commander consulted (albeit 
an abstract representation of a plan) did not specify, that the Police 
Service, in preserving the scene, should hinder the Fire Service rescue and 
fire containment behaviours. The Police Service operational commander, 
thus, had an inappropriate representation of the plan. This representation 
has caused his planning behaviours, for specifying the execution 
behaviours of preserving the scene, to be inappropriate. Now that it has 
been identified, where in the planning system the problem occurs, 
reasoning about potential solutions to this design problem, are possible. A 
potential solution is to enable adequate training of the procedures, 
specified in the operational plans, such that inappropriate planning 
behaviours are not carried out, and such that actual performance equals 
desired performance, for the crime scene preservation behaviours of the 
Police Service, i.e. the behaviours are carried out as desired with 
acceptable resource costs. The Fire Service behaviours of carrying out 
minimal trampling are identified in Chapter 8, as not causing ineffective 
performance for Fire Service rescue and fire containment. Thus, there is 
no performance deficit, identified for the Fire Service, for this co­
ordination design problem. Minimal trampling should be carried out by 
the Fire Service, if a crime scene has been declared, but non-trampling 
behaviours should not take precedence over life saving and preventing 
escalation of the disaster. The Fire Service execution behaviours of rescue 
and fire containment will still have a negative performance effect on the 
Police Service execution behaviours of preserving the scene, as whilst the 
Fire Service are carrying out these tasks, even with minimal trampling, the 
evidence will not be preserved. The execution behaviours of the Fire 
Service are affected by the planning and control behaviours of the Fire 
Service operational commander. Planning behaviour, as specified by the 
model, is based on plans and the information in the knowledge-of-tasks 
representation (in this case, for example, fires and trapped casualties; 
scene of crime declared). The plan that has informed this planning
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behaviour has been shown in Chapter 8 to be well specified with respect 
to the problem of trampling and in fact also implemented, as the Fire 
Service are attempting not to trample the site, but not letting non­
trampling behaviours affect fire containment and rescue. Since the Police 
Service obviously view trampling as a serious problem, it is probably the 
case that the Fire Service, although they should be carrying out minimal 
trampling are not, and are destroying more evidence than is necessary. 
Thus, it is the execution behaviours of the operational personnel that are 
causing the problem. W hether this outcome is because the operational 
commander has not specified that minimal trampling should be observed, 
or whether it is due to the operational personnel ignoring the instructions 
about minimal trampling cannot be decided here, as the data do not make 
this clear. Therefore, a more detailed potential solution to this problem 
cannot be made explicit at this time.
9.1.1.2 Co-ordination D esign  Problem  2: Cordon Restrictions
This co-ordination design problem was diagnosed as ineffective 
performance of both the Ambulance and the Fire Service. The Ambulance 
Service not being able to access casualties, cannot carry out triage, and 
thus, treatment of casualties, and they have unacceptable resource costs. 
The Fire Service, not allowing the Ambulance Service access, will have to 
carry out rescue of casualties, instead of fire containment, increasing Fire 
Service workload. In Chapter 6, the execution behaviours of the Fire 
Service (setting up an inner cordon and maintaining specified safety 
regulations) were identified as part of the cause of the identified design 
problem. The behaviours, that affected the Fire Service execution 
behaviours of inner cordon set-up, were the planning and control 
behaviours of the operational commander. Planning behaviour, as 
specified in the model, is based on the plans and the information in the 
knowledge-of-tasks representation (in this case, for example, structural 
damage and m any fires at the scene). It has been shown in Chapter 8, that 
the plan which the operational commander consulted, should have 
specified that set-up of the inner cordon should not be progressed without 
the knowledge of the Ambulance Service. The Fire Service operational 
commander, thus, had an inappropriate representation of the plan, which 
has caused inappropriate planning behaviours, that have contributed to
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the design problem. Now that it has been identified where in the planning 
system the problem is occurring, reasoning about potential solutions to 
this design problem, is possible. A potential solution is to enable adequate 
training of the procedures specified in the operational plans, such that 
inappropriate planning behaviours are not carried out, and such that 
actual performance equals desired performance, for inner cordon set-up 
by the Fire Service, i.e. the set-up is as desired and w ith acceptable 
resource costs.
The Ambulance Service execution behaviours of accessing casualties for 
triage and treatm ent are identified as part of the cause of this co­
ordination design problem. These execution behaviours are affected by the 
planning and control behaviours of the Ambulance Service operational 
officer. Planning behaviour as specified in the model, is based on the plans 
and the information in the knowledge-of-tasks representation (in this case, 
for example, casualties and an inner cordon). It has been shown in Chapter 
8, that the plan that the Ambulance Service officer consulted, should have 
specified that liaison should take place with the Fire Service about what 
safety equipm ent is required for entering the cordon. The Ambulance 
Service operational officer had an inappropriate representation of the plan, 
which has caused inappropriate planning behaviours, which have 
contributed to the design problem. A potential solution is to enable 
adequate training of the procedures specified in the operational plans, 
such that inappropriate planning behaviours are not carried out, and such 
that actual performance equals desired performance, for Ambulance 
Service triage and treatment of casualties, i.e. triage and treatm ent are as 
desired with acceptable resource costs.
9.1.1.3 Co-ordination D esign  Problem  3: D econtam ination
This co-ordination design problem was diagnosed as ineffective 
performance of the Ambulance Service. The Ambulance Service cannot 
carry out decontamination of casualties and others, due to the Fire Service 
behaviours of property protection and fire containment. Ambulance 
Service resource costs are unacceptable (contaminated personnel and 
equipm ent cannot be used). The execution behaviours of the Ambulance 
Service (decontaminating casualties in conjunction with the Fire Service) 
have been identified as part of the cause of the identified design problem.
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The behaviours, that affected the Ambulance Service execution 
behaviours, were the planning and control behaviours of the operational 
safety officer. Planning behaviour, as specified in the model, is based on 
the plans and the information in the knowledge-of-tasks representation (in 
this case, for example, contaminated casualties). It has been shown in 
Chapter 8, that the plan that the Ambulance service operational officer 
consulted was inappropriate, (in fact, little was specified on 
decontamination), which has caused inappropriate planning behaviours 
that have contributed to the design problem. Unlike the other two co­
ordination design problems already discussed, the Ambulance Service 
safety officer does not have an inappropriate representation of the plan, 
but the plan itself is inappropriate. Also, it has been shown that the Fire 
Service are the only agency with decontamination equipment, but in their 
plan decontamination is not mentioned. Thus, a potential solution to this 
problem is to re-specify the Ambulance Service, and Fire Service plans 
with respect to decontamination. This re-specification should ensure that 
actual performance equals desired performance for decontamination, with 
respect to the task quality (casualties and others decontaminated) and 
acceptable resource costs (Ambulance Service personnel and equipm ent 
all usable).
9.1.1.4 Co-ordination D esign  Problem 4: W itness reporting
This co-ordination design problem was diagnosed as ineffective 
performance of the Police Service. The Police Service cannot log witness 
information in the casualty bureau, as the witnesses have been sent to 
hospital by the Ambulance Service. The Police Service w orkload increases 
as they have to chase up witness information. The execution behaviours of 
the Police Service (logging all witnesses) have been identified as part of 
the cause of the identified design problem. These execution behaviours are 
affected by the planning and control behaviours of the Police Service 
incident officer. Planning behaviour, as specified in the model, is based on 
the plans and the information in the knowledge-of-tasks representation (in 
this case, for example, the site is a crime scene). In Chapter 8, it has been 
shown, that the plan that the Police Service incident officer consulted, was 
inappropriate. The plan should have specified that attem pts should be 
made to log details of all casualties in the casualty bureau; bu t not to delay
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casualties, and to get the information at the hospitals as required. This 
inappropriate plan representation has caused inappropriate planning 
behaviour by the Police Service incident officer, which has contributed to 
the design problem. A potential solution to this problem would be to 
ensure adequate training of operational procedures, as specified in the 
plans, for Police Service incident officers, such that actual performance 
would equal desired performance for witness reporting, i.e. witness 
information has been recorded as desired with acceptable Police Service 
resource costs.
The Ambulance Service execution behaviours of triage and transportation 
to hospital have been identified as part of the cause of the problem. These 
execution behaviours have been affected by the planning and control 
behaviours of the Ambulance Service incident officers. Planning 
behaviour, as specified in the model, is based on the plans and the 
information in the knowledge-of-tasks representation (in this case, for 
example, seriously injured casualties). In Chapter 8, it has been shown that 
the Ambulance Service behaviours of sending the m ost seriously injured 
to hospital without logging their details are appropriate behaviours, as 
specified in the Ambulance Service plan. Although these behaviours have 
an effect on the Police Service witness recording, as the Police Service 
cannot then get witness details at the scene, delay of casualty 
transportation is not an appropriate behaviour, as details of witnesses will 
be recorded at the hospitals. Thus, there is no performance deficit 
identified for the Ambulance Service, as actual performance is equal to 
desired performance for the Ambulance Service, i.e. casualties have been 
transported with acceptable Ambulance Service resource costs.
9.1.1.5 Co-ordination D esign  Problem  5: A ccess o f Fire A ppliances
This co-ordination design problem was diagnosed as ineffective 
performance for the Fire Service. The Fire Service cannot utilise their 
equipment for fire fighting etc. as the access points set-up by the Police 
Service are unsuitable. The resource costs of the Fire Service are 
unacceptable (the firemen will have excessive workload if they have no 
equipment). The execution behaviours of the Police Service (locating 
access points) have been identified as part of the cause of the identified 
design problem. These execution behaviours were affected by the
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planning and control behaviours of the Police Service incident officer. 
Planning behaviour, as specified in the model, is based on the plans and 
the information in the knowledge-of-tasks representation (in this case, for 
example, a major incident in a market town). Chapter 8 has shown that the 
planning and control behaviour of the Police Service incident officer was 
carried out according to his plan, i.e. that access points should be set-up by 
the Police Service. However, these access points are unsuitable for Fire 
Service appliance access. Therefore, the Police Service plan is 
inappropriate for specifying suitability of access points for Fire Service 
appliances. Thus, a potential solution to this problem is to re-specify the 
Police Service plan, to ensure that actual performance equals desired 
performance with respect to access, i.e. access point locations are as 
desired, and their set-up has acceptable resource costs for the Police 
Service.
The Fire Service execution behaviours of making the fire appliances 
utilisable for rescue, fire containment etc. are identified as part of the cause 
of the design problem. These execution behaviours were affected by the 
planning and control behaviours of the Fire Service incident officer. 
Planning behaviour, as specified in the model, is based on the plans and 
the information in the knowledge-of-tasks representation (in this case, for 
example, aviation fuel fires; trapped casualties). Chapter 8 has shown that 
the planning behaviour of the Fire Service incident officer, in sending their 
vehicles to the Police Service access points, so the appliances are utilisable, 
was according to their plan. However, the access points are unsuitable -  
the fire appliances are not utilisable. The plan consulted by the Fire 
Service incident officer has inappropriate information w ith regards to 
access point set-up. Thus, a potential solution to this problem is to re- 
specify the Fire Service plan (access point location should be set-up in 
consultation with the Fire Service), such that actual performance equals 
desired performance for having utilisable Fire appliances, i.e. the Fire 
Service appliances are utilisable and resource costs acceptable.
Thus, it has been shown that the EMCRS models developed within this 
research are indeed diagnostic models of the EMCRS as they can be used 
to diagnose planning and control co-ordination design problems, and 
support reasoning about how to prescribe potential planning and control
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design solutions. The EMCRS models thus constitute HCI substantive 
knowledge in support of EMCRS design problem diagnosis and reasoning 
about potential design solutions.
9.1.2 HCI-PCMT extension
The scope of the HCI-PCMT framework needed to be extended in order to 
be applied to the EMCRS. The HCI-PCMT fram ew ork, as shown in 
Chapter 2, Figure 2, has a representation and a set of axioms for producing 
diagnostic design models. The framework axioms for EMCRS have been 
presented in Chapter 4. The EMCRS axioms address some of the 
differences in nature of the EMCRS and the other dom ains previously 
modelled by the HCI-PCMT framework. The EMCRS axioms are 
considered to be extensions to the HCI-PCMT framework. The most 
im portant EMCRS axiom relates to how to describe a task and its sub­
tasks. This description has im portant implications for the characterisation 
of multiple task work and subsequent identification of behaviour conflicts 
exhibited by the data. Thus, the EMCRS m ultiple tasks are the individual 
agency tasks, which are identified as sub-tasks of the domain. These sub­
tasks carry out sub-object transformations in the domain, which affect 
disaster object transformations. Behaviour conflicts are identified, when 
sub-objects are not transformed as desired. Behaviour conflicts are 
diagnosed as co-ordination design problems by the EMCRS model. 
W ithout the EMCRS axiom extensions co-ordination design problem 
diagnosis would prove difficult, if not impossible.
Other characteristics of the EMCRS that were different from the previous 
domains studied by the HCI-PCMT framework, were identified as either 
issues with the framework representation, or w ith performance expression 
using the framework. Solutions to these issues were proposed in Chapter 
7, which have been implemented in the final EMCRS Model 2. The latter, 
therefore, represents a changing worksystem with more than one level of 
operation and interactions between the levels. The HCI-PCMT framework 
extension is thus to:
• Represent a changing worksystem with a time-line and + for additional 
structures;
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• Distribute the abstract cognitive structures across the different levels of 
the system and have input and output communication structures to 
represent interactions between the levels.
• For accurate performance expression of the EMCRS, where there are 
trade-offs between different parts of the system, Single Agency models 
giving individual agency performance with respect to their plans have 
been developed. HCI-PCMT framework extension w ould thus require 
the development of models for individual parts of the system with 
respect to their plans.
These HCI-PCMT framework extensions will be discussed in Section 9.2.
9.1.3 Method for Diagnosis
In Chapter 6, a m ethod for co-ordination design problem diagnosis was 
proposed. Further additions to the m ethod were presented in Chapters 7 
and 8. This method has been applied to diagnose the EMCRS co­
ordination design problems. Thus, the m ethod has been operationalised 
and tested by the current researcher. The m ethod is, however, initial -  it 
would need further development for operationalisation and testing by 
other researchers. It has, however, been shown to be useful in its current 
application -  EMCRS co-ordination design problems have been 
diagnosed. Future work w ould be to develop the method, so that it can be 
operationalised, tested, generalised and so validated.
9. 2 Generalisation
This research has presented diagnostic models of the EMCRS. These 
models have been developed through application of the HCI-PCMT 
framework, that was extended for application to the EMCRS domain. It is 
believed that the extended framework can be generalized in the following 
ways:
• The HCI-PCMT framework was extended to represent a changing 
worksystem. This issue is to be found in any complex system that does 
not have stable membership, e.g. changing battle-field formations; 
public services w ith peak demands etc. Time-slicing and a way of 
representing additional structures have been proposed as a means of
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describing such systems. Thus, the HCI-PCMT fram ework extension 
should be applicable to other systems with changing worksystems.
• The HCI-PCMT framework was extended to represent different levels of 
operation, and interaction between horizontal and vertical levels of the 
system. This issue is to be found in any complex system, where only 
certain parts of the worksystem interact directly w ith the domain, and 
where there are different levels of management, e.g. a hospital; military 
formations etc. The solution for this issue was to specify within the 
representation the different structures at the different levels of 
management, and to include a specific structure (input and output 
communications) to represent interactions w ithin and between levels. 
This framework extension should, thus, be applicable to other systems 
similar to the EMCRS as described above.
• The HCI-PCMT fram ework has been extended to represent effective 
system performance, w hen there are trade-offs betw een different parts 
of the system. This last issue is to be found in any system, where there 
are trade-offs between different parts of the system, which affect 
performance, e.g. a university; system development etc. Performance 
can be expressed with respect to the resource costs, required by the 
worksystem and the desired quality of the work, carried out by the 
worksystem. Thus, the way forward for this last issue, is to break down 
the system into its component parts and model each separately. The 
result will provide an expression of performance in terms of the 
resource costs and the quality of the work carried out (with respect to 
domain object transformations) for the tasks of each component part. 
Then, by remodeling the complete system using these performance 
expressions, the system trade-offs become specified and ineffective 
performance of the whole system identified. This fram ework extension 
should, thus, be applicable to all systems where there are trade-off 
between different parts of the system that affect performance.
9.3 Short-comings and Future Research
The first issue that m ust be discussed is the EMCRS data. It is understood 
that data from a real disaster would give the EMCRS model greater 
ecological validity, rather than using data from training exercises. Access
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to such data, is, however, complicated, and most of the data would also be 
confidential, and thus, not ideal for use in a PhD thesis, which is published 
in the public domain. People with access to such data (for example, senior 
emergency service training and research personnel) should, however, be 
able to apply the current framework to such data, and produce models 
that would support co-ordination design problem diagnosis. However, 
due to the complex nature of the EMCRS, data at any lower level of 
description, than presented in the training exercises, would have been 
very difficult to analyse effectively. Also, the EMCRS is a management 
system for co-ordination of the planning and control in response to 
disasters. Thus, the EMCRS is specified at a high level, w ith respect to the 
operational, tactical and strategic levels of command. The EMCRS does 
not specify within a service how each individual person should co­
ordinate with respect to their individual agency roles. The training 
exercises, where the EMCRS data were gathered, were set-up specifically 
to train the emergency service officers in how to use the EMCRS for the 
m anagement of response with respect to operational, tactical and strategic 
levels of command. Thus, the trainees were all emergency service officers, 
and not operational level personnel. The exercise data were thus viewed 
as appropriate for modelling the EMCRS, for planning and control of the 
different command levels for disaster response. The aim of the research 
was to model the EMCRS to diagnose design problems, bu t more 
specifically planning and control co-ordination design problems. Thus, 
again data at this level of detail were considered appropriate for meeting 
the current aims. However, one problem of the data only being at a high 
level of detail has been identified in the previous section, w hen attempting 
to offer potential design solutions to the diagnosed design problem. In 
Co-ordination Design Problem 1, it is not clear w hether operational 
personnel are not carrying out their commanders' orders, or whether the 
commander has specified the orders incorrectly. The data are not at a low 
enough level of detail to specify operational procedures, and thus the 
design problem  is not expressed at a suitable level of detail, such that a 
definitive design solution can be proposed. This situation w ould be 
remedied w ith m ore detailed data gathered from either an actual disaster, 
a live exercise, or even a table-top training exercise.
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Of course, there are other issues with the data, most importantly how it 
was recorded. Video an d /o r voice recording were not perm itted within 
the training exercises. For later analysis, data that have been either video 
recorded, or voice recorded, are more robust than hand recorded data as 
they can later be amplified. The expertise of the data gatherer (researcher), 
with respect to this type of data recording, needs to be demonstrated. The 
researcher had worked on many research projects, which involved cases 
where data needed to be recorded for later analysis. This data recording 
was sometimes in the form of structured /  semi-structured interviews that 
could only be recorded manually, due to confidentiality of the system 
under analysis (ACTS project Memo, 1997). The researcher, thus, had 
previous expertise in recording and analysis of data from note taking. 
Future w ork would therefore involve validation of the EMCRS model by 
application to data from an actual disaster. It is believed, however, that the 
co-ordination design problems diagnosed by the EMCRS model have 
merit with respect to 'real7 EMCRS performance. The diagnosed co­
ordination design problems were discussed w ith the emergency planning 
research group at the Home Office, who were persuaded of their existence 
and importance.
Within the EMCRS data, there were further potential behaviour conflicts, 
that could have been diagnosed as co-ordination design problems by the 
EMCRS model; for example, it is not only the Fire Service w ho tram ple the 
site, and thus do not preserve the crime scene, but also the Ambulance 
Service. Future work could use the EMCRS m odels to diagnose other 
potential design problems, and propose potential solutions to these 
problems.
The extensions to the scope of the HCI-PCMT fram ework have been 
discussed above. The extensions are related to the differences in the 
characteristics of the EMCRS system and the previous systems modelled 
by the HCI-PCMT framework. Each difference was identified as an issue 
for the framework, and solutions were proposed for each issue, which 
were implemented in the final EMCRS Model 2. There m ay be other 
solutions to these issues. Using a time-line and a + for additional 
structures was the solution implemented here, for representing a changing 
worksystem. W ithin the current research, this solution was seen as
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adequate mainly for model representation purposes, but also with respect 
to the level of detail of the data. More realistic data would involve more 
detailed model representation of the physical worksystem structures, and 
the changes in the worksystem would be more dynamic, i.e. there could be 
changes every few minutes. Using a time-line and an + for representation 
of additional structures might, therefore, be unsuitable and so a different 
solution to this problem m ight be required. The solutions to another issue 
-  having input and output communication structures, for representing 
interactions within and between levels - is considered as a solution that 
would be expected to tolerate the test of real data. The reason is because 
this solution relates to the abstract description of the worksystem, and so 
more detailed data could be accommodated. More im portant in this 
solution is the representation of the different behaviours that are carried 
out by the different levels of command -  i.e. that the tactical level only 
perceive through the operational level, and that the execution behaviours 
are only carried out by the operational level. These abstract structure 
distributions across the command levels have a great importance in the 
EMCRS response management; for example, tactical level personnel 
should not get involved with operational level executions. If they do, then 
EMCRS m anagem ent will not be effective.
The last issue -  that of accurately expressing EMCRS performance, when 
there are trade-offs between different parts of the system, and its solution - 
to model each agency individually with respect to its plans, is seen as a 
suitable and robust solution. The EMCRS performance diagnoses with 
respect to the individual agency plans, enabled m ore detailed design 
problem specification, such that potential design solutions could be 
proposed. The EMCRS models and accompanying extension to the HCI- 
PCMT framework are viewed as substantive HCI knowledge to support 
directly, diagnosis of EMCRS design problems and, indirectly, 
prescription of design solutions. W ithout the Single Agency models, the 
diagnosed design problems could not be verified, as possible solutions 
could not have been proposed. Thus, w ithout this extension to the HCI- 
PCMT framework, verifiable diagnostic models of the EMCRS would not 
have been produced.
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9.4 Summary
This thesis has presented research, constituting HCI substantive design 
knowledge, in the form of models that support diagnosis of design 
problems and reasoning about solutions to these problems. Such models 
have been developed. The EMCRS models diagnose EMCRS coordination 
design problems and support reasoning about solutions to these problems. 
The models were developed through application of the HCI-PCMT 
framework to data obtained from EMCRS training exercises. The HCI- 
PCMT fram ework had to be extended for this application. The extensions 
to the fram ework are generalisable to other systems w ith similar 
characteristics to the EMCRS. To support co-ordination design problem 
diagnosis with the EMCRS models, a m ethod was proposed. This method 
is initial and m ust be further developed for operationalising and testing. 
However, it has been applied in the current research, albeit by the method 
developer, and thus, has been shown to aid in EMCRS model diagnoses. 
Future research would develop this m ethod for operationalisation, testing, 
generalisation and so validation. The EMCRS data gathered for this 
research were from training exercises. Future research w ould apply the 
extended HCI-PCMT framework to more realistic data to verify the 
EMCRS model diagnoses.
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Appendices 
Appendix 1
Exercise Scorpio Dataset 1
Raw data Comprehensive data
SECTION 1 View from single disciplinary 
syndicates
Consideration 2: likely problems to 
face organisations
1 Police problems The Police Service syndicate 
view  o f the likely problems 
facing the Police Service when 
responding to the major 
incident
Data 1 .1 a ) Major incident
declared so gold control set up.
Gold control is the strategic 
level of command -  once a 
major incident is declared a 
strategic level of command will 
be set-up (it m ay not actually be 
used). It is the police 
responsibility to co-ordinate the 
strategic roles of all the 
emergency services initially.
Data 1 .1 b ) Scene protection Police need to protect the scene 
as there is evidence of 
vandalism  and thus the scene is 
declared a crime scene so 
evidence will need to be 
gathered. (There is a difference 
between the 'scene' and the 
'site ' -  the 'site ' is the whole 
area involved and the 'scene' is 
the nucleus where the main 
problem s relating to the major 
incident are happening.)
Data 1 .1c) Scene access - chaos It will be difficult for the Police 
Service to control access to the 
scene, as the Fire Service will 
w ant to fight fires and the 
Ambulance Service w ant to get 
at the casualties.
Data 1.1 d) Public warnings As the incident is in a busy 
m arket tow n on m arket day it 
will be difficult to get 
information to the public.
Data 1.1 e) Helicopter landing site Where could the helicopter 
land? Problem to sort out a site.
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Data 1.1 f) Incident log - start 
early
Need to keep a log of the 
incident -  m ust start early as 
otherwise will not be able to 
keep track of the incident.
Data 1.1 g) Lack of information Chaos at the scene so 
information flow will be poor.
Data 1.1 h) Lack of resources Will not have enough resources 
from local area.
Data 1.1 i) Access to scene As there are fires and hazardous 
materials access to the scene will 
be difficult for the Police Service 
as they will not have protective 
clothing.
Data 1.1 j) Com m and structure Need to keep to the gold, silver, 
bronze (strategic, tactical, 
operational) command structure 
to ensure proper management 
of the situation, and to enable 
good co-ordination with the 
other services.
Data 1 .1 k ) Control room W here will the control room be 
located- setting up  is important.
Data 1.11) Support control room 
staff
Lots going on and the control 
room staff are going to get very 
stressed, so will need support.
Data 1 .1m ) Information overload 
on phones - use BT RAYNET
BT RAYNET stands for the 
Radio Am ateurs Emergency 
N etw ork Ltd. RAYNET is a 
national voluntary organisation 
of licensed Radio Amateurs 
who provide additional 
communication facilities for the 
emergency services, public 
utilities and Government 
departm ents. It is a specialist 
system of communications that 
can be used by the emergency 
services in a major incident 
situation.
Data 1.1 n) Co-ordination of other 
services - roles and 
responsibilities
Police Service are responsible 
for co-ordination of the 
response -  need to make sure 
know which roles and 
responsibilities each Police 
officer has so that they can 
control the co-ordination w ith 
the other services.
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Data 1.1 o) Evacuation - advice 
needed from fire and others
There are general public in the 
buildings surrounding the 
scene; as there is potential for 
further explosions, need to 
evacuate these people, but get 
advice from the Fire Service for 
best means, routes for 
evacuation. Liaise with the 
Ambulance Service about 
evacuees who may be house 
bound etc.
Data 1.1 p) Casualty clearance/ 
num bers
Casualties, as a generic term for 
Police purposes, fall into the 
categories of uninjured, injured, 
survivors, and deceased. The 
Police Service are responsible 
for clearing all these people, 
including recording their 
details, and at this incident there 
are a lot of casualties so this will 
be problematic.
Data 1.1 q) Sightseers- control Difficult to keep sightseers 
away.
Data 1.1 r) Equipm ent Will need equipm ent that is not 
already available, for specialist 
tasks.
Data 1 .1 s) Media Keeping the m edia informed so 
that they will not get in the way 
of the services. They are still 
bound to be a problem.
Data 1 .1 1) W here should the 
RVP's go? Leaking fuel and 
running fires
An RVP is a Rendezvous point. 
The Police Service need to set 
up  RVP's for the ambulances, 
police cars and fire appliances 
that arrive at the site. It is a 
problem  w here they should go 
due to the leaking fuels and 
running fires.
Data 1.1 u) Mobility of cordon May need to move the cordon, 
which will be a problem  as extra 
personnel will be needed and 
deciding where to move it will 
be difficult.
Data 1. 1 v) Scale of incident time 
span resource allocation
W orking out the resources 
required, over w hat time span, 
need to be based on the scale of 
the incident which will be 
difficult to w ork out at the 
beginning.
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Data 1.1 w) Vehicle removal Having to remove vehicles, 
potentially damaged could be a 
problem as need to keep access 
and egress routes clear for the 
other services. Also need to 
remove vehicles to return to 
normality the disaster site. Will 
need to get the vehicle removal 
units on site soon.
Data 1.1 x) Coroner Need to get hold of a coroner. 
This may take some time - until 
the Coroner has arrived bodies 
cannot be moved.
Data 1.1 y) Senior investigation 
officer m anage crime scene
As it is a crime scene will need a 
senior investigation officer from 
the British Transport Police to 
m anage the crime scene who 
may not be available 
immediately.
Data 1. 1 z) Safety of officers Officers will not have the 
correct protective equipm ent to 
start w ith and will be required 
to help w ith rescue and may get 
hurt.
2 Police view  o f  problems facing other 
emergency services.
The Police syndicate view o f the 
problems facing the other 
emergency services response.
Data 1.3 a) Access in and out of 
the scene
Ambulances not only need to 
get in to the scene bu t need to 
get out. Fire Service vehicles 
need to get to the scene and 
need good access.
Data 1.3 b) M arshalling area W here the m arshalling area is 
situated m ay not be ideal for the 
other services.
Data 1.3 c) Lack of information All services will at the 
beginning be uniform ed about 
the situation
Data 1.3 d) Communications Communication between and 
within services will be 
problematic until proper 
communications systems are 
set-up and even then 
communications are often a 
problem.
Data 1. 3 e) Num bers of casualties There are m any casualties who 
need to be seen to.
Data 1. 3 f) Safe area for casualties Finding a safe area for casualties 
will be a problem  due to the 
fires and leaking fuels.
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Data 1. 3 g) Ambulance Service 
conflict w ith Fire Service re 
safety clothing etc. (similar 
problem s for the Police Service 
too)
The Fire Service set-up an inner 
fire cordon to protect all 
personnel. No-one will be 
allowed access without 
regulation safety requirements 
as specified by the Fire Service.
Data 1. 3 h) Flow of information Flow of information within a 
service will be problematic due 
to the chaos at the scene.
Data 1. 3 i) Escalation of the 
incident
As there are fires, and leaking 
fuels, the incident is likely to 
escalate.
3 Police conflict w ith  other agencies. The Police Service syndicate 
view  o f the Police Service 
conflicts w ith  the other 
agencies.
D ata 1. 3 j) Scene preservation/ 
fire exiting
The Police Service w ant to 
preserve the scene as it is a 
scene of crime. The Fire Service 
w hen they are exiting the scene 
will tram ple the site and cause 
damage.
Data 1 .3  k) Evidence gathering The Police Service w ant to be 
able to gather evidence to 
ascertain the cause of the 
incident. The Fire and 
Ambulance Services will be 
tram pling the scene w hen they 
are dealing w ith the casualties 
and the fires etc.
Data 1.31) W itness/ casualties The Police Service w ant to make 
sure that they have information 
about all potential witnesses so 
that they will be able to find out 
the cause of the incident. These 
witnesses m ay be casualties and 
be transported to hospitals 
before the Police Service can 
record their personal 
information in the casualty 
bureau.
4 Fire Service problems The Fire Service syndicate view  
o f the likely problems facing the 
Fire Service when responding to 
the major incident.
Data 1.4 a) Explosion - plum e There is a p lum e of smoke from 
the initial explosion, which will 
causes visibility difficulties. 
Aviation fuel is not explosive, 
bu t the fumes are.
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Data 1.4 b) Health and safety 
issues
Fire Service are responsible for 
safety of all emergency service 
personnel within the inner 
cordon.
Data 1 .4  c) Communication 
w ithin agency and with other 
agencies
Communications will be 
problematic due to the chaos of 
the incident initially
Data 1. 4 d) Fire fighting and 
escalation prevention
Will need a lot of Fire 
Servicemen and Fire appliances 
to control the fire and to prevent 
escalation of the disaster, which 
will not be available straight 
away.
Data 1. 4 e) Controlling resources - 
water, m arshalling - m aintain 
norm al service
Deciding which resources are 
required where, w hat available 
water there is, and marshalling 
the vehicles will be problematic. 
M aintaining normal services 
elsewhere will be problematic as 
many Fire personnel and 
appliances will be required for 
the incident.
Data 1. 4 f) Cordons access 
controls - w ho sets them  up, 
need early inter-service talks
There can be different cordons 
set up  and who controls them 
should be discussed. If the 
Police Service have control it 
can be problematic for the Fire 
Service for access.
Data 1. 4 g) Prim ary priority fire 
get dragged off to casualties
The Fire Service prim ary 
priority is to fight the fire, but 
they will get dragged off to the 
casualties to rescue them from 
areas the Ambulance Service 
cannot reach.
D a ta l .4 h )  Floating fuel on the 
river
The fuel will be an 
environm ental hazard that the 
Fire Service are responsible for 
sorting out.
Data 1. 4 i) Bleve risk w ind speed 
and direction
Need to find out the w ind 
speed and direction as there is a 
risk of a 'bleve' -blowing of the 
explosion plum e - which will 
cause contamination and cause 
problem s for all services health 
and safety.
Data 1. 4 j) Life saving and fire 
fighting
Need to fight the fires bu t also 
help save life conflict as to 
which resources to p u t for 
which role.
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Data 1.4 k) Evacuation - safety Need to make sure that people 
can be evacuated safely and this 
is the responsibility of the Fire 
Service.
Data 1.41) W ater/foam  supplies There are a lot of fires which 
will need water to pu t them out, 
where will the water come from. 
Foam can be used for the 
aviation fuel, but it will need to 
be supplied from somewhere.
Data 1 .4  m) Com m and and control 
issues -  forw ard and sector - 
liaison
There will be forward and 
sector controls, who is in 
command can be a problem will 
need close liaison.
Data 1. 4 n) Assistance to other 
services during early stages 
lim ited to silver control
As the fire will be priority at the 
early stages the first Fire Service 
personnel on site will need to 
focus on this and will not be 
able to assist the other services. 
Silver control is the tactical 
level, or in this case the Incident 
officer.
Data 1. 4 o) Site preservation for 
evidence and inquiries
The fire needs to be controlled 
as does the aviation fuel and in 
so doing the Fire Service will 
tram ple the site. The Fire 
Service need to try and keep 
tram pling to a m inim um  so that 
the site is preserved for 
evidence. This will cause 
problem s for the Fire Service as 
keeping tram pling to a 
m inim um  will reduce their 
perform ance w ith respect to 
controlling the fires etc.
Data 1. 4 p) Fire fighting and 
escalation prevention
Will need lots of personnel in 
order to fight the fire and 
prevent escalation of the 
disaster, which will be a 
problem  at the beginning.
Data 1. 4 q) Access to incident 
sites, road and rail problems for 
evacuation
As the incident is on a railway 
line that cuts the m ain road in 
half, getting access at the 
required incident sites will be 
difficult especially for 
evacuation
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Data 1. 4 r) Cordons need safe 
working area, identify whether 
safe for other emergency services 
to operate
Fire Service are responsible for 
safety of all emergency services 
at the scene. An inner fire 
cordon is set-up to protect 
personnel. Emergency service 
personnel other than Fire 
Service will not be allowed 
access unless the Fire Service 
believe that the area is safe for 
them to work.
5 Fire Service view  o f the main  
problems facing the other services.
The Fire Service syndicate view  
o f the main problems facing the 
other services in response to the 
exercise.
Data 1.5 a) Site preservation for 
evidence and inquiries difficult 
for Police Service
The Police Service will find it 
hard to preserve the site as the 
Fire Service will be trampling 
the site w hen fire fighting etc.
Data 1.5 b) Police crime
investigation people, evacuation 
of the area
The Police crime investigation 
people will find it hard to gather 
evidence due to the chaos of the 
scene. Evacuation by the Police 
Service will be difficult due to 
the hazards at the incident.
6 Fire Service conflict w ith  other 
agencies.
The Fire Service syndicate view  
o f the Fire Service conflicts w ith  
other agencies.
Data 1.6 a) Health and safety 
problems -  identify w hether safe 
for other emergency service 
personnel to operate w ithin the 
cordon
Fire Service are responsible for 
the safety of all emergency 
service personnel at the scene. 
Due to the hazards for the other 
services they need the right 
level of safety equipm ent to 
enter the cordon as.
Data 1.6 b) Site preservation for 
evidence and enquiries
The Fire Service will be 
tram pling the site and 
destroying evidence so that the 
Police Service will have 
problem s w ith evidence 
gathering.
7 Ambulance problems The Ambulance Service 
syndicate view  o f  the likely  
problems facing the Ambulance 
Service when responding to the 
major incident.
Data 1.7 a) Communications Problems w ith communications 
w ithin the Ambulance Service.
Data 1 .7  b) Forward control of 
Ambulance Service where?
Due to the hazards it will be 
problematic to find a good site 
for the Ambulance Service 
forward control.
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Data 1. 7 c) Movement,
destination and priority of pick- 
up
Problems w ith the movement of 
Ambulances, deciding priority 
of pick-up of casualties and the 
destination hospitals. Need 
forward control set-up to co­
ordinate.
Data 1. 7 d) Basics medical support 
not available in all areas
British Association of 
Immediate Care Schemes - 
BASICS is a voluntary national 
organisation consisting of 
groups of doctors and 
individual doctors providing 
immediate medical care 
throughout the country. BASICS 
doctors can be called out by any 
of the emergency services 24 
hours a day, 365 days a year via 
locally agreed contact points. 
N ot necessarily available in all 
areas.
Data 1. 7 e) M anpower - A & E 
crews available, 50% of resources 
already committed
There will be some accident and 
emergency crews available, but 
50% of all ambulance resources 
are already committed so 
getting enough m anpow er will 
be a problem.
Data 1. 7 f) Non emergency crews 
(skill, training, stress, health and 
safety)
N on emergency crews can be 
used, bu t there are problems 
w ith their skill level, training, 
stress and their health and 
safety.
Data 1. 7 g) Availability and
experience of others - Red Cross, 
St John's ambulance
Red cross and St John's 
ambulance m ay be available, 
bu t not necessarily and if they 
are they m ay not have the right 
experience.
D a ta l .7 h )  Staff safety at scene There are lots of hazards at the 
scene and the ambulance staff 
probably do not have the right 
level of safety equipm ent so 
safety will be a problem.
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Data 1. 7 i) Inter-agency
communications and control of 
site access
Although there are 
communication systems set-up 
for all the services to 
communicate between each 
other, the communication can 
still be problematic, and 
information not flowing 
helpfully. Ambulances need 
good site access, to get in and 
get out to transport casualties 
and they need the control of the 
site access to be sensible.
SECTION 2 View from multi-disciplinary 
syndicates
Consideration 3: co-ordination of 
response
8 Media
Data 1.8 a) Policy Policy for dealing w ith the 
m edia needs to specified early 
on.
Data 1.8 b) Interim statem ent Interim statem ent produced for 
the media.
Data 1.8 c) Vantage points Vantage points for the media 
decided upon.
Data 1. 8 d) Media centre - where? W here should the media centre 
be?
Data 1. 8 e) Regular m eetings Hold regular meetings with the 
media.
Data 1. 8 f) Co-ordinated press 
releases
Co-ordinate press releases.
Data 1. 8 g) Access to site Should access to the site be 
allowed for the media?
Data 1. 8 h) Liaison officers Allocate liaison officers to deal 
w ith the media.
9 Cordons
Data 1.9 a) inner cordon - police? 
Fire?
Cordons - inner cordon who 
should be responsible, Police or 
Fire? (An inner cordon is set up  
by the Fire Service.)
Data 1.9 b) outer cordon -traffic 
diversions
O uter cordon set up  by the 
Police Service w ith traffic 
diversions required.
10 evacuation and assem bly areas
Data 1.10 a) Safe place for initial 
removal
Require a safe place for initial 
removal.
Data 1.10 b) Records needed - 
names and addresses
Need to get nam es and 
addresses of everyone for 
records.
Data 1.10 c) Possible longer term 
accommodation needs
Need to find places for possible 
longer term  accommodation 
needs.
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11 Survivors, friends and relatives 
reception centres
Data 1.11 a) Separate locations Need to have separate locations 
for survivors and friends and 
relatives.
Data 1 .11b) Log in and log out 
names and addresses
Everyone m ust be logged in and 
out w ith names and addresses.
Data 1.11 c) Security - media 
infiltration
Require security to sop media 
infiltration.
Data 1.11 d) Docum entation who 
records
Need to have specialist 
docum entation teams.
Data 1.11 e) Telephones Set-up of telephones is a 
priority.
12 Access - M arshalling rendezvous 
points
Data 1.12 a) Safety Need to make sure that all 
access, m arshalling and 
rendezvous points are safe.
Data 1.12 b) Helicopter landing 
Medevac
Need a helicopter landing site 
for Medevac (medical evacuees).
Data 1.12 c) Large area think Big Need a large area for 
m arshalling and rendezvous, 
bigger than you think.
Data 1.12 d) Good access -protected 
routes if possible
Routes which provide good 
access and are not through 
danger zones are preferable.
13 casualty clearing
Data 1.13 a) Receiving station close 
to site - triage
Need a receiving station for 
casualties close to the site where 
triage of casualties can take 
place.
Data 1.13 b) Ambulance loading 
point
Need to set up  a loading point 
for ambulances.
Data 1.13 c) Body holding - police 
responsibility, death 
confirmation, followed later by 
death certification
Need a body holding area 
controlled by the Police Service, 
to hold bodies once they have 
been confirmed dead, and 
before death  certification.
14 Body holding area
Data 1.14 a) No m ortuary
procedures are carried out here
Need a body holding area set 
up, bu t this is just an area for 
bodies not for m ortuary 
procedures.
15 temporary mortuary
Data 1.15 a) Full m ortuary
procedures are carried out here
Need to set up a tem porary 
m ortuary where full m ortuary 
procedures can be carried out
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Appendix 2
Exercise Scorpio Dataset 2
Raw data Comprehensive data
Consideration 1: organisations and 
their roles/responsibilities
View from  m ulti 
disciplinary syndicates.
Data 2. A 1) Fire Service standard pre­
determ ined attendance for a train 
crash
Fire Service initial response is 
the pre-determ ined response 
for a train crash.
Data 2. A 2) Cordon Police 
responsible w ho else help?
Police responsible for cordon 
will Fire Service help too?
Data 2. A 3) Rescue Fire 3 pum ps and 
an emergency rescue tender
Three w ater pum ps for 
fighting the fire and an 
emergency rescue vehicle for 
rescue
Data 2. A 4) Police RVP, cordon, 
access and egress, docum ent 
anyone leaving
Police are responsible for the 
rendezvous points, cordon, 
access and egress to the site 
and m ust docum ent anyone 
coming in and leaving.
Data 2. A 5) Ambulance mobilise as 
many vehicles as possible and 
many senior people. RV point not 
direct to scene sorted by senior 
officer.
Ambulance Service will need 
as m any vehicles as possible 
and will need senior people 
to co-ordinate the operation. 
A rendezvous point should 
be sorted by a senior officer 
for Am bulances outside the 
scene.
Data 2. A 6) W iden cordon Due to hazards, and num ber 
of people w ho will need to be 
w ithin the cordon, the cordon 
will need to be widened.
Data 2. A 7) Fire - im m ediate rescue 
and control of fire
The Fire Service are 
responsible for immediate 
rescue and control of the fire.
Data 2. A 8) Ambulance holding area, 
casualty control
N eed an Ambulance holding 
area as will not w ant all 
ambulances at scene at once, 
so can control the m ovem ent 
of casualties.
Data 2. A 9) National rivers and water 
authority
Need to inform the national 
rivers and w ater authority as 
there is aviation fuel running 
into the canal and the river.
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Data 2. A 10) Fire cordon explosion 
(600m) 100m structural damage
Set up  fire cordon by the Fire 
Service one for protection 
from explosion at 600m and 
one for protection from 
structural damage at 100m 
from the nucleus of the 
incident.
Data 2. A 11) Police scene m anagem ent Police Service are responsible 
for m anagem ent of all the 
services within the scene.
Data 2. A 12) Ambulance casualty 
collecting point - triage, ambulance 
rendezvous point distinct so that 
they can get away quick.
Need an ambulance casualty 
collecting point where triage 
is taking place and an 
ambulance rendezvous point 
which is at a separate location 
so m ovem ent of ambulances 
is efficient.
Data 2. A 13) Ambulance squads 
cascade calling system
Set up  cascade calling system 
to alert ambulance squads.
Data 2. A 14) Social services support 
team at hospitals
Request social service 
support teams at hospitals.
Data 2. A 15) Declare major incident 
after 15 minutes
Major incident declared after 
15 m inutes of assessment (the 
type of incident, the num ber 
of casualties and the chaos at 
the incident site have lead to 
the major incident being 
declared).
Data 2. A 16) Coroner Need to inform the coroner of 
the incident as h e /sh e  will 
have to confirm victims are 
dead before the bodies can be 
moved.
Data 2. A 17) Environmental agencies -  
environmental experts
Need environm ental agencies 
involved as there are 
environm ental hazards and 
the expertise of these 
agencies will be required.
Data 2. A 18) Local authority technical 
services
Need local authority technical 
services to be activated to aid 
in the response.
Data 2. A 19) Hospital support 
team s/ other
Hospital support teams and 
other hospital teams need to 
be set-up.
B) Police response View from  m ulti-disciplinary  
groups
Data 2. B 1) 1 person assess situation The first person on the scene 
m ust assess the situation and 
pass information to the Police 
Service, but m ust not get 
involved in any response to 
the situation.
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Data 2. B 2) Major incident - cordon 
(initial) controllable w ith num ber of 
people got access to and from.
Major incident declared, an 
initial cordon m ust be set-up 
to control access to and egress 
from the incident site.
Data 2. B 3) Crime scene - witness 
and possibly scene m anagem ent 
offenders
Due to the potential of 
vandalism causing the 
incident the scene m ust be 
treated as a crime scene. 
Need to treat all at the scene 
as witnesses. Need to be 
aware of scene management 
offenders and protect the 
scene.
Data 2. B 4) More people w iden 
cordon.
As m ore people arrive at the 
site m ust w iden cordon to 
allow access.
Data 2. B 5) Emergency Services RVP. Set-up the emergency 
services rendezvous point.
Data 2. B 6) Two marshalling areas 
for a through flow
Set-up two marshalling areas 
for a through flow of 
emergency service vehicles.
Data 2. B 7) Below canal 1 RVP One rendezvous point 
situated below the canal.
Data 2. B 8) Make sure ambulance 
have access
Need to make sure that the 
Ambulance Service have 
access to the site to collect 
casualties.
Data 2. B 9) RVP for changing crews 
over - incident control police keep 
flow going
Set-up a (RVP) rendezvous 
point for changing over 
crews. Make sure that the 
flow of emergency crews is 
controlled, to keep response 
to incident stable.
Data 2. B 10) Ambulance holding area 
a distance away.
Set-up an ambulance holding 
area a distance away from the 
scene to allow easy access 
and egress for ambulances
C Fire response View from  single disciplinary 
groups
Data 2. C 1) Stem flow of ruptured  
tanks
Stop the flow of aviation fuel 
from the rup tu red  tanks on 
the train.
Data 2. C 2) Reconnaissance need 
other assistance
Will need help from the 
Police Service to survey the 
scene and ascertain w hat 
response is needed.
Data 2. C 3) Establish route and 
marshalling area
Need to w ork out best route 
for Fire Service vehicles for 
best access to the scene, and a 
m arshalling area that 
coincides w ith the route
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Data 2. C 4) Liaise w ith the Police 
Service w ith the assistance of safe 
routes
Need to let the Police Service 
know which routes to the 
scene are safe.
Data 2. C 5) Inner cordon Set-up an inner fire cordon to 
protect emergency service 
personnel and others from 
injury.
Data 2. C 6) Evacuation of residents 
w ith local police
Need to carry out the 
evacuation of local residents 
will need information from 
the local Police as to which 
residents need evacuation 
and the local Police will also 
help in the evacuation.
Data 2. C 7) Involved w ith rescue 
liaise w ith the Ambulance Service
Will need to be involved in 
rescue of casualties, will need 
to liaise w ith the Ambulance 
Service to find out how they 
can help.
Data 2. C 8) Stemming the flow N eed to stop the flow of 
aviation fuel.
Data 2. C 9) RTA 4 bronze 
commanders
Road traffic accident requires 
4 Bronze commanders
Data 2. C 10) Fire station silver control 
point
Set-up silver control (tactical 
level of operations) at the fire 
station.
Data 2. C 11) Ambulance quick liaison 
with Fire Service of the num ber of 
casualties
Am bulance Service need to 
liaise w ith the Fire Service 
quickly to find out the 
num ber of casualties so the 
num ber of ambulances 
required and receiving 
hospitals can be informed.
Consideration 2: likely  problem s to  
face organisations
View from  single 
disc ip linary groups.
1 Police problems
Data 2.1 a) Major incident declared 
so gold control set up.
It is the Police Service 
responsibility at a major 
incident to initially co­
ordinate the strategic roles 
(gold control) of all the 
emergency services and other 
organisations involved.
Data 2.1 b) M anpower m utual aid 
from neighbouring forces
Will need a lot of m anpow er 
- the local force will not have 
enough personnel so requests 
will need to be m ade to 
neighbouring forces for help.
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Data 2.1 c) Evidence gathering and 
preservation
As the scene is now a crime 
scene will need to preserve 
the scene so that evidence can 
be gathered.
Data 2.1 d) Support control room 
staff
Lots going on and the control 
room staff are going to get 
very stressed, so will need 
support.
Data 2.1 e) Com munications -  scene. 
Access overload BT RAYNET
Communication at the scene 
will be problematic. If there 
is access overload on the 
communication channels then 
BT RAYNET can be 
contacted. RAYNET stands 
for: Radio Amateurs 
Emergency N etw ork Ltd. 
RAYNET is a national 
voluntary organisation of 
licensed Radio Amateurs who 
provide additional 
comm unication facilities for 
the emergency services, 
public utilities and 
G overnm ent departm ents.
Data 2.1 f) Control of traffic and 
crowd control (public order)
Problems w ith traffic control 
especially as the incident has 
effectively cut the town in 
half, and need to divert non­
emergency traffic away from 
the scene. Crowd control may 
be a problem.
Data 2.1 g) Evacuation hazards - 
advice needed from fire and others
There are general public in 
the buildings surrounding 
the scene, as there is potential 
for further explosions, need 
to evacuate these people, bu t 
m ust find ou t from the Fire 
Service best m eans and 
routes for evacuation, and 
liaise w ith the Ambulance 
Service w ith regards any 
evacuees w ho m ay be house 
bound etc.
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Data 2.1 h) Casualty bureau set up Need to find a suitable place 
to set-up the casualty bureau. 
The purpose of the Casualty 
Bureau is to provide a central 
contact and information point 
for all records and data 
relating to persons who have, 
or w ho are believed to have 
been, involved in an incident. 
It has three fundam ental 
tasks: to obtain relevant 
information on the persons 
involved, or potentially 
involved; to process that 
information; and to provide 
accurate information to 
relatives and friends, the 
Investigating Officer and 
H.M. Coroner.
Data 2.1 i) Casualty clearance Casualties, as a generic term 
for police purposes, fall into 
the categories of uninjured, 
injured, survivors, and 
deceased. The Police Service 
are responsible for clearing 
all these people, including 
recording their details, and at 
this incident there are a lot of 
casualties so this will be 
problematic.
Data 2.1 j) Control of scene and 
elsewhere
Police Service are responsible 
for keeping control -  this will 
be problem atic as the scene is 
complex w ith lots of hazards, 
and the site is in the m iddle 
of a busy town.
Data 2.1 k) RVP's possibly 2? Possibly set-up two 
rendezvous points -  one 
either side of the incident so 
emergency vehicles can have 
easier access and egress.
Data 2.11) Press liaison (PRO) Need to set-up press liaison 
early to keep the press 
informed, to stop the press 
from being a nuisance.
Data 2.1 m) Coroner N eed to get hold of a 
Coroner. This m ay take some 
time - until the Coroner has 
arrived bodies cannot be 
moved.
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Data 2.1 n) Senior investigation 
officer m anage crime scene
As it is a crime scene will 
need a senior investigation 
officer from the British 
Transport Police to manage 
the crime scene who may not 
be available immediately.
Data 2.1 o) Welfare of own people at 
scene (Local authority rest centres)
Need to make sure that the 
officers at the scene are 
looked after -  find out where 
the local authority rest centre 
has been set-up and inform 
the personnel.
Data 2.1 p) International
implications Foreign embassies, 
interpreters foreign office, VIP to 
scene
As there were foreign tourists 
on the bus, this incident has 
international implications, so 
the foreign embassies will 
need to be contacted, 
interpreters found and VIPs 
m ay arrive at the scene who 
will have to be managed.
Data 2.1 q) Finance w ho pays? Strategic com m and need to 
w ork out w ho is paying for 
the emergency response 
resources etc.
Data 2.1 r) International body 
handling people (KENYONS)
For international body 
handling the KENYONS can 
be contacted. The Kenyon 
Emergency Service are 
specialist funeral directors 
w ith experience in operating 
at the scene of disasters, 
where the death toll is high.
Data 2.1 s) Consider hospitals - give 
hospital reception teams
Need to send hospital 
reception teams to the 
hospitals nom inated as 
receiving hospitals for the 
major incident.
Data 2 .1 1) Major incident advisory 
team
Contact the major incident 
advisory team, w ho will give 
guidance for operations, 
based on previous experience 
of major incidents. The team 
comprises police officers each 
of whom  has personally been 
responsible for certain 
operational aspects of 
disaster m anagem ent. The 
team will not take over the 
running of the disaster 
response, bu t just give 
advice.
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2 Police Service view  of problem s facing 
other em ergency services
Data 2. 2 a) Access in and out of the 
scene
Ambulances not only need to 
get in to the scene but need to 
get out. Fire Service vehicles 
need to get to the scene and 
need good access.
Data 2. 2 b) Resources It is a large incident and 
many resources are going to 
be required for all services 
which will be difficult to 
access.
3 Police Service conflict w ith  other 
agencies
Data 2. 3 a) Problems w ith 
m aintaining the site as a crime 
scene as the fire and ambulance 
crews need to rescue casualties and 
property will be dam aged.
The Police w ant to preserve 
the scene as a crime scene. 
The Fire and Ambulance 
Service need to rescue 
casualties and in so doing 
will dam age the evidence.
4 Fire Service problem s
Data 2. 4 a) Access: one R.V.P. either 
side of the bridge w ith control
As the incident has cut the 
town in half there will need 
to be two rendezvous points 
one either side of the bridge 
to enable good access.
Data 2. 4 b) R.V.P. initial and 1 hour 
into the incident
Will need to have an RVP 
initially and then move it 
after one hour into the 
incident as the RVP will be 
too close to the scene, and not 
a large enough area to cope 
w ith all emergency vehicles.
Data 2. 4 c) Control of the scene There are m any hazards at 
the scene which the Fire 
Service will have to control, 
which will be problematic 
until enough personnel and 
equipm ent are m ade 
available.
Data 2. 4 d) Health and safety of all in 
the scene
Fire Service are responsible 
for safety of all at the scene -  
this will be problem atic as 
the scene has m any hazards.
Data 2. 4 e) Communication within 
agency and with other agencies
Communications will be 
difficult due to the hazards 
and due to different 
communications used by 
each agency.
Data 2. 4 f) Casualty area Where should the casualty 
area be sited?
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Data 2. 4 g) Terrain and incidents 
over a w ide area
The terrain will be 
problematic, and there are 
separate incidents -  fires, 
running fuels, casualties 
under the bridge, which will 
all need controlling.
Data 2. 4 h) Environmental problem Aviation fuel can cause an 
environm ental problem, 
which the Fire Service will 
have to deal with.
Data 2. 4 i) Rescue The Fire Service will have to 
rescue people due to the 
hazards at the incident, which 
will take personnel from 
fighting the fires and 
controlling the other hazards 
at the scene.
Data 2. 4 j) M aintaining normal 
service -  need a multi brigade 
response -  alert other nearby 
agencies
A norm al Fire Service will 
need to be maintained. This 
incident will require a lot of 
resources, so other agencies 
will need to be alerted to 
help.
Data 2. 4 k) Incident control room 
(operations room)
Will need to set-up an 
incident control room to co­
ordinate the response.
Data 2. 4 1) Communications: Fire 
Service have different channels - 
need one person from each agency 
together
The Fire Service use different 
comm unication channels to 
the other services. To 
m aintain close liaison will 
need to physically have one 
person from each agency 
together, probably at the 
incident control post.
Data 2. 4 m) Foam dam age limitation 
units
If foam is used for the 
aviation fuel, then will need 
foam dam age limitation units 
to stop the foam from being 
an environm ental hazard.
Data 2. 4 n) Access for fire fighting 
and rescue
Need good access - the Police 
Service set-up the access 
points which will not 
necessarily be deem ed 
suitable by the Fire Service 
which will cause problems 
for the Fire Service response.
Data 2. 4 o) Health and safety for all 
(accountability for no's)
Fire Service are responsible 
for safety of all emergency 
service personnel within the 
inner cordon. N eed to log 
personnel in and out as are 
accountable for numbers.
207
Data 2. 4 p) Cordons - assistance may 
be needed
To control access to the inner 
fire cordon may need 
assistance from the Police 
Service.
Data 2. 4 q) Communications - inter 
agency command channel
Set-up inter agency command 
channel for communications 
between all the services.
Data 2. 4 r) Close liaison command 
and control/sector controls/ 
com m ander
Need close liaison between 
the different levels of control.
Data 2. 4 s) Environm ent issues and 
w ater authorities/ canal
There will be problems with 
the w ater and canal 
authorities w ith respect to the 
environmental issues of 
aviation fuel, and the foam 
for dealing w ith the fuel.
Data 2. 4 t) Media Keeping the m edia away 
from the scene will be 
problematic.
Data 2. 4 u) Decontamination areas 
fire-fighters and others
Need to set-up 
decontam ination areas but 
where to p u t them will be a 
problem.
Data 2. 4 v) Reduce risk of further 
chemical leak
Problem to stop the fuel from 
leaking from the other 
carriages.
Data 2. 4 w) Casualty handling/ help Will need to help with 
casualties which will take 
away resources for fire 
fighting etc.
Data 2. 4 x) Protective clothing Protective clothing will need 
to be w orn by all Fire Service 
personnel at the scene. There 
needs to be enough protective 
equipm ent for all personnel.
5 Fire Service view  of the main problems 
facing the other services
Data 2. 5 a) Ambulance Service going 
into hostile areas
Ambulance Service personnel 
will not be allowed access to 
hostile areas w ithout the 
correct protective equipment. 
Even w ith protective 
equipm ent it will be 
hazardous for the Ambulance 
Service personnel.
Data 2. 5 b) Ambulance Service
getting enough people at the scene,
There are a lot of casualties 
and therefore a lot of 
Ambulance personnel will be 
required this will be 
problematic as the personnel 
are not readily available.
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Data 2. 5 c) Ambulance Service no 
senior officers
Ambulance Service will have 
no senior officers at the scene 
initially (the Ambulance 
Service does not have that 
m any senior officers), which 
will cause a lack of co­
ordination of operations for 
the Ambulance Service.
Data 2. 5 d) Police crime investigation 
people, evacuation of the area
There will be problems for 
the Police crime investigation 
people due to tram pling of 
the site by the Fire and 
Ambulance personnel. 
Evacuation will also be a 
problem  for the Police due to 
num bers of evacuees, status 
of the evacuees and safe 
routes for evacuation.
6 Fire Service conflicts w ith other 
agencies
Data 2. 6 a) Preservation of the scene 
- trampling
The Police service will be 
trying to preserve the scene, 
the Fire Service will be 
tram pling the scene when 
carrying ou t their response.
Data 2. 6 b) Access of appliances Good access is needed for the 
fire appliances. The Police 
Service decide w here the 
access points will be which 
will not necessarily be where 
the Fire Service w ant them.
Data 2. 6 c) Safety of personnel, not 
necessarily equipped to the fire 
brigades satisfaction
The Fire Service are 
responsible for safety of all 
personnel at the scene, who 
will not necessarily have the 
right level of protective 
equipment, and will 
therefore, not be allowed 
access.
Data 2. 6 d) Inner cordon entrance 
and exit
The inner cordon entrance 
and exit will need to be 
controlled by Fire Service 
personnel. There will be 
people who w ant to have 
access who are not properly 
equipped and the Fire Service 
will have to m aintain control.
Data 2. 6 e) Tags etc. as responsible 
for those going in and out
Need to tag everyone going 
in and out of the cordon.
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Data 2. 6 f) Problem foam is an 
environmental hazard (use for the 
aviation fuel)
The foam that will be used to 
control the aviation fuel will 
cause environmental 
problems.
Data 2. 6 g) Decontamination of 
ambulances and people (conflict)
The Fire Service have 
decontamination equipm ent 
but do not see it as their 
responsibility to 
decontaminate ambulances 
and people who are not their 
own personnel, as they will 
need their personnel for 
carrying out other primary 
tasks.
7 Ambulance -  problems
Data 2. 7 a) Responsibility of all 
patients at the scene
The Ambulance Service are 
responsible for all patients at 
the scene. There are a lot of 
patients and there may be 
injury to others during the 
incident, who the Ambulance 
Service will also be 
responsible for.
Data 2. 7 b) Resourcing problems 
both of personnel and vehicles
Will need lots of resources 
which will not be readily 
available.
Data 2. 7 c) Liaison at the scene Liaison at the scene will be 
problematic due to a lack of 
senior ambulance officers.
Data 2. 7 d) Forward controls Forward controls will need 
senior officers, who will not 
be readily available.
Data 2. 7 e) Safety at the scene - 
maintain life get the casualties out
Need to keep Ambulance 
personnel safe, bu t also need 
to m aintain life by getting the 
casualties out. Ambulance 
personnel will not necessarily 
have specialist safety 
equipment.
Data 2. 7 f) Getting medics to the 
scene not involved with transport 
of the injured
Will need to get medics to the 
scene extra to Ambulance 
personnel, who will need to 
be alerted and transported.
Data 2. 7 g) Maintaining normal 
service - day care patients etc.
, .... .......................................................................... ..... .. ..................................................... .. ,
This incident will require a 
lot of personnel and 
equipment, bu t normal 
services will need to be 
m aintained as well which 
will be difficult
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Data 2. 7 h) Decontamination of 
casualties before they are p u t in the 
ambulance
Need to decontaminate 
casualties before they are put 
in an ambulance, otherwise 
the ambulance will become 
contaminated and will be out 
of action for the rest of the 
incident.
Data 2. 7 i) Access Need suitable access for 
ambulances where casualties 
can be loaded. The Police 
decide the access positions 
which m ay not be suitable 
from the Ambulance Services 
perspective.
Data 2. 7 j) Co-ordination of 
volunteers - Red Cross, St John's 
ambulance
Co-ordination of volunteers 
will require personnel who 
are potentially required for 
other tasks.
Data 2. 7 k) Names and addresses of 
casualties
Recording names and 
addresses of casualties can be 
problematic when the 
casualties are severely injured 
and with lack of personnel to 
record the information on 
site.
Data 2. 71) Space to work Will need space to triage 
patients, and treat if 
necessary which could be 
problematic at this incident 
due to the incident location.
Data 2. 7 m) Safety at scene - advice 
from Fire Service
Need to keep personnel safe 
at the scene -  will need to 
take advice from the Fire 
Service about where it will be 
safe for personnel to work.
8 Ambulance Service view of problems 
facing other emergency services
Data 2. 8 a) Injury to Fire Service and 
others
Due to the hazards at the 
scene the Fire Service and 
other emergency personnel 
may be injured.
Data 2. 8 b) Evacuation of buildings 
may have bedridden people so 
need to help police
The Police Service are 
responsible for evacuation. 
There may be bed-ridden 
evacuees, whom the Police 
need to help in evacuating.
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Data 2. 8 c) Assist people to casualty 
bureau
The Police and Fire Services 
may need to assist people to 
the casualty bureau, which 
will take personnel away 
from carrying out more 
im portant tasks.
Data 2. 8 d) Keeping ambulances out 
of the way but need access
The Police Service will need 
to keep the Ambulances out 
of the way, but still allow 
access.
9 Ambulance Service conflicts w ith  other 
services
Data 2. 9 a) Sensible restrictions in 
the inner cordon
Need access to the inner 
cordon to rescue/ triage 
casualties. If the restrictions 
set-up by the Fire Service are 
too severe, then the 
Ambulance Service personnel 
will not conform to the 
recom mended safety 
requirements and therefore, 
will not be allowed access.
Data 2. 9 b) Decontamination There will be contaminated 
casualties and others at the 
scene. The casualties will 
need decontaminating before 
they are taken from the scene, 
otherwise ambulances, and 
Ambulance Service 
personnel, will become 
contaminated, as will 
receiving hospitals who 
receive contaminated 
casualties. Any contaminated 
vehicle, or hospital will be put 
out of action for the whole 
incident. The Fire Service 
have the decontamination 
equipm ent so will need to 
carry out the
decontamination. The Fire 
Service see their 
decontamination equipm ent 
as use for their own 
personnel, and will be too 
busy carrying out their own 
response to the incident to 
carry out decontamination of 
others.
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Consideration 3: co-ordination of 
response 10
Data 2.10 a) Incident officers -  meet 
every two hours, share core 
information, agree plan, produce 
minutes.
The tactical level officers for 
all services should meet every 
two hours to share 
information and agree a co­
ordinated plan. Minutes 
m ust be produced.
Data 2.10 b) Standing down after 4 
hours
After 4 hours the services will 
be able to stand down from 
their major disaster position.
Data 2.10 c) Need bronze/forw ard 
control
Need control at an 
operational/forw ard (bronze) 
level, to ensure co-ordination 
of operations.
Data 2.10 d) ACO not go to the scene Ambulance Commanding 
Officer not go to the scene.
Data 2.10 e) Incident control points -  
outside inner, inside outer cordon.
There should be incident 
control points set-up outside 
the inner cordon but inside 
the outer cordon.
Data 2.10 f) Inner cordon -  canal The inner cordon should be 
set-up at the canal.
Data 2.10 g) Outer cordon rd junction The outer cordon should be 
set-up at the road junction.
Data 2.10 h) 2 marshalling areas There should be two 
marshalling areas set-up.
Data 2.10 i) Rendezvous points to 
book in and out
There should be two 
rendezvous points, m ust book 
everyone in and out of the 
points.
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